




UNITED NATIONS
UKRAINE



UKRAINE COMMON COUNTRY ANALYSIS 2023



Data and analysis as of August 2023



UNITED NATIONS UKRAINE



Resident



Non-Resident



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United Nations Entities Operating in Ukraine

Resident United Nations Entities

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Non-Resident United Nations Entities

ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization

Acronyms

CCA	Common Country Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LGBTQIA+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex and Asexual +
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UAH	Ukrainian Hryvnia (<i>currency</i>)
UN	United Nations
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
US\$	United States Dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

1. Executive Summary

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulted in massive internal displacement, movement of millions of Ukrainians out of the country, mass civilian casualties, as well as widespread damage and destruction to civilian infrastructure, with long-term consequences for Ukraine's sustainable development trajectory. Prior to 2022, Ukraine had made substantial progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), though significant challenges persisted in various areas. However, the ongoing war has severely undermined these advancements, necessitating a drastic reorientation of the Government of Ukraine's priorities. The government's focus has shifted towards defence, direct budget support, humanitarian response, reconstruction, and recovery.

The war in Ukraine is one of the largest and most complex humanitarian crises in the world today. The **humanitarian situation** has deteriorated drastically, rendering 14.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2024, an increase from just over 3 million people prior to the full-scale invasion. An estimated 5.9 million Ukrainian fled to Europe as refugees, with a further 362,000 elsewhere in the world, 5.1 million people have been internally displaced, marking the beginning of a refugee crisis of unparalleled scale since World War II. Frequent missiles, air strikes and loitering munitions regularly launched by the Russian Federation across the country, and especially close to the over 1000 km frontline, every day continue to cause multitude of devastating consequences, including the loss of lives, the destruction of infrastructure, and the significant disruption of economy and livelihoods.

The **human rights** situation is dire amid the ongoing conflict — particularly in areas of ongoing military hostilities and territories under the control of the Russian Federation — resulting in a wide range of violations by the Russian Federation affecting both civilians and combatants. In the temporary occupied territories, cases of arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment, conflict-related sexual violence, forced deportation and transfer of population, including children, and unlawful destruction and appropriation of property by the Russian Federation, amongst other violations, continue to be documented (*SDG 16*). Ethnic minorities, especially marginalized Roma, faced unfair treatment and threat of violence. The war has also imposed significant difficulties in accessing economic and social rights and caused significant harm to cultural rights with millions of Ukrainians now displaced or having lost their livelihood. Equal access to economic and social rights such as the right to water, housing, health, education and decent jobs is difficult for millions of Ukrainians. There is significant evidence that cultural infrastructure and assets have been damaged or destroyed, artists and creators have lost their livelihoods, and access to culture and enjoyment of cultural rights has been impeded by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Immediately following the full-scale invasion, the President of Ukraine issued a decree imposing martial law, which therefore prohibits the holding of elections and limits various constitutional guarantees, including freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and property rights. Despite this, Ukraine's **civil society** remains vibrant and active, making significant contributions to the country's humanitarian response and recovery efforts. Effective inclusive decision-making with clear mechanisms for civic participation in recovery planning, implementation and oversight, ensuring that all voices are heard and respected, will be decisive for Ukraine's recovery. (*SDG 16*)

The Government of Ukraine, regional and local public administrations have demonstrated remarkable resilience in reacting to, leading, and coordinating crisis response and **governance** efforts since the full-scale invasion. However, important **challenges** continue to affect Ukraine's development. Public

administration at all levels does not have sufficient capacities to focus on all priorities simultaneously, also facing significant budgetary constraints. **Decentralization reform** is hampered by limited capacity of local governments, particularly in smaller communities, to effectively manage the increased responsibilities and resources devolved from the central government. Prioritization of military spending and humanitarian assistance leaves fewer resources for delivery of essential public services on the local level. Despite significant progress over recent years, **corruption** remains a persistent challenge and poses a significant risk to democratization and good governance as well as securing financing for Ukraine's recovery. (SDG 16)

While the country has continued to take on important normative commitments to advance **gender equality**, the war has disproportionately affected women and girls -- including their realisation of human rights, access to livelihoods and services. At the same time, the war has limited their access to participate equally and meaningfully in decision making (SDG 5). The Global Gender Gap Index score¹ ranks Ukraine 66 out of 146 countries for 2023, which is an increase in comparison to 2022 (81) however with actual decreases in scores in some sectors such as economic participation and opportunity, health and survival.

The war has triggered a devastating economic downturn, propelling **poverty** rates from 5.5% in 2021 to a staggering 24.1% in 2022, plunging an additional 7.1 million people into poverty and erasing 15 years of progress towards SDG 1. The agrifood sector, a cornerstone of Ukraine's economy, is contracting rapidly amidst the deteriorating security situation, severely compromising **food and nutrition security** across the country (SDG 2). Ukraine's food systems and logistics chains have been disrupted, leading to increased food insecurity, while rampant inflation has inflated the prices of essential goods, including food, further straining household economies. In 2022, 44% of households struggled to meet their basic needs due to insufficient income, prompting a rise in negative coping strategies. Although the **social protection** system has maintained pre-existing support levels and introduced new benefits, the growing need for assistance had already outpaced the coverage and adequacy of social benefits before the full-scale invasion.

While the Government of Ukraine had made significant progress in reforming the **health care** system, the conflict has resulted in reduced access and availability of health services and medicines, damage to health care facilities and infrastructure with over 1400 health institutions damaged and 193 completely destroyed as of September 2023, and a loss of staff due to displacement or conscription. Ukraine is also facing a looming mental health crisis with likely long-term consequences, as well as a substance abuse crisis, with rates of drug use already being high before the war². Increasing numbers of people with disabilities, especially amputees, will put additional pressure on health care and social support systems (SDG 3).

Access to **education** has been impeded, with more than 3,000 educational institutions damaged and 363 destroyed by the end of September 2023. Conflict related disruptions continue to impact the learning of up to 5.7 million school-aged children. Half a million school-aged children and up to 15,000 teachers continued to reside abroad by September 2023, with an additional 161,000 school children being internally displaced. Almost half of children in Ukraine are struggling to learn online or through a

¹https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf?_gl=1*16jin9v*_up*MQ..&gclid=EA1alQobChMI1dWo-fqcgAMVjguiAx2tWAo6EAAYAiAAEgl4sfD_BwE

² https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Ukraine/Ukraine_drug_demand_supply.pdf

mixture of online and in person classes, posing challenges to learning, particularly for the most vulnerable students. (SDG 4)

The war has exacerbated pre-existing economic structural weaknesses and devastated Ukraine's **economy**, with GDP declining by 29.2 per cent in 2022. (SDG 8) Total damage to Ukrainian commerce and industry is estimated at US\$ 10.9 billion, with much of the country's heavy industry located in conflict areas or those under Russian control, making reconstruction in these areas highly risky and unlikely under current circumstances. (SDG 9) In addition, any green recovery will face significant challenges given the pollution levels associated with large industries. (SDG 12)

Ukraine has already experienced its highest levels of **unemployment** in the last decade in 2021 and it is estimated that employment in 2022 was 15.5 per cent (2.4 million jobs) below pre-war levels. Sixty per cent of IDPs who were employed before their displacement have lost their jobs while 29 per cent are currently employed. In addition to Ukraine's already aging population, outward migration and internal displacement will likely constrain availability of human capital to support Ukraine's recovery and longer-term development. **Exports** of goods and services fell sharply from US\$ 81.28 billion in 2021 to US\$ 56.91 billion in 2022. With export revenues integral to supporting jobs and investment, the likelihood for the Ukrainian economy to continue experiencing difficulties throughout 2023 and 2024 remains high. (SDG 8) Despite the challenges, Ukraine's economy has shown considerable resilience and economic projections present a more positive outlook for 2023 with women leading the way in the registration of new small and medium sized businesses.

The second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates that in the year since 24 February 2022, the war has resulted in more than US\$ 135 billion in direct damage to buildings and infrastructure, while total estimated reconstruction and recovery needs exceed US\$ 411 billion, which is 2.6 times the actual GDP of Ukraine in 2022. However, this is likely to increase further. As such, Ukraine's recovery will be a massive undertaking and require long-term commitment, leveraging a wide range of **partnerships** and **financing**, both within the country and internationally. (SDG 17)

Ukraine's **infrastructure** has suffered considerable damage — including transport, energy, communications, and water. This affects a significant proportion of the population, particularly the most vulnerable, and impedes economic activity, service provision, governance, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, amongst others. Energy infrastructure was highly affected by attacks in winter 2022-2023, affecting both power lines and generation capacities, and perspectives for full recovery remain difficult with new attacks anticipated. (SDGs 6, 7, and 9) The cost of damage to **housing** is estimated at over US\$ 50 billion and inhibits the return of those displaced. (SDG 11) Cultural heritage infrastructure and assets have also been particularly affected, with direct impact on World Heritage Sites, such as the 'Lviv, the ensemble of the Historic Centre' and the 'Historic Centre of Odesa' inscribed in January 2023 on the World Heritage List in Danger, in addition to cultural institutions, museums, built heritage, religious sites, archaeological sites, libraries and archives, meaningful for communities' socio-economic resilience and ties (SDG11.4).

Ukraine faces multiple environmental challenges due to the ongoing war and a legacy of inadequate environmental and climate-sensitive planning, with potentially severe impacts on critical infrastructure, food systems, human health, ecosystems, and the broader **environment**. Military operations have led to the destruction of environmental monitoring infrastructure, accelerated ecosystem and biodiversity degradation, damaged water-related infrastructure, industrial pollution, and waste accumulation. (SDGs 6, 11, 13, 14, and 15)

The full-scale invasion has created new categories of vulnerable groups while increasing the vulnerabilities of those already **marginalized, excluded, and at risk**. Vulnerabilities and characteristics are often intersectional and overlapping and can apply to multiple groups or individuals simultaneously. Those identified as being particularly vulnerable include, but are not limited to: 1) children; 2) young people; 3) older people; 4) persons with disabilities; 5) women and girls at risk or survivors of gender-based violence; 6) internally displaced persons; 7) refugees and asylum seekers; 8) national minorities; 9) stateless persons; 10) the Roma community; 11) LGBTQIA+ persons, and 12) veterans and their families, widows and orphans of veterans. Those people located in areas of active combat and under Russian control are acutely vulnerable and at risk.

While the challenges are considerable and cannot be underestimated, particularly in the fluid context of an ongoing and evolving conflict, Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction provides significant **opportunities** to build in an inclusive manner that strengthens good governance and the rule of law, sustainable economic and social and human capital development, environmental sustainability and protection, gender equality and women's empowerment, poverty reduction, resilience to shocks, and human rights for the benefit of all people in the country, particularly those most vulnerable and marginalized.

2. Introduction

At the end of 2021, the United Nations in Ukraine published its Common Country Analysis (CCA) as an independent, collective, and forward-looking assessment of the situation in the country through the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda.³ The 2021 document was developed to serve as the analytical basis for the development of a new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) to replace the expiring Government of Ukraine – United Nations Partnership Framework 2018–2022.

However, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 halted the UNSDCF development process and fundamentally changed the context in the country, thereby requiring the formulation of a new analytical framework that reflects the new reality and needs.

This new CCA primarily focuses on developments that have occurred since February 2022 up to mid-2023, complementing the analysis detailed in the 2021 CCA, which highlights many key development and structural challenges in Ukraine that remain relevant, many of which have been exacerbated by the full-scale invasion. As such, the 2021 CCA and this new analysis are complementary and should be used in conjunction with one another.

This CCA draws from and synthesizes a multitude of analyses and data that have been produced by multiple sources on the impacts of the full-scale invasion across various thematic areas (*see Annex I for a list of key reference documents*). The document analyses the multidimensional consequences of the conflict on peace and security, social cohesion, internal political and governance dynamics, human rights, humanitarian needs, as well as socioeconomic and environmental conditions in the country, amongst others.

Root causes of vulnerabilities and impediments to sustainable development within the context of the ongoing war are examined to identify potential opportunities and entry points for recovery and reconstruction. Underpinned by the principle of leaving no one behind, the CCA also identifies those population groups most impacted by the conflict and at risk of being left behind in any recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The CCA development process was led by the UN Programme Management Team and represents the collective efforts of all resident and non-resident UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes operating in Ukraine across humanitarian and development mandates. It is intended that the CCA will provide the UN in Ukraine with a shared understanding of the situation in the country to assist in the prioritization of UN programming, policy, and advocacy, and to instigate and facilitate stakeholder coordination and cooperation on key recovery and development issues. It is envisaged that the CCA, and other analytical documents, will also underpin the development of a new UN system-wide strategic planning framework to enhance the UN's collective coherence and impact to better support Ukraine's recovery and progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs.

³ United Nations Ukraine, *Ukraine Common Country Analysis*, 14 December 2021.

Stakeholder engagement and ownership

In the war context the UNCT leveraged existing opportunities of engagement with partners on the national and local level to discuss and validate key recovery and development challenges and priorities outlined in this CCA. These included throughout 2023:

- Sectoral discussions with key stakeholders for the preparation of the WB-EU-UN Second Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment early 2023 and for the preparation of the UN-led Kakhovka dam disaster PDNA in Q2-3 2023;
- Dedicated UNCT consultations with women led CSOs (March 2023); Organisations of people with disabilities (April 2023); Roma organisations (July 2023). Women-led CSOs and OPDs have further reviewed the CCA from gender and disability inclusion perspectives;
- RC and UNCT regular visits to key regions (Kherson, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv etc) to discuss recovery priorities on de-occupied and frontline communities, including a Sumy Region Recovery Coordination Forum initiated by the RCO, organised in July 2023;
- Extended UN consultations with key stakeholders during the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2023 in July 2023;
- RCO consultations with development partners within the regular Heads of Cooperation meetings on key recovery and development priorities;
- UNCT participation in the Sectoral Working Group meetings to update of the State Strategy for Regional Development for 2021-2027;

Furthermore, based on the CCA findings in Aug-Sept the UNCT undertook a wide-reaching online survey with the Government of Ukraine, regional authorities, CSOs, academia (204 entities, 214 responses), to review, validate and prioritise the CCA challenges.

3. Country Context

The War

Following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine experienced an active and low-intensity conflict localized in eastern parts of the country, accompanied by inconclusive peace talks through the Minsk framework and marked by more than a dozen short-lived ceasefire agreements. Those in control of the self-proclaimed — not internationally recognized — so-called “*Donetsk People's Republic*” and “*Luhansk People's Republic*” continued the cultural, political, and economic integration of these areas into the Russian Federation, while the Ukrainian government continued to pivot towards the Euro-Atlantic community.

On 21 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree recognizing the so-called “*Donetsk People's Republic*” and the “*Luhansk People's Republic*” as independent states and signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the newly Russian recognized entities. On 22 February, the Russian Parliament approved this decision.

On 22–23 February, the Russian Federation launched operations with the stated intent to protect the people of Donbas and on 24 February 2022 declared the start of its full-scale “*special military operation*” in Ukraine, extending the area of hostilities beyond eastern oblasts. The country-wide Russian attack was accompanied by political demands that Ukraine's political leadership be changed, its pro-Western foreign policy orientation be altered, and Russian territorial claims on Ukraine be accepted. The Russian Federation consequently rebranded the purpose of its “*special military operation*” from the defence of the Donbas and of Russian speakers, to the defence of Russia from an existential threat from the West.

Through counteroffensives in spring and summer of 2022, Ukraine regained around half of its territory that was previously under the military control of Russia during the early months of the war. However, in September 2022, Russia illegally annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions through so-called “referendums”. These regions of Ukraine are now considered as part of Russian Federation under the Russian constitution which also prohibits the return of these territories. Russia therefore continues to insist on recognition of these illegal annexations as the basis for any peace. Ukraine meanwhile in summer of 2023 launched a counteroffensive in an effort to recapture more of its territories currently under Russian control.

National unity and cohesion as a reaction to the invasion seems to have reinforced national and cultural identity. Surveys indicate that a vast majority of the population aspires to victory, defined as regaining all temporarily Russian-controlled territories and a restoration of the 1991 borders. Support for Ukrainian political and military leadership reached 90–95 per cent, while support for a greater Euro-Atlantic orientation has almost doubled to 80–90 per cent. The continuity in Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course since 2014 has been reflected in the national Constitution since 2019 and Ukraine, together with the Republic of Moldova, obtained European Union (EU) candidacy status in June 2022.

Prospects for peace remain entangled with military outcomes. The three rounds of bilateral talks in Belarus between 28 February and 7 March 2022, one online round of talks from 14–15 March, and two rounds of talks in Türkiye on 10 March and from 29–30 March 2022 were inconclusive and officially suspended in May 2022. Reportedly, the peace talks initially focused on Ukraine's neutrality in exchange for security guarantees. However, Ukraine rejected trade-offs on its independence, sovereignty, and

territorial integrity as part of the negotiations. While there are currently no ongoing negotiations, there may be a window of opportunity for future peace talks if the military means to achieve political objectives have been exhausted.

However, there are concerns related to both a protracted conflict or premature peace scenarios. A protracted conflict could have further devastating impacts on Ukraine and contribute to further global instability. A ceasefire agreement cementing the current lines of control would not only concern Ukraine in terms of its territorial integrity, but also the international community as a whole by potentially normalizing territorial acquisition by force and questioning the international community's collective capacity to maintain international peace and security order based on sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states.

Ukraine has outlined its own peace parameters in the Peace Formula presented by President Zelenskyy at the G7 summit in November 2022 and updated after the adoption of GA resolution A/RES/ES-11/6 of 23 February 2023.⁴ Ukraine has also put forward the Kyiv Security Compact aimed at ensuring Ukraine's self-defence and preventing new aggression.⁵ Ukraine argues that security guarantees should start, not end, with Russian forces withdrawal from Ukrainian territories. Ukrainian authorities and civil society reject a Minsk Agreements type approach that would result in a simmering conflict prone to new escalations and cement Russian *de facto* control over some Ukrainian territories. In March 2023, over 50 civil society activists signed the *Sustainable Peace Manifesto: Never Again 2.0* calling for full restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and prevention of future attacks and setting EU and NATO integration of Ukraine as preconditions for a sustainable peace.⁶

Humanitarian Impact

The humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorated drastically after Russia's invasion dramatically escalated eight years of conflict into a full-scale war. Intense hostilities have caused and continue to cause immense human suffering, with thousands of civilians killed and injured, millions forced from their homes, families separated, access to essential services decimated, and livelihoods destroyed. The situation is particularly severe in areas close to the front line, and in the parts of Ukraine currently under Russian control. An estimated 5.9 million Ukrainians and others have been recorded across Europe, having fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022, with a further 345,000 outside Europe, while 5.1 million have been internally displaced as of June 2023. Approximately 90 per cent of refugees are women and children, and 60 per cent of the internally displaced population are women.

Approximately 17.6 million people — 49 per cent of the current population — are now in need of humanitarian assistance and protection, an increase from just over 3 million people at the start of 2022. Forty per cent of those in need are women and 15 per cent are girls. Children represent 27 per cent, of people in need of humanitarian aid, older people 22 per cent and persons with disabilities 15 per cent. It


⁴ UN News, *Ukrainian President outlines peace formula that punishes aggression, restores security*, 21 September 2022.

⁵ *The Kyiv Security Compact, International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations*, 13 September 2022.

⁶ *Sustainable Peace Manifesto: Never Again 2.0*, March 2023.

was estimated that some US\$ 3.9 billion were required to provide critical assistance to 11.1 million people in Ukraine targeted under the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan.⁷

Figure 1: Severity of Humanitarian Conditions and Number of People in Need by Oblast



The international and UN response to the war in Ukraine

Many UN member states consider the Russian war on Ukraine a “threat to international peace and security” which demands a response in line with the UN Charter and raises moral questions and legal responsibilities. On 1 March 2023, at an emergency special session initiated on 27 February, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 Aggression against Ukraine with 141 Member States voting in favour. The resolution deplored in the strongest terms Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in violation of the Charter and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.

On 24 March 2022, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the humanitarian consequences of the war with 104 votes in favour. On 26 October 2022, the General Assembly adopted with 143 votes in favour (5 against and 32 abstentions) a resolution rejecting Russia’s attempt to change the status of four regions of Ukraine, condemning the “attempted illegal annexation” of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine and again demanding the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine’s territory.

One year after the start of the war, on 24 February 2023, the UN GA adopted with 141 votes in favour resolution A-ES-11L.7 on a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, consistent with the UN Charter. The resolution called upon the Member States and international organizations to redouble support for diplomatic efforts to this end. The resolution also acknowledged the global impact of the

⁷ OCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan Ukraine 2023*, 15 February 2023.
 OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023*, 28 December 2022.

war in Ukraine on food, security, energy, financial, environment and nuclear security and safety and called upon all Members States to support the UN SG in his efforts to address these challenges.

In 2022, the UN Security Council met 46 times on Ukraine, on topics ranging from humanitarian assistance, potential use of chemical weapons, nuclear safety to the Black Sea Initiative. The debates were generally acrimonious and polarizing. The only united action by the Council on Ukraine since February 2022 is the Presidential Statement on 6 May 2022 expressing strong support for the Secretary-General's efforts in the search for a peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine.

The United Nations SG Guterres called early on in the war for an immediate stop of hostilities, de-escalation and offered his good offices. On 22 February 2022 the UN SG called for an end to the escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine and stated that the decision of the Russian Federation to unilaterally recognize the so-called "independence" of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions is a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and conflicts directly with the UN Charter's principles. Since 24 February 2022, the SG has repeatedly stated that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a violation of the UN Charter and of international law. He continues to stress that peace must be in line with the UN Charter, international law, and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

On 28 April 2022, the SG visited Ukraine and since then, he visited Ukraine two more times, in August 2022 and in March 2023.

Outside of the UN, Ukraine's mostly Western partners arguing for Ukraine's right to self-defence, in line with the article 51 of the UN Charter, provide Ukraine with extensive political, military and financial support. At the same time, international calls for peace and de-escalation have also increased with several UN Member States in particular from the global south expressing concern about the dangers of further escalation and a protracted war. For example, Brazil and a group of African leaders have put forward their own peace initiatives. China has also presented its own position paper regarding a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The United Nations concerted response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has relied on three pillars: humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring and reporting, and early recovery and preparation for reconstruction throughout Ukraine. Beyond standing with Ukraine's society and continuing to deliver on these tasks to mitigate war effects, the UN acted early on in the conflict to assist with the evacuation of civilians (Mariupol) and to alleviate the global impacts of the war by enabling, together with Türkiye, the signing of the Black Sea Initiative which allowed for safe corridors of sea export of over 30 million tons of Ukrainian foodstuffs worldwide. Together with others, the UN also acted on nuclear safety and security and supported exchanges of prisoners of war. The UN is committed to a long-term engagement in supporting Ukraine, in partnership with the Government and other national stakeholders, and in concert with international partners.

Updated quarterly, an [interactive dashboard](#) offers a comprehensive overview of the recovery programs being implemented by UN in Ukraine. The dashboard provides detailed information on the programs, sectors, and resources invested by the UN and its partners – including national, international, and local stakeholders – involved in the implementation of recovery initiatives.

Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus Approaches

The UN, in partnership with the humanitarian community, will continue the provision of life-saving assistance and concurrently in 2023 and 2024 support the accelerated recovery led by the government at national and community level. In parallel with the humanitarian response and community recovery and nexus approaches, the UN will also support the government with data, capacity strengthening at central and decentralized level and technical assistance for national and local (hromada level) planning and policy reform to create a conducive environment for fostering community durable solutions, meet long term goals such as macro-economic stability, economic growth, decentralization and EU integration, to the extent circumstances will allow.

While the focus at first is from a participatory community approach, it will evolve towards a community-driven approach where communities are fully empowered to prioritize and plan inclusive recovery and development activities in alignment with local/hromada plans and national policies and frameworks.

Recognizing the extensive scale of displacement, the UN prioritizes durable solutions to displacement within the context of community recovery. This includes displacement both within and outside the country and attention to the fact that a majority of IDPs are women and children, and the negative implications of the demographic and human capital changes for future sustainable development. Multifaceted durable solutions at the community level involve national and local dialogues, collaboration with local authorities and women's groups, needs assessment, reconstruction efforts, housing solutions, access to livelihoods, economic growth opportunities, education, and mental health and psychosocial support, all contributing to social cohesion.

Cross-cutting enabler initiatives will underpin community interventions and support the development of inclusive community led recovery plans and budgets, including child-sensitive and gender-responsive budgets, anti-corruption risk assessments and accountability frameworks and the mobilization of individuals, in particular women, young people and marginalized populations, also contributing to social inclusion and cohesion.

4. Progress Towards 2030 Agenda and SDGs

While moderately improving, the 2021 CCA — based on the analysis in 2021 Sustainable Development Report — noted that progress towards SDG targets had been mixed, with some targets already achieved, although most face challenges. The 2022 Sustainable Development Report did not capture the impacts of the war in Ukraine, while the 2023 Report had not yet been published prior to the finalization of this CCA. However, it is expected that the ongoing war has and will continue to significantly impede Ukraine's progress across all SDGs.

This section primarily focuses on the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine through the lens of the thematic areas of the SDGs, notably 1) Politics and Governance; 2) Social Development; 3) Economic Transformation, and 4) Environment and Climate Change.

4.1. Politics and Governance Analysis

Political Dynamics and Governance

President Zelenskyy was elected in 2019 with an agenda to deepen reforms, focus on development, and try to achieve peace in eastern Ukraine. His landslide electoral victory produced a single-party majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Post-February 2022, President Zelenskyy remains the most popular political figure in Ukraine while other political actors rally behind defence efforts while trying to maintain their distinct political profiles.

On 24 February 2022, the President of Ukraine issued Decree No. 64/2022 on the Introduction of Martial Law, which was approved by the Parliament, and has been subsequently extended. While national elections had been scheduled for 29 October 2023, the legislation on martial law prohibits the holding of elections, making it unlikely that any electoral process will take place before the abolition of the decree. In this case, the powers of the current convocation of the parliament will be extended. Even after the abolition of martial law, the holding of elections will face multiple challenges, such as deciding the timeline for elections in de-occupied territories, the administration of elections in severely damaged or destroyed settlements, and facilitating the participation of those displaced.

Even before the martial law will be lifted, political parties will likely begin to position themselves electorally and prepare at central and local levels for what may be pivotal post-war presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. The composition of the next parliament and post-war cabinet will depend on voters' post-war aspirations. The three main electoral campaign themes already emerging are reconstruction and development, security and stability, and Euro-Atlantic integration. Mergers of established political parties and alliances, political realignments, and emergence of new political forces should be expected. There is an expectation that the influence of oligarchs and vested interests in post-war politics will continue to diminish as result of the internal societal pressures and external conditionalities set by international partners providing support.

While women's leadership and decision-making has increased at household and partially at the community levels due to martial law, displacement, and other war dynamics, this has not been reflected in formal political and decision-making processes. While highest per cent to date, only 20.4 per cent of seats in parliament are currently held by women while 21 per cent of cabinet ministers are women.⁸

⁸ UN Women, *Women in Politics: 2023 (map)*, 2023.

While approximately 30 per cent of seats on local councils were won by women, no woman was elected as mayor of a major city. The electoral code, as amended in 2021, provides for a 40% gender quota with rank and placement rules, and sanctions for non-compliance to be implemented during the next Parliamentary election. As such, the proportion of women in parliament will be expected to significantly increase after the next election. Women's equal political participation and representation is the key to ensuring the full realization of their political rights and may help ensure that in the post-war environment more inclusive decisions are made, women's voices are heard, and gender-sensitive solutions are created.

The Government of Ukraine has continued to prioritize gender equality and women's empowerment as part of its EU integration requirements, as well as for the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda (see **Box 1**). The first-ever comprehensive State Strategy on Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men by 2030, and its operational action plan, were adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in August 2022 and is in line with key aspects of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. It not only identifies strategic goals for gender mainstreaming across all levels and sectors, but also addresses new priorities for the context of war, while the actual implementation may remain limited due to severe budget constraints.

Box 1: Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

In 2022, the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security was revised by the Government of Ukraine in close collaboration with the UN and women's civil society organizations.⁹ While its overarching strategic goals remain unchanged, the operational aspects of the Plan have been expanded to better address the emerging needs of vulnerable women and girls affected by the war and subsequent humanitarian crisis, and to advance women's equal representation and meaningful participation in conflict prevention, resolution, and recovery at all levels. The newly adopted goals also include the provision of humanitarian aid and support for women who are in temporarily occupied territories and/or under the jurisdiction of other countries, as well as existence of regional councils for the localization of the NAP.

It commits also to address conflict-related sexual violence and trafficking issues. Ukraine has joined international efforts to combat conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) through its participation in the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict International Alliance created in 2022. Ukraine co-chairs the initiative until the end of 2023.

In November 2022, CEDAW Committee recommended the Government of Ukraine to "ensure the meaningful participation of women at all stages of decision-making on the State party's response to the armed conflict and in future peace and recovery processes; and to continue to promote the equal participation of women in the security and defence sectors"¹⁰. In regard of CRSV, it recommended i.a. to prevent and respond to cases of CRSV, provide adequate reparations to survivors of sexual and other forms of conflict-related gender-based violence, collect evidence in cases of CRSV, in cooperation with civil society organizations and international investigative bodies.

Since 2014, Ukraine had made significant progress on its decentralization reform agenda, although this has slowed since the full-scale invasion. Freedom House notes that the most significant decentralization

⁹ Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine: [On making changes to the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of October 28, 2020 No. 1544](#), 16 December 2022.

¹⁰ https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolNo=CEDAW%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F9&Lang=en

laws that were scheduled to be implemented in 2022 were either put on hold or failed to obtain parliamentary approval. In addition, certain legislative initiatives related to urban planning and construction that might impose restrictions on local government were supported by the Parliament and have faced harsh reactions from local councils and mayors across Ukraine, as well as from decentralization watchdogs.¹¹ In addition, military administrations became responsible for exercising the powers of the relevant state administrations during martial law at local level, including the preparation and approval of local budgets.

The Government of Ukraine and regional and local levels of public administration have demonstrated remarkable resilience and capacity in reacting to, leading, and coordinating all crisis response and governance efforts since the full-scale invasion. However, weakened by war, government institutions at all levels do not have sufficient capacities to address mounting challenges. This also entails the implementation of reforms, some of them adopted before the start of the full-scale invasion, which remain stalled due to a weak regulatory framework or lack of capacity in implementation (for the latter see media law and education reform).

The reduced number of civil servants and law enforcement personnel, decreased budget allocations for most sectors due to increased military expenditures, limited up-to-date and accurate statistics, as well as skill gaps among civil servants, are likely to negatively impact the democratic reform process and the delivery of services. The Government has also declared its plans to move forward on public administration reform, which may further reduce the overall number of civil servants, having a potential impact on marginalized groups and on gender equality in the public sector, in particular in education and health.

The Government considers continuing to develop the digital economy and facilitate the ITC sector's development as a key SDG accelerator. Prior to Russia's invasion, the Ukraine Government developed and introduced a comprehensive set of digitalized services to reach the following strategic targets by 2024: 100% of the public services delivered online; 6 million citizens participate in the digital skills development programmes; IT represents 10% share of the country's GDP; and 95% of the transport infrastructure and settlements are covered with high-speed internet. In 2021, the Government made commitments under the Generation Equality Action Coalition on Innovation and Technology for Gender Equality. The commitments are focused on equal opportunities for distance education in STEM disciplines (All-Ukrainian online school) and attracting girls to STEM education. It also recognizes that digital solutions and technological innovations are important for post-war reconstruction and recovery. It requires systemic measures on ensuring access to digital literacy, digital public services and tools to be assessable and user-friendly for the women and girls in vulnerable and marginalized situations and those facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.

Owning a mobile phone has been shown to be an important tool to empower women by connecting them to other people and enabling them to access information and services. Globally, 73 per cent of the population aged 10 and over owned a mobile phone in 2022, up from 67 per cent in 2019. However, women were 12 per cent less likely to own mobile phones than men, a gap that has remained relatively unchanged since 2019.¹²

¹¹ Freedom House, [Ukraine Profile](#).

¹² https://moldova.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2023_4.pdf

Despite the challenges, the Government of Ukraine has continued to provide, expand, and digitize its public services. In 2022, 63 per cent of Ukrainians used public electronic services, compared to 60 per cent in 2021 and 53 per cent in 2020.¹³ Continued support for the digital transformation agenda is considered essential for resilience building and recovery and is critical for Ukraine’s EU integration.

Addressing online and technology facilitated violence by development and implementation of a comprehensive set of actions responding to risks and all forms of violence (bullying, online harassment, hate speech, etc.) needs to be prioritized in the recovery and development policies.

According to the recent perception study on citizens’ trust in institutions, people generally believe that the authorities are coping well with the challenges posed by the ongoing war in the areas of defence, energy, foreign policy, and social services. However, citizens' assessments of the Government’s performance on the economy, national recovery, tackling crime, justice, and anti-corruption fared more poorly (see **Table 1**).¹⁴

Table 1: Citizens' Assessment of the Situation in the Country and the Actions of the Authorities

	Very well	Rather well	Rather Poorly	Very Poorly	Difficult to answer
Economy	6.8	37.9	40	5.5	9.8
Defence	25.4	56.4	11	2.2	4.9
Fight against corruption	4.1	19.5	44.5	21.3	10.7
Fight against crime	4.9	33.3	35.6	11.7	14.5
Social protection and pensions	8.6	44	28.8	8.2	10.4
Health care	6.2	47.6	30.3	5.7	10.3
Education	6.3	49.5	24.1	5.4	14.7
Energy supply	18	61.6	12.9	3.4	4
Foreign policy	26	48.7	12.5	3	9.8
Justice	3.7	25	37.3	10.8	23.2
Reconstruction	5.6	32.3	26.7	9.1	26.2

A recent survey indicates a substantial increase in trust in the central institutions and sub-national authorities since the start of the full-scale invasion.¹⁵ However, civil society councils attached to governmental institutions do not reflect the diversity of the population, including minority groups and persons with disabilities. For example, in 2020, only ten Romani candidates were elected to municipal councils while it is estimated that between 20,000 to 40,000 Roma were unable to register to vote because they lacked identity documents. Organizations representing persons with disabilities emphasize the need for their inclusion in decision-making. In addition, the national representative body for tripartite social dialogue — the National Tripartite Social and Economic Council — is not fully functional.


Openness, Transparency, and Accountability

Ukraine ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 2 December 2009. Its first cycle review under the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism was completed in 2013, and the second cycle review is ongoing.¹⁶ Effective 4 March 2022, Ukraine notified the United Nations that it was unable to guarantee full implementation of its obligations under UNCAC.

¹³ UNDP, *Opinions and views of the Ukrainian population regarding state electronic services*, 16 January 2023.
¹⁴ Razumkov Centre, *Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and the actions of the authorities, trust in social institutions (February–March 2023)*, 2023.
¹⁵ SHARP, *SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population*, May 2023.
¹⁶ UNODC, Ukraine [Country Profile \(UNODC.org\)](https://www.unodc.org/country-profiles/ukraine), 2023.

Anti-corruption and justice system reforms, public administration reforms and decentralization, and *de-oligarhization* remain core demands of Ukrainian citizens. Following the 2019 elections, anti-corruption reforms were a key element in limiting influence of parallel power mechanisms challenging official institutions. Nepotism and cronyism are perceived as phenomena permeating most strata of society.

In 2022, Ukraine scored 33 points in the Corruption Perceptions Index (scores on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt) and ranked 116 out of 180 countries compared to 142 in 2014,¹⁷ indicating sustained progress in the fight against corruption despite Russian’s full-scale invasion. Control of corruption is the second lowest assessed indicator for Ukraine as per the 2021 Worldwide Governance Indicators report (24.52 out of 100).¹⁸



The adoption of the State Anti-Corruption Strategy and the appointment of the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine have been instrumental in bringing about investigations into high-profile corruption cases, and in increasing the number of cases being adjudicated by the High Anti-Corruption Court.

However, some of Ukraine's major achievements in recent years in increasing transparency and accountability have been put at risk since the 2022 invasion. The obligation of political parties to submit financial and other reports for National Agency on Corruption Prevention verification has been suspended, while the obligation for civil servants to file asset declarations — which already triggered several high-profile cases and sentencing of members of parliament, ministers, and judges who tried to conceal information about their income — was made optional. The Government also suspended access to the Unified State Open Data Portal. While access was restored in August 2022, most of the data is outdated and much of the information is not being published. Even though the temporary restrictions on access to certain information during wartime may be justified, it must be explained and meet specific criteria for determining security-sensitive information.

Civic Space

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had an active and vibrant civic space and positive attitude toward civic participation.¹⁹ However, citizens of Ukraine under temporary military occupation control of Russia have lost almost all of their political and civil liberties. Ukrainians in other areas of the country have had their political rights and civil liberties limited by the imposition of martial law which has limited constitutional guarantees, including freedom of assembly, inviolability of the home, secrecy of correspondence, non-interference in private and family life, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and property rights. At the same time, the war triggered a new civil society activism in other parts of Ukraine, also involving those who left the eastern regions.

On 1 March 2022, Ukraine notified the United Nations Secretary-General of its decision to derogate from certain human rights obligations under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

¹⁷ Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index*, 2022.
¹⁸ World Bank, *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, 2022.
¹⁹ AIDDATA, *Ukraine: Measuring civic space risk, resilience, and Russian influence in the lead up to war*, 21 March 2023.

Rights and Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for the duration of martial law.


The media law, adopted in December 2022 as a requirement for the EU candidacy process, increases the state language quota requirements for broadcasters and provides for the preferential treatment of official EU languages. This has resulted in a decreased use of some minority languages in media.²⁰ It also contains several provisions restricting freedom of expression. While the law has received positive feedback in EU candidacy reviews, it has also been criticized for being open to allowing over-regulation by a regulatory body that is not sufficiently independent or, as noted by experts, may not have the capacities to execute its increased workload. Experts have therefore recommended specific capacity-building among the regulatory bodies and the media sector to allow for a transition on implementation of the law while respecting freedom of expression.

The destruction of technical infrastructure, electricity shortages, economic crisis, along with violence (physical and psychological) directed against journalists has put extraordinary pressure on the media sector which has been essential for providing citizens with potentially life-saving information. By June 2022, 20 television centres were destroyed, with damage to television and radio infrastructure estimated at more than UAH 600 million.²¹ Several hundred media outlets have had to close while others are unable to pay their staff.²² Many institutions, as well as freelance media workers, are currently reliant on foreign assistance to continue to do their job. In addition, UNESCO has documented the killing of 12 journalists and media workers while on duty since February 2022.²³ Along with a weakened media sector, mis- and disinformation circulate widely in the country, particularly online, including on social media platforms and on private messenger services.

An underlying active community and social fabric still is present across Ukraine. Vibrant civil society organization networks, faith-based networks, and many newly formed volunteer networks are providing critical humanitarian assistance, particularly at the local level.²⁴ Despite their limited capacity and funds, they are more agile in their ability to reach affected populations, even in the most dangerous areas, and often better understand local needs.

Justice and the Rule of Law

According to the Rule of Law Index 2022, Ukraine scored 0.50 on a scale of 0-1 (with 0 denoting weaker adherence to the rule of law and 1 denoting stronger adherence), ranking it 76 out of 140 countries, a decline from 74 in 2021.²⁵ Some of the pre-existing weaknesses in access to justice and administration of justice have become exacerbated by the full-scale invasion. While public attitude towards the judicial system has slightly improved compared to 2021, the courts and prosecutors were the only Ukrainian



²⁰ Council of Europe, *Opinion of the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law Information Society and Action against Crime Directorate Information Society Department*, 24 February 2023.

²¹ Preliminary estimates of The Radio Broadcasting, Radio Communication and Television Concern of Ukraine.

²² Reporters Without Borders, *Ukraine Country Profile*.

²³ UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists. Status as of 16 May 2023.

²⁴ ACAPS, *Ukraine: Bridging the humanitarian response*, 25 May 2022.

²⁵ World Justice Project, *WJP Rule of Law Index: Ukraine Profile*, 2022.

institutions with a negative trust-distrust balance in 2022.²⁶

According to the ECs Analytical report on Ukraine's alignment with the EU acquis²⁷, Ukraine has made significant strides in areas such as **judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, and human rights**.

The judicial institutions and justice providers face a significantly increased workload due to growing and newly emerging conflict related legal issues and public demand for legal services. This includes a demand for legal assistance on property issues, restoration of personal documentation, IDP registration, rights of victims of conflict-related human rights violations and other losses, war crimes investigations.²⁸ Many justice providers, including 22 per cent of courts, have had to relocate because of the war. Despite the circumstances, the free legal aid and administrative services systems continue to provide services, in person or remotely, to citizens, including IDPs.²⁹

The war has severely undermined prison conditions and the State Penitentiary Service's capacity to ensure continued security, safety, and the provision of basic needs to prison populations. According to the Ministry of Justice, Ukraine lost 20 per cent of its prison population since February 2022. Twelve prisons reportedly fell under Russian control while three were destroyed. As a preventive measure, 5,000 prisoners were evacuated from 12 prisons in the east to the central and western parts of the country.

No dramatic increase in the identification of victims of cross-border trafficking from Ukraine has been recorded since the full-scale Russian invasion.³⁰ However, an October 2022 survey on people's vulnerability to human trafficking and exploitation in the context of war revealed that 59 per cent of Ukrainians were ready to accept at least one risky offer which could lead to human trafficking, exploitation or violence, of whom 53 per cent were women.³¹

Pre-war drug traffic flows appear to have largely halted, with shipments presumed to have been diverted to alternate, established routes. At the same time, the war appears to have driven up domestic production of synthetic drugs with the risk of increased drug use. Illicitly trafficked and diverted firearms represent a threat to security and longer-term peace and stability. However, the launch of a Unified Weapons Registry in June 2023 is a positive development.³² The ongoing conflict can also exacerbate other forms of trafficking, including falsified medicines, cigarettes, pesticides, and cultural property.

Ukraine's National Risk Assessment on preventing and countering legalization (laundering) of proceeds of crime and financing of terrorism (NRA) in, 2019 identified corruption, tax evasion, organised crime, and use of new technologies for money laundering as primary threats with identified persistent gaps in Ukraine's response, especially in relation to AML investigation, prosecution and the confiscation of assets.³³ Ukraine is also among the largest virtual currency markets globally, which could create new opportunities for criminals to move and launder funds. In terms of cyber criminality, cyberattacks, mainly denial of service (DDoS) and malware have increased. The primary targets have been governmental websites, energy service providers and Ukrainian financial institutions.

²⁶ Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, *Dynamics of Trust in Social Institutions in 2021-2022*, 13 January 2023.

²⁷ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-02/SWD_2023_30_Ukraine.pdf

²⁸ UNDP, *Availability of Legal Aid in the Context of Martial Law (Report Summary)*, February 2023.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ UNODC, *Conflict in Ukraine: Key Evidence on Risks of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants*, December 2022.

³¹ IOM, *National Survey on People's Vulnerability to Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the Context of War*, October 2022.

³² Ministry of Internal Affairs, *From June 23, the Unified Register of Weapons will be operational in Ukraine*, 16 June 2023.


³³ Ukraine's National Risk Assessment (2019) fiu.gov.ua/assets/userfiles/200/NRA/2%20NRA%20report.pdf and 2nd Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating (2020) rm.coe.int/moneyval-2020-9-sr-2nd-enhanced-fur-ua/1680a01d6a

Human Rights

The human rights situation across the country remains dire amid the ongoing conflict. The international armed conflict has led to a wide range of human rights and international humanitarian law violations affecting both civilians and combatants. Many cases of arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment, conflict-related sexual violence, forced deportation and transfer, including of children, and unlawful destruction and appropriation of property, continue to be documented. In addition, the persecution of Ukrainians and suppression of Ukrainian identity in territories occupied by the Russian Federation hinder individuals from freely reporting human rights violations or abuses that they may have experienced or witnessed.

From 24 February 2022 to 18 June 2023, OHCHR recorded 24,862 civilian casualties in the country (9,083 killed and 15,779 injured).³⁴ However, actual figures are considerably higher, with many incidents not yet documented or corroborated. Explosive weapons with wide area effects caused the majority of civilian casualties.

Figure 4: Total Civilian Casualties, Per Age and Sex (24 February 2022 to 18 June 2023)



OHCHR also documented 864 cases (763 men and 94 women, 7 boys) of enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions perpetrated by Russian armed forces. The real number is considerably higher. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found a widespread pattern of torture and inhuman treatment committed by Russian forces against civilians and prisoners of war.³⁵ OHCHR has also documented the widespread pattern of torture and ill-treatment of civilians and prisoners of war held in penitentiary facilities in Russian Federation and Russian occupied areas of Ukraine.

Over 150 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented by OHCHR, most of which relate to the use of sexual violence as a method of torture and ill-treatment — mostly against male civilians and prisoners of war — and rape, including gang rape, of women and girls in residential areas. Most violations occurred in areas of Ukraine controlled by Russian armed forces or in the Russian Federation.

Civilians have been transferred to areas in occupied territory or deported to the Russian Federation under circumstances that may amount to forced transfers or deportations. These transfers include children and adults who lived in areas under Russian control. It is unclear how many unaccompanied children from Ukraine have been taken to the Russian Federation. Many have been placed in the Russian foster care system and Russian citizenship imposed on them in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.

The imposition by the occupying authorities of various restrictions on the freedom of movement of residents of occupied territory has jeopardised their access to essential services and basic needs. The damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure has also infringed on people's enjoyment of other human rights, including the rights to security, health, work, education, housing, social support, and

³⁴ OHCHR, *Ukraine Civilian Casualties Update*, 19 June 2023.

³⁵ UN Human Rights Council, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/HRC/52/62)*, 15 March 2023.

services for persons with disabilities, and freedom of religion or belief. Impacts on cultural rights and heritage are also significant (see **Box 2** below).

Box 2: Conflict Related Impacts on Cultural Rights and Livelihoods

The war has significantly impacted the diversity and richness of culture and cultural heritage in Ukraine, reducing livelihoods limiting access to culture, and impeding the exercise of cultural rights. The market for artists and cultural professionals has shrunk, with a notable reduction in their incomes. Government figures from 2022 state that a significant number of workers employed in the creative industries have lost their jobs (37 per cent) and creative businesses have suffered a decrease in revenues (90 per cent), with an outflow of 20% creative industry professionals from Ukraine. The Government's human and financial resources in culture have drastically decreased due to the conflict, affecting the culture sectors at large, including the livelihoods of heritage professionals, cultural actors, and artists. Over 20 per cent of creative industry professionals left the country in the early months of the war. A UNESCO survey conducted in May–June 2023 found that approximately 70 per cent of cultural workers in the creative and cultural industries in Ukraine are female, who, on average, earn approximately 22 per cent less than their male counterparts, even when holding the same positions.

In addition to the damage to Ukraine's buildings and landscapes, along with the infrastructure that sustains them, the war is damaging if not destroying the way of life of communities, their social relations and attachment to place, which are essential to the safeguarding of living heritage. In times of conflict, the threat posed to the intrinsic values of intangible heritage - spiritual, symbolic, emotional – along with its roles in unifying communities with a shared sense of identity, is enormous.

Tourism, especially international tourism, has declined, although several religious sites and cultural institutions are progressively reopening and hosting temporary exhibitions. Due to the drop in national budget expenditure on culture, many cultural institutions are at risk of closure, with the independent sector the most impacted. Losses are estimated at US\$ 15.2 billion and include revenue losses from tourism, art, sports, entertainment and recreation, cultural and creative industries, and cultural education, as well as valued asset protection. The most critical losses are for cultural and creative industries (US\$ 10.8 billion) and tourism (US\$ 3.2 billion).³⁶

Due to the drop in national budget expenditure on culture, many cultural institutions are at risk of closure, with the independent sector being the most impacted. A significant number of cultural institutions either were relocated and/or transformed, in fact, into humanitarian centres or focused their efforts on volunteering projects, not income generation, requiring to recentre and boost those institutions, to be fully enabled to contribute to the recovery and reconstruction plan of the sector. There is a skills gap in several domains, including crisis institutional management and planning. More positively, civil society organizations, volunteers, artists, and cultural professionals have demonstrated unprecedented activism in supporting the preservation of Ukraine's culture during the war. The attacks and looting of collections have furthermore sparked public debates on national values and post-war recovery.

Survivors of human rights and international humanitarian law violations have experienced damage to their health and psychological well-being, as well as loss of their loved ones, homes and livelihoods. The

³⁶ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

associated stresses raise the risk of child abuse and intimate partner violence. Traumatic events such as experienced by large parts of the Ukrainian population are often associated with the onset of mental health including substance use disorders. Human rights violations also create a significant justice gap and limited victim assistance programmes are in place to address those with highest needs. However, the Office of the Prosecutor General and law enforcement agencies have made significant efforts to improve their capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes. As of June 2023, the law enforcement authorities registered over 91,000 of alleged war crimes by the Russian military, although there have been only a few convictions. Ukraine will face serious challenges in future prosecutions given that most defendants are largely located beyond Ukrainian-controlled areas.

Ukraine's **engagement with UN human rights mechanisms** remained uninterrupted, even amidst the ongoing armed conflict. Ukraine submitted its combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on 14 April 2022. This comprehensive report not only updated previous submissions but also delineated changes in domestic legal structures from January 2014 to December 2019. Notably, it addressed the Concluding Observations of the CERD from prior reviews and detailed Ukraine's actions toward implementing the Committee's recommendations. This document was the collaborative effort of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Consciousness, in conjunction with other pertinent state authorities.

Furthermore, Ukraine responded to the Committee on the Rights of the Child by submitting replies to a list of issues regarding its combined fifth and sixth periodic reports on 4 January 2022, following the Committee's request from November 2020. The Committee's review during its 91st session and later during the review period highlighted areas such as child protection, children with disabilities, and children deprived of family environments.

The Committee on Enforced Disappearances, in its 23rd session, directed significant attention towards Ukraine, and the Committee's published list of issues significantly resonated with insights shared by the UNCT. Similarly, during its 27th session, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities delved into the challenges faced by individuals with disabilities, especially those from conflict zones and areas under Russian military occupation affected post-24 February 2022.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in 2022, examined a joint report from the UNCT on the situation in Ukraine. The Committee's observations underscored the importance of legal reforms, urging Ukraine to prioritize the adoption of draft law No. 2689.

International justice platforms, such as the OSCE Moscow mechanism and the ICC, also have been proactively engaged with the situation in Ukraine from March 2022, engaging in comprehensive briefings examining both broad patterns and individual cases. Concurrently, Special Procedures offices undertook in-depth discussions about the human rights situation in Ukraine, focusing on issues like arbitrary detention and LGBTI rights. CEDAW, CRC, and CRPD in their turn also engaged in detailed briefings and discussions on Ukraine.

The scheduled Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for Ukraine, originally set for 2022, had to be postponed due to the ongoing conflict, and was tentatively rescheduled for 2028.

In a broader assessment, as of August 2023, OHCHR's review highlighted Ukraine's progress in addressing human rights concerns in the country. Out of 68 recommendations made post the inception of the armed conflict on 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian government successfully implemented 73%, either in full or partially. In contrast, the Russian Federation, acting as the occupying power,

demonstrated limited progress, achieving only 18% implementation of those recommendations relevant to it as an occupying power.

Cross-border dimensions

According to [UNHCR's latest intentions surveys](#), the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees and IDPs – 76% and 82% respectively – want to return home one day. With active hostilities ongoing, taking lives and damaging civilian homes and infrastructure, only about 15% plan to return in the third quarter of 2023, and intend to stay in their current location, either abroad or in safer areas in Ukraine. Hopes to return are higher (71%) among refugees who found temporary protection in countries neighbouring Ukraine, compared to those hosted in other European countries (57%). Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Kyiv and Kharkiv regions, as well as Kyiv city, were identified among the top areas of intended return. While safety and security were cited as the main factors preventing displaced people from returning home, access to basic services, housing, employment and livelihoods were named as enablers facilitating return. There are signs of increased mobility among the refugee population in the form of steady cross-border movements, which include temporary stays as well as more sustained visits in Ukraine, as well as early signs of more permanent return. Many refugees have engaged in short term visits to Ukraine since their arrival in host countries, primarily to visit family members, retrieve documents, check on property and the overall situation (35% of refugees and 50% of IDPs). As in other refugee situations, the ability to return home for short periods to maintain links with family and community and check on the prevailing situation can help pave the way for more durable returns in the future once conditions permit. As indicated in [UNHCR's Position on Voluntary Returns to Ukraine](#) (June 2023), UNHCR considers that the vast majority of persons displaced from Ukraine are likely to be in need of international protection, and therefore welcomes the [proposal of the European Commission to extend the temporary protection](#) for people fleeing the international armed conflict from 4 March 2024 to 3 March 2025. While recognizing that refugees are best placed to evaluate risks and make decisions on return, the extension of Temporary Protection in the European Union and similar legal schemes elsewhere will continue to enable refugees from Ukraine to access protection and rights in host countries and prevent premature return, induced by negative push factors or withdrawal of legal and social rights.

Risk analysis

There are multiple vulnerabilities and risks that could undermine achieving the national recovery and development priorities and SDGs for the next five years in Ukraine. The key risks and trends are interlinked with security, political, societal, and economic areas. Ongoing counteroffensive and military operations, including de-occupation and shifting frontlines, merged with attacks on civilian infrastructure, especially after the termination of the implementation of the Black Sea Initiative, further exacerbate the vulnerability of different groups described under this CCA.

The ongoing fluid and volatile military and political landscape with frontline escalations proposes the need for a UN dual approach: managing in parallel a humanitarian focus closer to the frontline and a recovery focus throughout Ukraine. This further highlights the need for a humanitarian-peace-development triple nexus approach. The UN will define a long-term strategy through its next Cooperation Framework to ensure financial commitments for the long haul for both humanitarian and recovery/development priorities throughout Ukraine.

Holding elections during the post-war period in Ukraine is related to various political risks. The most critical challenges include lack of security and insufficient legislative framework, followed by different constraints such as holding free and democratic elections during martial law, which is restrictive and would not allow for proper campaigning in terms of gatherings, transparency, and media activities. It is

necessary to update the electoral system to ensure major votes and adapt to the changed demographic patterns, including an increased number of IDPs and refugees abroad and soldiers at the front line.

War and displacement-related challenges to social cohesion and resilience of the war-affected communities may lead to horizontal inequalities. The social cleavages and marginalization may increase between population groups, including the most vulnerable. UN strategic frameworks and recovery interventions incorporate social cohesion objectives to strengthen community resilience and overcome trauma and fragility. In line with “A New Agenda for Peace”³⁷, the UN will target promoting social cohesion and resilience to ensure greater tolerance and solidarity.

Due to war destruction and response efforts, the fragile financial and economic situation may gradually increase Ukraine’s dependency on donors and partners. To mitigate this economic risk, UN efforts will further focus on immediate and longer-term socio-economic impact projects throughout the country, support SMEs, and strengthen private-sector partnerships.

³⁷ A New Agenda for Peace, UN Policy Brief, 2023.

4.2. Social Development Analysis

Poverty Analysis

The impacts of the full-scale Russian invasion have significantly increased the numbers of those living in poverty while exacerbating pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities. The country's poverty rate — based on the global poverty line of US\$ 6.85 per person per day — increased from 5.5 per cent in 2021 to 24.1 per cent in 2022, pushing an additional 7.1 million people into poverty and reversing 15 years of progress.³⁸ This situation has been further exacerbated by high-levels of inflation which reached 23.8 per cent in August 2022, with high food prices negatively impacting household economies.

Loss of income and rise in poverty also disproportionality impacted women, increasing vulnerability for female headed households — especially those headed by an unemployed woman — as well as households with older persons and persons with disabilities, and women from marginalized groups. The effects of war have been especially negative for households with less diversified income sources and are more dependent on one paid job, which tend to include single mothers and female headed households.³⁹ A 2022 survey found that women have a lower household monthly income and women-headed households were more likely to report extreme livelihood needs (23 per cent) compared to households headed by men (14 per cent).⁴⁰

Additionally, women's unpaid care burdens have significantly increased as they need to care for dependents, such as older parents and out of school/home-schooling children, rendering them less able to engage in income-generating activities.⁴¹ Even before the escalation of war, poverty rates were found to be higher among children and in large families whose situation is likely to have further deteriorated.⁴² Rural households which rely on agriculture as one of their main sources of income have experienced a more significant decrease in their income levels compared with those households which rely on non-agricultural activities.⁴³

In 2022, 44 per cent of households reported facing challenges in meeting their basic needs due to inadequate income.⁴⁴ About a fifth of households were found to have regular consumption expenditures below the minimum subsistence level.⁴⁵ Consequently, the need for various types of assistance is high across population groups, although with variations based on their displacement status (*see Table 2 below*). In addition, 80 per cent of IDP households report needing financial assistance to meet their basic needs compared to 54 per cent for non-displaced households and 58 per cent for returnees. Cash remains the most pressing assistance need identified by surveyed non-displaced (46 per cent), IDP (68 per cent), and returnee respondents (63 per cent). While the need for financial assistance was ubiquitous, female IDPs were most likely to report this need.⁴⁶

³⁸ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

³⁹ UN Women, *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine*, May 2022.

⁴⁰ REACH, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) - Gender Focus Brief*, March 2023.

⁴¹ UN Agencies, *Human impact of war in Ukraine*, 12 June 2023.

⁴² UNICEF, *Child Poverty and Disparities in Ukraine*, 2021.

⁴³ FAO, *Impact of the War on Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods in Ukraine. Findings of a Nation-Wide Rural Household Survey*, December 2022

⁴⁴ REACH, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment 2022: Livelihoods Findings*, March 2023.

⁴⁵ REACH and WFP, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment 2022: Food Security Findings*, March 2023.

⁴⁶ IOM, *Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 13 (11 May-14 June 2023)*, 2023.

Table 2: Proportion of population groups in need of various types of assistance

Types of Assistance	Non-IDPs	IDPs	Returnees
Cash	54%	80%	58%
Medicine and health services	22%	36%	23%
Repair materials	25%	27%	27%
Food	13%	29%	17%
Access to money	6%	10%	8%
Clothes, shoes, and other non-food items	10%	30%	12%
Hygiene items	10%	29%	12%
Accommodation	3%	24%	6%

Heightened needs have also driven an increase in the adoption of negative coping strategies across both displaced and non-displaced populations.⁴⁷ While 88 per cent of households among the general population had adopted at least one negative coping strategy, this number increases to 95 per cent for IDP households. IDPs households also reported adoption of nearly all types of coping strategies, including reduced food consumption (68 per cent, compared to 53 per cent of non-IDPs and 61 per cent of returnees) and savings spent (67 per cent, compared to 58 per cent of non-IDPs and 64 per cent of returnees).⁴⁸ Overall, female IDPs were moderately more likely to have employed a coping strategy but were significantly more likely to have reduced non-food and food consumption or to have switched to using lower cost products to meet household needs.⁴⁹

Food Security, Agriculture, and Food Systems

Being a major food producer and exporter, the ongoing conflict has caused significant disruptions to Ukraine’s food systems with implications beyond its borders. Impacts of the war in Ukraine on rising food and energy prices, rising inflation, and unsustainable debt burdens have significantly reduced countries’ fiscal space, undermining their ability to invest in recovery efforts⁵⁰. In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine, or both, ranked among the top three global exporters of wheat, barley, maize, rapeseed and rapeseed oil, and sunflower seed and sunflower oil.⁵¹ The war resulted in a significantly lower output of agrifood products compared to previous years, and difficulties to food exports, particularly through the Black Sea ports. This has impacted the food security of millions of vulnerable people in many fragile developing countries reliant on food staples from the Black Sea area. While 2022 production volumes are sufficient to cover domestic needs, the availability of Ukrainian agricultural products beyond its borders could be compromised in the future should the agriculture sector continue to deteriorate. It was forecasted that 2022 cereal harvest (comprising winter and spring/summer crops) would reach 51 million tonnes, about two thirds of the annual average and 40 per cent below the exceptional 2021 harvest.⁵²

A quarter of the population was food insecure at the end of 2022, with higher prevalence in the eastern and southern regions compared to the rest of the country. While economic access to food was found to be the main driver of food insecurity across the country, physical access from markets posed an

⁴⁷ World Bank, *Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022: Social Protection for Recovery*, 2022.

⁴⁸ IOM, *Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 13 (11 May-14 June 2023)*, 2023.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ <https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/SDG%20Progress%20Report%20Special%20Edition.pdf>

⁵¹ FAO, *The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine*. Information note, 10 June 2022 Update

⁵² FAO, *Ukraine Response Programme. January–December 2023. Restoring Food Systems and Protecting Food Security in Ukraine*, 2023.

additional challenge in areas close to frontline and to those recently liberated.⁵³ Demographic groups most vulnerable to food insecurity included displaced households, households with a member with a disability, single parent households headed by women, households with people with chronic illnesses, and those who are unemployed.⁵⁴

The overall slowdown in the economy, increasing unemployment, reduced food production, and high levels of food inflation meant that many vulnerable households were unable to afford healthy diets or even relied on humanitarian support. Over the course of 2022, the proportion of households with inadequate food consumption increased from one fifth to one third, with the southeast macro-region being most negatively impacted.⁵⁵ Poor nutrition also posed a risk to the overall health of the population, especially children, with longer-term impacts on the physical and mental well-being of Ukrainian citizens.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, 13 million rural Ukrainians — a third of the population — engaged in small-scale agriculture, producing approximately 32 per cent of domestic agricultural output.⁵⁶ Such small-scale agricultural production will continue to be pivotal for ensuring food security for local communities. In 2022, localized rural food production proved critical to supporting IDPs who have moved from urban to rural areas to escape the impact of the war.

Damages to agricultural land and infrastructure, land abandonment, displacement of rural populations, destruction of government offices, and loss of formal documents have resulted in a situation where many landowners and users' rights to land have become insecure, questioned, or unknown. Re-establishing and confirming tenure arrangements and the ensuing task of land restitution will be complicated. In addition, the development of Ukraine's agricultural land market, which was opened in July 2021 after a 20-year moratorium, has been severely restricted, making it more difficult, particularly for family farms, to increase their opportunities to access land.

In 2022, agricultural production declined by as much as 38 per cent in conflict affected areas, with many farmers resorting to negative coping strategies to meet their basic needs.⁵⁷ Around one-third of rural households required humanitarian and technical assistance — including the provision of feed, fodder, clean water, and electricity to sustain their livelihoods.

In addition to smallholder farmers, other actors upon which food systems relied upon included agricultural enterprises, transporters, vendors, wholesalers, processors, and packagers, who have also seen their incomes and livelihoods impacted. The observed and projected impact of climate change, particularly on the agriculture sector, is likely to further exacerbate the situation.

Both commercial and non-commercial producers face difficulties to access production resources and variable inputs, including agricultural land, water, seeds, agrochemicals, food ingredients, extension and advisory services, energy, and fuel. In particular, the threat of explosive remnants of war/unexploded ordnance contamination prevents lands from being cultivated and has resulted in significant declines in the winter sowing campaign for 2023 crops. The situation is further aggravated by the damage to

⁵³ REACH and WFP, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment 2022: Food Security Findings*, March 2023.

⁵⁴ UN Agencies, *Human impact of war in Ukraine*, 12 June 2023.

⁵⁵ WFP, *Ukraine food security trend analysis (February 2023)*, 13 March 2023.

⁵⁶ FAO, *Ukraine: Impact of the War on Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods in Ukraine*, 2022.

⁵⁷ FAO, *Ukraine: Response programme, January–December 2023*, 2022.

hydrological infrastructure at large reservoirs and irrigation canals. (See section on ‘Environment and Climate Change Analysis’ for further information on the impact of the escalation on the environment)

The war has also had a negative impact on the aquaculture and fishery sectors, especially in frontline and adjacent areas. The effect on industrial sea fishing was immediate, with all activity in the Azov-Black Sea basin ceasing due to increasing threats to fisherfolk and their vessels. In addition, 91 per cent of aquafarmers and 56 per cent of fisherfolk have reported a price increase in inputs while 32 per cent of aquafarmers and 23 per cent of fisherfolks in frontline oblasts reported damage to assets, resulting in lost incomes and an inability to meet international demand for fish.⁵⁸

Social Protection

The Ukrainian social protection system is benefit oriented rather than ensuring provision of adequate levels of social protection and social services. The decentralisation reform has shifted the social protection funding responsibility towards the communities, that still may lack resources that leads to unequal access to social services. There is noticeable lack of social series providers, lack of reliable and disaggregated data and needs assessment on population in need of social services.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s social protection system covered between 19 to 22 million people,⁵⁹ with approximately 73 per cent of the population covered under at least one form of direct or indirect social support.⁶⁰ Women made up 72 per cent of social protection recipients prior to the full-scale war and were the majority of older people and caregivers reliant on benefits.⁶¹ While the social protection system has managed to maintain pre-existing social support levels, current beneficiary levels and preliminary poverty estimations do not yet reflect the full extent of the financial resources required as a consequence of the conflict.

In 2022, Ukraine’s social programmes — including pensions, subsidies, assistance to low-income families, payments to IDPs — totalled UAH 426 billion, representing the second largest state budget priority.⁶² According to the Government of Ukraine,⁶³ social protection expenditures in 2023 will amount to UAH 447 billion, corresponding to 7.1 per cent of the forecasted GDP volume.⁶⁴

The Government of Ukraine has introduced new benefits in response to the ongoing conflict, including humanitarian assistance, such as cash transfers to IDPs, a modality consistently considered as the most pressing need by IDPs.⁶⁵ The obligation to continue to operate in war conditions, in addition to the temporary expansion of support, has significantly stretched national resources and Ministry of Social Policy’s capacities. It is estimated the number of available social workers has halved since the beginning of the war to 3,000 — many due to displacement — which is severely inadequate to meet the rising needs.⁶⁶ Despite consistent spending on social safety nets, growing needs had already outpaced coverage and adequacy of social benefits even before the current escalation began.⁶⁷ As humanitarian

⁵⁸ FAO, *Ukraine: Damages and losses in the aquaculture and fishery sectors - Report on the impact of the ongoing war*, 2023.

⁵⁹ ILO, *Universal Social Protection: Universal old-age, disability and survivors pensions in Ukraine*, 2016.

⁶⁰ ILO (2019). *Ukraine Country Profile Data*.

⁶¹ UN Women, *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine: Secondary Data review*, March 2022

⁶² Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, *Open Budget Portal*.

⁶³ Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, *Social Protection National Recovery Plan – Sectoral Working Group No. 22 Analysis Paper*, 2022.

⁶⁴ Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2023” on Provision of Expenditure for the Security and Defense Sector”.

⁶⁵ IOM, *Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 13 (11 May-14 June 2023)*, 2023.

⁶⁶ Reported from UNICEF citing Ministry of Social Protection figures.

⁶⁷ ILO (2016) *Social Security System of Ukraine in 2014–15 and Beyond Towards effective social protection floors*, World Bank (2019) *Challenges and Options for Reforming the SSN System in Ukraine*, WFP (2017) *Study on Social Protection and Safety Nets in Ukraine* and UNICEF (2020) *Social Policy Programme*.

structures step in to support additional needs, it is crucial to ensure such efforts contribute to the strengthening of the national social protection system, enabling access to quality social services, while avoiding risks, such as a potential lack of ownership of social support provision and the de-prioritization of social support financing from national budgets in the recovery phase.

Health and Nutrition

Over the past years, the Government of Ukraine has made significant progress in reforming the national health care system and improving public health. Since 2013/2014, the Government of Ukraine has implemented various health care reforms aimed at ending corruption, raising the quality of primary health care, and improving accessibility. Reform efforts continue amidst the ongoing war, in line with Ukraine’s National Health Strategy 2030 agenda.

Despite these reform efforts, **access to medicines and health and nutrition services** have deteriorated, especially for the most vulnerable children and women and representatives of HIV and TB key populations and people in detention. Conflict related damage to health infrastructure and facilities, the loss of staff through displacement and/or conscription, and a lack of transportation, particularly in rural areas, has limited the ability of many to access primary and secondary health care services.

The lack of staff as a result of a war-related exodus of healthcare professionals has become a major barrier to service delivery. For example, maternal and new-born care services are unavailable in 23 per cent of facilities due to a lack of staff, while mental health and psychosocial support is unavailable in a third of facilities because of an absence of qualified personnel.⁶⁸ Given that pre-war Ukraine already had a lower life expectancy than comparable European states, the impact of a longer-term loss of medical services could be significant.⁶⁹

A December 2022 assessment found that half of respondents reported that they were struggling with the increased cost of medicines (47 per cent) and treatment (27 per cent).⁷⁰ Another survey found that, 17 per cent reported insufficient access to medical services and medicines, reaching 26 per cent in the southern macro-region and 28 per cent for those living in settlements occupied during the war (see **Figure 5**).⁷¹




Figure 5: Share of all respondents who reported lack of medicines and health

Constrained access to health care also disproportionately impacts women and girls who face obstacles not just for routine needs, but also for sexual health and gynaecological and gender-based violence related health care. While the maternal mortality ratio has declined in recent years — although still very high compared with neighbouring countries — the conflict has increased risks by limiting access to ante/postnatal care and assisted facility-based births. Caesarean rates have

⁶⁸ WHO, *HeRAMS Ukraine First Round Results November 2022 - January 2023*, 2023.
⁶⁹ UNFPA, *Gender Perspective of the Healthcare Sector of Ukraine*, 2022.
⁷⁰ WHO, *Health needs assessment of the adult population in Ukraine: Survey report December 2022*, 10 March 2023.
⁷¹ IOM, *Ukraine Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey Round 11*, December 2022.

risen, and rates of premature births have also reportedly increased, especially in areas near to active conflict.

Already low exclusive breastfeeding rates during the first six months of life have dropped further, with a survey from October 2022 finding rates of around 15 per cent.⁷² Lack of financial means to purchase the breastmilk substitutes and lack of privacy and hygiene conditions are reportedly a key challenge for mothers who do not breastfeed their children.⁷³ These combined factors may directly impact the survival and health and development outcomes for infants and young children, both during and after the war.

Even prior to the escalation, routine childhood **vaccination coverage** in Ukraine was among the lowest in Europe.⁷⁴ Despite a substantial increase in coverage between 2017 to 2021, the country has not yet reached the regional target of 95 per cent for any antigen under routine vaccination and has not implemented the supplementary immunization activities on measles, polio, and hepatitis at the required scale.

The burden of **non-communicable diseases** in Ukraine is great. In 2020, cardiovascular disease was the leading cause of death, accounting for two-thirds of all deaths.⁷⁵ Ukraine has a very high prevalence of the behavioural and biological risk factors for non-communicable diseases, especially in men. A third of the population are smokers, nearly a third of all men engage in heavy episodic drinking, and more than half of the population are overweight while a quarter are obese.⁷⁶ This situation is likely to further deteriorate due to the severe mental health consequences resulting from the conflict (*see Box 3 below*).

Box 3: A Looming Mental Health Catastrophe

Even before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine carried a high burden of mental illness, with a particularly high prevalence of depression in comparison to other countries. Mental disorders are the country's second leading cause of disability burden in terms of disability adjusted life years and are estimated to affect 30 per cent of the population. The war has compounded these issues.

Based on other emergency settings, it is estimated that of those who have experienced war or other conflict in the previous decade, 22 per cent will suffer depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia. In applying these estimates to Ukraine, it is expected that approximately 9.6 million people may have or develop a mental health condition. It is estimated that 1.5 million children in Ukraine are at risk of mental health issues, with potential long-term effects.⁷⁷ Populations on the front line and workers providing essential services in areas that have experienced Russian atrocities and in areas impacted by weapons with wide area effects are more likely to have experienced trauma. Displaced populations also have a significant need for mental health support. In the context of traditional gender roles and general lack of mental health services, women are often expected to provide emotional support to family members, leading to women in such situations to prioritize the health and welfare of their children and other family members over their own.

In the education sector, according to surveys conducted by national institutions, 75 per cent of Ukrainian schoolchildren have experienced stress and 26 per cent of Ukrainian teenagers have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. 54 per cent of teachers are professionally burned-out, and 46 per cent of teachers

⁷² Findings from UNICEF October 2022 survey.

⁷³ WHO and Ukraine Health Cluster, *Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) (May 2023)*, 1 June 2023.

⁷⁴ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, *Operational public health considerations for the prevention and control of infectious diseases in the context of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine*, 8 March 2023.

⁷⁵ WHO, *Tackling noncommunicable diseases in Ukraine 2015-2019*, 2020.

⁷⁶ WHO, *STEPS: prevalence of noncommunicable disease risk factors in Ukraine 2019*, 2020.

⁷⁷ UNICEF, *War in Ukraine pushes generation of children to the brink, warns UNICEF*, 21 February 2023.

identified psychological support as the primary need for their school.^{78 79} Meanwhile, there is a significant shortage of school psychologists, and institutions providing Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, such as Inclusive Resource Centers, are in need of support in terms of capacity and infrastructure.

The Government of Ukraine has recognized the need to address mental health concerns and has collaborated with a range of partners, including the UN, to develop a roadmap to address mental health and psychosocial support challenges which outlines evidence-based interventions and actions to scale-up mental health services in the short- and long-term.⁸⁰ In addition, the Office of the First Lady, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Science, the Presidential Foundation for Support of Education, Science and Sport and various partners launched the National Program for Mental Health and Psychosocial Support. With the aim of addressing the negative impacts on the mental health of Ukrainian students, teachers, parents and care givers the Government also adopted the Concept of Safety of Educational Institutions which presents a comprehensive strategy to create safe, inclusive, and appropriate educational environments for students and teachers.

The war has had a significant impact on **people who use drugs**, in that shortage of medicines and medical supplies has put them at risk of discontinued drug treatment.⁸¹ It is estimated that more than one out of six young people use any drugs during lifetime.⁸² People with drug use disorders are often affected by other mental health disorders and physical health comorbidities and marginalized including when it comes to their access to other services offered to the general population.

The spread of **communicable diseases** poses another challenge. Ukraine is one of the top 20 countries with the highest estimated number of drug-resistant tuberculosis cases worldwide⁸³ and has one of the highest rates of newly diagnosed HIV infections in the WHO European Region highly associated with the prevalence level of injecting drug use.⁸⁴

The war has caused significant disruption to the quite well-established **HIV** services. An average of 38 HIV treatment sites have not been functioning since the first day of the war, while more than 20 hospitals providing HIV related services have been damaged or destroyed. According to Public Health Centre, at least some 13,000 people on antiretroviral therapy treatment were lost to follow up (i.e., not in contact with doctor for new course of antiretroviral therapy for 28 days or more) between 24 February to 31 December 2022. Although not yet measured, there is a risk of an increased spread of HIV and sexually transmitted infections due to an increase in unsafe sexual and drug use in people under stress. Injuries, blood transfusions, and sexual violence — which have risen since the beginning of the full-scale invasion — have further increased the risks of HIV infection.

Specialized **tuberculosis** treatment facilities were damaged in nine oblasts,⁸⁵ mostly in the east and south of the country. Population displacements and movements have increased the risk of spread of respiratory infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, due to overcrowding in shelters, malnutrition, and continuous heightened levels of stress. In addition, the **disease surveillance** system has been

⁷⁸ 24 Ocbita: *Цифра тривожить: скільки вчителів "вигоріли", а учнів стресує через війну*, 27 January 2023.

⁷⁹ Ministry of Education and Science, 11 May 2023

⁸⁰ WHO, *Ukrainian Prioritized Multisectoral Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Actions During and After the War: Operational Roadmap*, 9 December 2022.

⁸¹ UNODC, *Conflict in Ukraine: key evidence on drug demand and supply*, 2022

⁸² Ministry of Health of Ukraine, *Report on drug and alcohol situation in Ukraine for 2022 (based on data 2021), 2022*

⁸³ WHO, *Global tuberculosis report 2021*, 2021.

⁸⁴ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and WHO, *HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe 2021 – 2020 data*, 30 November 2021.

⁸⁵ Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Luhansk, Kyiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv city metropolitan area.

disrupted, especially in conflict-affected oblasts, with many laboratories being non-functional, leading to a decline in pandemic preparedness.

Despite the challenges, significant progress in health and rehabilitation support to persons with disabilities has been made over the past decade (*see Chapter 4: for more information on persons with disabilities*). More recently, citizens injured as a result of the conflict have begun receiving rehabilitation care in a hospital immediately after surgery or other interventions.⁸⁶ In addition, a number of rehabilitation centres have recently opened,^{87,88} although more work is needed to meet the rising need for rehabilitation services that are aligned with international standards.

Education

While challenges existed prior to 2022, the ongoing war is further testing the capacity of the education system. More than 3,000 educational institutions were damaged and 363 destroyed until the end of September 2023⁸⁹ — mostly in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk oblasts^{90,91} — representing more than 10 per cent of all institutions in the country. Around 16 per cent of schools do not have a bomb shelter,⁹² while the size of a school's bomb shelter often determines how many students can attend class in person. In areas recently regained by Ukraine, unexploded ordnance and mines pose an additional risk to the safety of students and education personnel.⁹³ Regular air raid sirens and power and heating outages in winter have brought additional disruption to the learning process. In addition, higher education institutes and research centres have been destroyed, looted, or are understaffed.

Such damage and other war related disruptions continue to impact the ability of the education system to ensure the continuity of learning of up to 5.7 million school-aged children.⁹⁴ As of September 2023, around half a million school-aged children and nearly 12,000-15,000 teachers continued to reside abroad,^{95,96} with an additional 161,000 school children being internally displaced.⁹⁷ In displacement settings, there is a high risk of disruption to education as well as diminished learning outcomes, exacerbating the losses of the COVID-19 pandemic. The enrolment of refugee students in national schools remains very low in seven countries hosting Ukrainian refugees (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia). It is estimated that 6 in 10 children are not enrolled in host country schools.⁹⁸

The New Ukrainian School reform, which was launched in 2017 and expected to be rolled out in secondary schools in 2022, is currently hampered by the war and a lack of capacity to implement on the ground. Preparations for the third stage of implementation in 2027 are also hampered, jeopardizing the results and quality of learning outcomes for children currently enrolled.

⁸⁶ President of Ukraine, Official website, *At a joint event with the WHO, Luliia Sokolovska spoke about the development of the rehabilitation system in Ukraine*, 7 March 2023.

⁸⁷ ECH Alliance, *Ukraine's first spinal cord injury centre opened in Rivne: patients in wheelchairs are taught to control their bodies*, 8 March 2023.

⁸⁸ UNBROKEN, *A modern rehabilitation building of the UNBROKEN national center opened in Lviv*, 12 April 2023.

⁸⁹ Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, *Overview of the current state of education and science in Ukraine*, February 2023.

⁹⁰ Cedos, *War and Education. How a Year of the Full-scale Invasion Influenced Ukrainian Schools*, 31 March 2023.

⁹¹ World Bank, *Ukraine Human Development Update*, February 2023.

⁹² Cedos, *War and Education. How a Year of the Full-scale Invasion Influenced Ukrainian Schools*, 31 March 2023.

⁹³ Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, *Attacks on Education and Military Use of Education Facilities in Ukraine in 2022*, February 2023.

⁹⁴ UNICEF, *Humanitarian Situation Report No. 24: 24 February – 31 December 2022*, 7 January 2023.

⁹⁵ 24 Osbita, *Другий навчальний рік за кордоном: які зміни очікують на українських школярів у різних країнах*, 6 September 2023.

⁹⁶ 24 Osbita, *Скільки українських учителів не повернулися з-за кордону через війну*, 4 September 2023

⁹⁷ 24TV, *Це дуже великий виклик!": скільки учнів та вчителів з України досі за кордоном* ("This is a very big challenge": how many students and teachers from Ukraine are still abroad), 24 February 2023.

⁹⁸ UNESCO, *Mapping education responses for Ukrainian refugees*, June 2023

Sixty-two per cent of children do not attend kindergarten, with this figure increasing to 76 per cent in frontline areas,⁹⁹ while 72 per cent of children do not attend other educational or developmental centres, depriving them the space to socialize, play, and learn, while significantly adding to women's care burden.

Face-to-face education remains restricted, especially in areas close to the front line. For the new school year 2023/2024, in almost 13,000 functioning schools in Ukraine, only 58 per cent operate in a traditional classroom setting, while another third moved to an exclusively online format.¹⁰⁰ During the 2021/2022 school year, 3.6 million children learned remotely.¹⁰¹ At the beginning of March 2023, around a third of general secondary schools operated online, with 1.63 million secondary students studying exclusively online.¹⁰² Meanwhile, widespread learning loss has been observed, including a deterioration in learning outcomes of the Ukrainian language, reading and mathematics.¹⁰³

The biggest challenges to online learning are access to highspeed internet, a lack of devices for online teaching and learning, evolving security threats, a lack of digital skills, destroyed or damaged educational facilities, and power outages.^{104,105} These limitations are even greater for vulnerable categories of students. The lack of communication with classmates and teachers are additional limiting factors for social development, especially for children with disabilities.¹⁰⁶

The war has also had a dire impact on the mental health of children, youth, and teachers, hampering the protective capacity of education. Children in war who are exposed to violence and displacement and lose their usual routines experience disrupted cognitive, emotional, social, and physical development.¹⁰⁷ According to a survey conducted at the end of 2022, 75 per cent of schoolchildren experienced stress, 54 per cent of teachers are professionally burned-out, and 46 per cent of teachers identified psychological support as the primary need for their school.^{108,109}

Meanwhile, there is a significant shortage of school psychologists, and institutions providing Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, such as Inclusive Resource Centres, are in need of support in terms of capacity and infrastructure.

A March 2023 survey found that 60 per cent of parents identified anxiety as the reason for their children's absence from schools. Among youth, 69 per cent reported that their emotional situation worsened, and a high percentage reported feeling anxious, especially among female youth (58 per cent versus 44 per cent for male youth).¹¹⁰ Many children have lost connections with their friends and peers due to the war and displacement. The move towards online learning together with an increased exposure to cyberspace in their personal relations due to the limitations of the safety and security situation has also increased the risk and vulnerability of children to cybercrime, including to online child sexual abuse and exploitation. Though the global criminal trend of the child sexual abuse material

⁹⁹ UNICEF, *Preschool education: monitoring public opinion survey*, February 2023.

¹⁰⁰ Serhiy Shkarlet, (former) Minister of Education of Ukraine. [Telegram channel](#), post on 6 March 2023.

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, [Overview of the current state of education and science in Ukraine in terms of Russian aggression \(as of May 16 – 21, 2022\)](#), 2022.

¹⁰² Serhiy Shkarlet, (former) Minister of Education of Ukraine. [Telegram channel](#), post on 6 March 2023.

¹⁰³ UNICEF, [Widespread learning loss among Ukraine's children, as students enter fourth year of disruption to education](#), 29 August 2023

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of Education and Science, [Ukraine Education Needs Assessment Survey \(6 May – 24 June 2022\)](#), 2022.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ REACH, [Education Sector Assessment in Conflict-Affected Areas](#), February 2023.

¹⁰⁷ WHO, [Ukrainian Prioritized Multisectoral Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Actions During and After the War: Operational Roadmap](#), 9 December 2022.

¹⁰⁸ 24 Ocbita, [Цифра тривожить: скільки вчителів "вигоріли", а учнів стресує через війну \(The figure is alarming: how many teachers are "burnt out", and students are stressed because of the war\)](#), 27 January 2023.

¹⁰⁹ 24 Ocbita, [Втрати є значними: які проблеми змушені долати учні та вчителі у час війни \(Losses are significant: what problems students and teachers have to overcome in wartime\)](#), 24 April 2023.

¹¹⁰ UNICEF, [U-Report poll on mental health](#), February 2023

(CSAM) production and sharing is increasing in all countries¹¹¹ however, in Ukraine, current numbers of CSAM reports (CyberTipline Data) decreased by 23% from 2021 to 2022¹¹². There is a risk that this reduction might not be linked to a reduction in the number of victims directly, but to the lower institutional capacities to detect and report CSAM in the current situation. Unaddressed risks and mental health problems among children and youth can lead to acute and long-term psychological and economic issues that have the potential to detrimentally affect human capital development, thereby hampering longer-term development, especially given the added impact of the conflict induced 'brain drain' from the country.¹¹³ As such, many families, teachers and students are in urgent need of digital safety sensitization and training in cybercrime prevention aspects, as well as of , psychological and multidisciplinary family support to ensure the full enjoyment and exercise of their human rights.¹¹⁴

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

Before the onset of the full-scale invasion, approximately 10 million people lacked access to safely managed water services and 20 million lacked access to centralized wastewater collection and treatment services. The conflict has caused severe damage to water-related infrastructure, including water supply and sewage networks. Water and sewage facilities, pumping stations, and other critical facilities are also highly dependent on and require constant power and have been impacted by ongoing blackouts. This has resulted in a lack of safe drinking water for millions of people, posing serious public health risks, and has rendered 11 million people in need of humanitarian emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene services.¹¹⁵ The use of unsafe water used in food production and processing can also result in knock on impacts on health.

Total physical damage to the water supply and sanitation sector is estimated at US\$ 2.2 billion;¹¹⁶ however, this figure may underestimate the actual damage by up to 30 per cent, particularly in light on the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023. Major physical infrastructure, such as sewage treatment plants, water supply and sewerage networks, drinking water treatment plants and facilities, have suffered the most damage. Numerous water and sewage pumping stations have also been impacted.

The war has destroyed wetland and water-related ecosystems, which is already posing problems for inland fisheries, some of which are suspected to be mined. Damage to sewage and water treatment infrastructure can lead to increased water and adjacent soil pollution, threatening further the environment's ability to support healthy plant and animal life. There have also been substantial water control losses due to damage to hydrological infrastructure at large reservoirs and irrigation canals, impeding flood control and leading to loss or damage of homes and causing water shortages for consumption, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, aquaculture, and other essential purposes. Industries reliant on water or those posing potential threats to water quality have also been impacted.

The war poses significant obstacles to integrated water resource management. Notably, it hinders establishing water management regimes, issuing permits for special water use in inaccessible territories,

¹¹¹ National Centre for Missing and Exploited Persons *NCMEC received 29.3 million of suspected CSAM reports by the end of 2021, a 35% increase in relation to 2020.

¹¹² International Centre for Missing and Exploited Persons receives reports of online child sexual abuse and exploitation. In 2021, Ukraine registered 52,322 reports and in 2022, 67,852.

¹¹³ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

¹¹⁴ Cedos, *War and Education. How a Year of the Full-scale Invasion Influenced Ukrainian Schools*, 31 March 2023.

¹¹⁵ OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023*, 28 December 2022.


¹¹⁶ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

complicates river basin management, flood, and drought risk management plans, and impedes transboundary cooperation.

4.3. Economic Transformation Analysis

In 2021, Ukraine's GDP growth was comparatively low (3.4 per cent year-on-year) when considered alongside that of Central Europe and the Baltics, which was 6.1 per cent year-on-year. Like its neighbours, Ukraine also experienced COVID-19 related contractions of GDP at a rate of -3.8 per cent, compared to the average of -3.4 per cent for Central Europe and the Baltics as a whole.¹¹⁷

Pre-existing economic structural weaknesses have been further compounded by Russia's full-scale invasion, with devastating consequences for Ukraine's economy. GDP declined by 29.2 per cent in 2022 and inflation rose to 26.6 per cent.¹¹⁸ The trade deficit more than doubled between December 2021 and December 2022.¹¹⁹ Massive fiscal deficit increases have so far been met through significant external financing and monetization. However, considering the scale of the shock, Ukraine's economy has shown considerable resilience, with the economic outlook for 2023 projected to be more favourable.¹²⁰



In the last decade, the national economic structure of Ukraine, previously heavily focused on the export of goods, progressively shifted to include a strong service economy, with an emphasis on information technology services.¹²¹ The service sector employed most of the workforce in 2021 and accounted for half of Ukraine's GDP.¹²² In contrast, agriculture represented only 11 per cent of GDP in 2021 and 14 per cent of employment, but accounted for 44 per cent of total exports.¹²³ Even prior to full-scale invasion, Ukraine's economic development was characterized by increasing inequality, with Kyiv city and the central oblasts (Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava) and some Eastern oblasts (Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia) on a faster track of economic and demographic growth compared to conflict-affected areas.¹²⁴ (*SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities*)

In 2021, manufacturing value added accounted for 11.4 per cent of Ukraine's GDP.¹²⁵ The vast majority of Ukrainian industrial companies are micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.¹²⁶ Total damage to

¹¹⁷ World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Available [here](#).

¹¹⁸ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

¹¹⁹ O'Hanlon, Michael E., Constanze Stelzenmüller, and David Wessel. "Ukraine Index." *Brookings* (blog), February 24, 2023.

¹²⁰ National Bank of Ukraine, *Business Outlook Survey, Q4 2022*, 16 January 2023.

¹²¹ IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files, *ICT service exports (% service exports, BoP)*, [Accessed 17 April 2022].

¹²² Especially women (49% of the workforce for men and 75% of the workforce for women). The other half of the economy is dominated by industry (35% of men and 14% of the women in the workforce) and agriculture (16% of men and 11% of women in the workforce). ILO estimates. World Bank database.

¹²³ US Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Production and Trade*, April 2022.

¹²⁴ Mezentsev, Kostyantyn, Grygorii Pidgrushnyi, and Nataliia Mezentseva. "Challenges of the Post-Soviet Development of Ukraine: Economic Transformations, Demographic Changes and Socio-Spatial Polarization." *In Understanding Geographies of Polarization and Peripheralization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond*, edited by Thilo Lang, Sebastian Henn, Wladimir Sgibnev, and Kornelia Ehrlich, 252–69. *New Geographies of Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015.

¹²⁵ UNIDO statistics data portal, *Ukraine*.

¹²⁶ UNIDO, *Rapid Industrial Diagnostic Study, Ukraine*, February 2023.

Ukrainian commerce and industry (*SDG 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure*) is estimated at US\$ 10.9 billion. Large parts of the Ukrainian heavy industry were based in the east and south of the country where territories have been occupied or where intense battles have damaged or destroyed industrial facilities. Due to constant shelling, industries are not encouraged to reconstruct destroyed facilities due to risks of repeated attacks, nor are investors eager to invest. Many industries in the east have moved to the west of the country, with the Government providing temporary relocation support for companies.¹²⁷ Despite its intended temporary nature, there are concerns around a longer-term deindustrialization of the eastern oblasts.

Any recovery of the commercial, agricultural, and industrial sectors is likely to be extremely constrained while the conflict persists and may take decades to recover completely. In addition, any green recovery will face significant challenges given the nature of Ukrainian industries which are major sources of air, water, and land pollution, as well as greenhouse gas emissions (*See section on 'Environment and Climate Change Analysis' for further information*).

Labour Market and Employment

Ahead of Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine was already experiencing its highest unemployment rate in the past decade, standing at 9.8 per cent of the total labour force in 2021 (9.5 per cent for men, 10.1 per cent for women, 10.6 per cent in rural areas, and 9.5 per cent in rural areas).¹²⁸ 52 per cent of women in Ukraine were employed compared to 62 per cent of men.¹²⁹ There was an approximately 23 per cent gender pay gap¹³⁰. However, access to employment opportunities in Ukraine have declined considerably as a result of the war. It is estimated that employment in 2022 was 15.5 per cent (2.4 million jobs) below pre-war levels.¹³¹ National surveys report that only 67 per cent of those who were employed before the escalation still have a job.¹³² Ninety per cent of previously employed IDPs who are currently inactive — including those seeking work, not seeking work, and engaged in housework — lost their jobs directly due to the war, affecting both male and female IDPs equally.¹³³ Only 29 per cent of IDPs of working age are currently employed in their area of displacement, with the lack of decent employment opportunities and childcare cited as the main barriers to seeking work.¹³⁴ Businesses reportedly still expect to reduce their workforce in 2023, although at a slower pace than in 2022.¹³⁵

There were already many barriers to women's economic participation and livelihoods prior to the full-scale invasion. However, this situation has been exacerbated since February 2022 with women's engagement in voluntary activities and men's absence due to their participation in the armed forces severely limiting the ability of women to participate in income-generating activities. These impacts have been particularly negative for women with restricted mobility, including older women and female caregivers.¹³⁶ For displaced women and for those returning to their homes, finding new livelihoods is a considerable challenge. Moreover, women from minority communities such as the Roma face additional barriers in terms of access to livelihoods and care responsibilities.

¹²⁷ Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine, *Make in UA: Relocation website*.

¹²⁸ State Statistic Service of Ukraine, *Labour Force of Ukraine 2019*, 2020.

¹²⁹ CARE & UN Women (2022). *Rapid gender analysis of Ukraine*.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ ILO, *ILO Monitor on the world of work. 10th edition: Multiple crises threaten the global labour market recovery*, October 2022.

¹³² Rating Sociological Group, *Legal Protection of Victims from the War Crimes of Russia (December 23–26, 2022)*, February 2023.

¹³³ IOM, *Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 13 (11 May–14 June 2023)*, 2023.

¹³⁴ UNHCR, *Ukraine Intention Report 3*, February 2023.

¹³⁵ National Bank of Ukraine, *Business Outlook Survey, Q4 2022*, 16 January 2023.

¹³⁶ UN Women, *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine: Secondary Data review*, March 2022.

In Ukraine, unpaid care for children, elderly people, and people with disabilities continues to be viewed as a responsibility primarily for women and girls. The salience of this norm results in fewer women participating in the labor market, participating in vulnerable informal employment, and pursuing lesser paid work or altered working hours which in turn contribute to gender wage and pension gaps.¹³⁷ Since the escalation, inequalities in care work and access to livelihoods for women have greatly increased. As indicated by a CARE and UN Women report, it is estimated that prior to 24 February 2022 women spent an average of 24.6 hours per week on unpaid work, including care work, to men's 14.5 hours per week.¹³⁸ Since then, it is estimated that this number has greatly increased for women in and outside of Ukraine, due to the closure of or lack of access to care facilities, security risks, loss of paid employment, and engagement in volunteer efforts among others. At the same time, it is estimated that roughly 4.8 million jobs have been lost in Ukraine since the escalation.

Large-scale population displacement, combined with military service volunteer mobilization and conscription, has resulted in imbalances in the formal labour market. In addition to an already declining and aging population (estimated to shrink by a third in the next 30 years), high levels of displacement — especially outside of Ukraine — have heightened already existing demographic concerns about Ukraine's shrinking skilled labour force, especially as two million children have left Ukraine and are expected to remain abroad in other parts of Europe.¹³⁹ There is a considerable outflow of specialized workers in all areas of employment: the sector of culture is suffering from this phenomenon particularly as sectorial specialization are often owned already by limited number of professionals country wise. Not only are fewer workers available, but Ukrainian refugees abroad are highly employable and therefore less likely to return. Ukraine is likely to have more female-headed households, a larger proportion of single earner households, as well as increasing numbers of households with individuals with disabilities. Such workforce demographic changes will be particularly important to consider when looking ahead to a labour market recovery.¹⁴⁰ The integration into the labour market of a growing number of veterans and physically disabled persons will require specific attention.

Infrastructure

Significant analysis on the costs and impacts on damage and destruction of infrastructure has been published in the *'Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023'* which should be referenced for further information.¹⁴¹ It has been estimated that damage to infrastructure — including in energy and extractives, transport, telecommunications and digital, water supply and sanitation, and municipal services — in the year since the beginning of the full-scale invasion amounted to US\$ 52.5 billion, with reconstruction costs estimated at US\$ 156.4 billion. However, this does not include damages caused since February 2023, including the massive impacts caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023 (see **Box 4** below).

Box 4: Impacts of the Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam

The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023, as a consequence of Russia's war on Ukraine, has led to the flooding of downstream communities, prompting an urgent need for population evacuation and humanitarian assistance. The Kakhovka reservoir played a crucial role in providing energy, drinking water, irrigation, and river transport to various regions in southern Ukraine, as well as supplying water for industries.

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸ [CARE & UN Women \(2022\). Rapid gender analysis of Ukraine.](#)

¹³⁹ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

¹⁴⁰ Giacomo, Anastasia, Tito Boeri, and Oleksandr Zholud. *"The Labour Market in Ukraine: Rebuild Better"* Vox Ukraine. 11 January 2023.

¹⁴¹ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

The release of over 18 cubic kilometres of water poses a significant threat to nearly 80 settlements, potentially affecting around 100,000 inhabitants directly. An initial assessment indicates that 2,200 people have been displaced, while up to one million people could lose access to drinking water. Affected areas will require complete reconstruction before the population can return to their homes. A significant number of mines and unexploded ordnance have been swept downstream and are scattered throughout affected communities.

Approximately 150 tonnes of oil products have been released from the hydroelectric power plant, which may spread downstream to the Black Sea. The floodwaters will also carry waste from industrial sites, sewage facilities, and fertilizer depots, causing extensive pollution of water and land resources. Many thousands of hectares of agricultural land on both sides of the Dnipro River have been affected while forestry resources may also suffer adverse effects. Ecosystems of the Kakhovka reservoir and the lower Dnipro River have been devastated. An estimated 80,000 hectares of protected areas are at risk of destruction.

The breach of the dam has also resulted in the loss of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, a crucial source of clean energy for southern Ukraine, with reconstruction of the plant estimated to cost over US\$ 1 billion. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant also relies on water from the Kakhovka reservoir. The potential loss of the primary cooling water source further exacerbates the already challenging nuclear safety and security situation. Other critical sectors have been impacted, Among which environment, culture.

See the UN's Post Disaster Needs Assessment, 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster report for further information.¹⁴²

The cost of war related to **transport** (SDG 9) sector damages is estimated at US\$ 35.7 billion.¹⁴³ Since the conflict is primarily concentrated in the east and south of the country, economic activity, including transportation services, have had to move to the centre and west, increasing the stress on transportation networks in these areas. While the Government has managed to restore destroyed transport infrastructure, many repairs and reconstruction work require preliminary demining and debris removal in both urban and rural areas, significantly slowing progress. As many qualified Ukrainians have fled the country, the availability of experienced construction personnel poses an additional challenge. The need to rapidly repair and reconstruct damaged roads and bridges makes it more difficult to improve construction standards and to apply a more strategic approach in infrastructure planning.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, 70 per cent of Ukraine's trade, much of it agricultural related, was transported by sea. However, the Russian blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports resulted in most trade being redirected to land border crossing in the west of the country, increasing pressures at crossings not designed to support such volumes of cargo flows. Damage to the power grid and other critical infrastructure also significantly affected border processing capacities. Such increased cargo flows with no additional inspection resources for border management agencies has increased the risk of trafficking of persons and illicit goods, such as narcotic drugs, weapons, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials.

By June 2022, one-fifth of the country's **telecommunications** (SDG 9) infrastructure was damaged or destroyed and by July 2022, 12.2 per cent of settlements had completely lost access to mobile communications. Considerable damage to and destruction of telecommunications infrastructure occurred in more than 10 out of 24 oblasts of Ukraine by August 2022, significantly affecting connectivity in the country. The accumulated damage to the telecommunications sector is estimated at

¹⁴² United Nations Ukraine, [Post Disaster Needs Assessment, 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster](#), September 2023.

¹⁴³ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, [Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023](#), March 2023.

US\$ 1.6 billion while direct damage to telecom facilities, networks, systems, and equipment is estimated at over US\$ 700 million. It is estimated that US\$ 1.79 billion will be needed to restore the telecommunication sector to pre-2022 levels.

Energy (SDG 7) infrastructure was heavily targeted by the Russian military, especially during the winter period. As of February 2023, damage to power, gas, and heating infrastructure was estimated at more than US\$ 10 billion.¹⁴⁴ Continued attacks remains a significant risk. The main challenge for the Government is not only to repair the damages, but also to build back a better infrastructure and to increase energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy security. Before the invasion, renewables accounted for more than 12 per cent of Ukraine's energy mix with the Government aiming to reach 25 per cent by 2035. While the war has created an increased push towards renewables, it is infeasible to switch to renewable energy and bioenergy at large scale in the short-term. However, small steps towards a greener energy system can be made, even within urgent reconstruction projects, while some larger-scale renewable initiatives are already underway.¹⁴⁵

4.4. Environment and Climate Change Analysis

Ukraine faces multiple challenges due to the ongoing war and a legacy of inadequate environmental and climate-sensitive planning with potentially severe impacts on critical infrastructure, food systems, as well as air, land, and water ecosystems and the broader environment. According to the INFORM risk index 2023, Ukraine is considered at a high level of disaster risk, including natural hazards, with low levels of coping capacity, including low structure for prevention of disasters.¹⁴⁶ Given the scale of conflict related destruction — in addition to the already significant pre-existing environmental challenges in the country — and the imperative to address immediate human needs, there is a risk that environmental and climate change challenges and commitments may not be adequately considered or prioritized. However, Ukraine's recovery provides a considerable opportunity to build back better in a manner that advances climate action and is environmentally sustainable, inclusive, and resilient.

Housing and Urban Planning

The housing sector accounts for a large share of conflict related damage in Ukraine, estimated at over US\$ 50 billion, with more than 1.4 million units damaged.¹⁴⁷ More than 67% of the urban population live in multifamily dwellings, the majority of which are aging and require significant investment, not just to repair damage but also to ensure adequate compliance with new energy efficiency and environmental requirements. While integrated urban planning should ideally precede any large-scale recovery to ensure sustainable communities, urban planning and reconstruction efforts are not well integrated. Given the scale of damage and destruction and the urgency to provide places to live for the population, immediate reconstruction efforts are focusing rapid repairs, allowing individuals to remain at home or to return, but it is vital that a longer term response, driven by the Government and focused on larger scale reconstruction is appropriately planned to ensure that it addresses the pre-existing challenges related to environmental, economic, and cultural sustainability, as well as issues pertaining to vulnerability and social exclusion. Given the complexity of urban planning requirements in Ukraine, this effort will require strong coordination and significant financing. While in recent years the Government has actively

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Washington Post, *In the middle of war, Ukraine is building a wind farm*, 10 March 2023.

¹⁴⁶ European Commission INFORM Country Risk Profile: [Ukraine](#).

¹⁴⁷ Gov of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

promoted energy efficiency of residential and social buildings, the rate of energy efficient renovation remained low, recognising the aging housing stock in country, hence there is a good opportunity to use the current need for reconstruction to 'build back better' and to modernise much of the soviet era buildings that predominate, especially in urban settlements.¹⁴⁸

Box 5: Conflict Related Impacts on Cultural Assets and Infrastructures

According to the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, Ukraine counts 120,000 immovable cultural properties on the territory, 401 historic cities, in addition to over 12 million artefacts spread in over 970 museums and 2,500 public collections. It also hosts 8 World Heritage Sites, including Odesa Historic City Centre inscribed on the World heritage List in 2023, in addition to 16 properties listed on the Tentative List¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰. Since the outbreak of the war, culture in all its forms and expressions has suffered widespread damage, destruction, and disruption, concerning cultural sites and institutions, immovable and moveable cultural property, living heritage practices and the creative sector. As of 26 July 2023, UNESCO has verified damage to 274 sites, including 117 religious sites, 27 museums, 98 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 19 monuments, 12 libraries, 1 Archive.¹⁵¹ Damages to museums and looting of collections have shown that in many cases, when available, inventories are still on paper for the high number of movable cultural property in the country, accounting Historic cities with heritage and monuments are under threat, and damage to museums and looting of collections have exposed the need for better inventory and collections management. In April 2022 UNESCO, with some partners, issued a call to professionals and the public involved in the trade of cultural property to refrain from acquiring or taking part in the import, export, or transfer of ownership of cultural property when they have reasonable cause to believe that the objects had been stolen, illegally alienated, clandestinely excavated, or illegally exported from Ukraine.¹⁵²

There is also an insufficient heritage protection regulatory framework with regards to urban regulations and protocols, to protect heritage from development pressures in relation with urban sector ambitions: supporting the preparation of such a framework will be crucial for post-war recovery and reconstruction.

Terrestrial and Aquatic Environment and Ecosystems

The destruction of the environmental monitoring infrastructure in Ukraine and a general lack of environmental monitoring tools, systems, and analyses prevents a comprehensive understanding of the state of the environment, and therefore where remediation is most needed. However, initial assessments indicate significant environmental damage and destruction. More generally, the lack of functioning environmental and climate monitoring systems — including air quality monitoring systems in major cities and radiation monitoring in nuclear power plant exclusion zones — hamper routine assessments and damage evaluations of air, soil, water, forests, ecosystems, and biodiversity. Paired with the absence of early warning systems for climatic events, these limitations create additional risks

¹⁴⁸ As of 1 January 2021, about 6,000 buildings in Ukraine received energy certificates, almost 44% had the lowest energy efficiency class "G", only 1.4% had the highest class "A" according to Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. [Link](#)

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.unesco.org/en/ukraine-war>.

¹⁵⁰ Ukraine has ratified UNESCO Cultural Conventions: Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) with its 2 protocols (1954 and 1999); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. (1970); Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972); Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003); Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005).

¹⁵¹ [Damaged cultural sites in Ukraine verified by UNESCO | UNESCO](#).

¹⁵² UNESCO, *Call by UNESCO and partners concerning the risk of illicit trafficking of Ukrainian cultural property*, 1 April 2022 - Last update: 20 April 2023.

and uncertainties that may negatively affect agriculture and human health, particularly in disaster-prone and urban areas.

Damage or destruction of industries and factories containing hazardous substances, including emissions control equipment, will require immediate environmental remediation. Numerous industrial facilities containing hazardous substances have been damaged, including their emissions control equipment and fuel infrastructure, causing the discharge of pollutants, hazardous materials, and greenhouse gas emissions into the air, water, and land. Consequently, contaminated soils and ground and surface water — including in agricultural lands — pose significant hazards to human health. An increase in greenhouse gas emissions is also an undesirable outcome and, though it may pale in comparison to the other more immediate negative environmental impacts of the war in Ukraine, it has serious global consequences. Moreover, many hazardous chemical and tailing storage facilities are in areas under Russian control which further aggravates the risk of soil, water, and air contamination in the event of accidents, lack of maintenance, or attacks on such facilities.^{153,154}

Military operations have also led to a dramatic increase in waste accumulation, including damaged or abandoned military and civilian vehicles, equipment, shell fragments, building debris, and uncollected household and medical waste. It has been estimated that around 10–12 million tonnes of debris and construction waste has accumulated across the country because of the conflict.¹⁵⁵ Some materials are toxic — such as shell fragments, medical waste, and building debris containing asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and heavy metals — necessitating specialized handling, transportation, and disposal. Contamination by explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnances are widespread and pose additional risks. A key priority will remain mine action, as is estimated that 25 percent of Ukraine territory has been exposed to the war and will not be freed of explosive remnants of war for decades. Almost 10.7 million people are in need of mine action services. The World Bank estimates that the full demining package will cost more than \$37 billion.

Despite the need, waste management systems are overwhelmed, and the country currently lacks the technologies and capacities to clear debris efficiently and manage dangerous waste. In response, the Cabinet of Ministers approved in September 2022 the *Procedure for Handling Waste from the Destruction of Buildings and Structures* to regulate the removal or conflict-related waste.

The war has also accelerated the degradation of vital ecosystems, including agricultural fields and grazing lands, forests, inland waterways, and wetlands. Ukraine has eight UNESCO recognized biodiversity reserves. War-related activities have caused wildfires — including within these biosphere reserves — soil contamination, and waste accumulation, resulting in the destruction and contamination of ecosystems which threaten the survival of numerous plant and animal species, disrupts ecosystem functioning and resilience, hampers their ability to recover and adapt to changing conditions, and impedes sustainable livelihood activities.

Approximately 131 nature conservation areas are situated fully or partially within Russian occupied areas making them inaccessible for maintenance and disrupting forest value chains. Industrial deforestation and illegal logging are widespread, further increasing wildfire risks. War-induced internal

¹⁵³ UNECE, *OSCE press conference “Tailings storage facilities: threats to transboundary waters of Ukraine*, 2 March 2021.

¹⁵⁴ UNEP, *The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine: A Preliminary Review*, 2022.

¹⁵⁵ EcoPolitic, *The volume of debris from destroyed buildings has reached the annual amount of household waste*, 10 February 2023.

and external migration has resulted in shortages of qualified staff while pre-existing scientific research initiatives have halted, resulting in job losses.

Ukraine's National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan is revised and aligned with the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), and policy coherence is further supported through synergies with NDCs, NAP and LDN. An on-going piloting of LDN compatible integrated landscape management, sustainable forest management, rotational grazing and livestock management around key biodiversity areas located in the northern part of the country will offer replicable and scalable models that can be used to address some of the drivers of the ecosystem decline at landscape scale.

Consequences for sustainable use of transboundary water resource within the framework of the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) are still to be fully estimated.¹⁵⁶

Support with strengthening the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) legislation and reporting to the Espoo Convention is needed, to support the integrated environmental rehabilitation and recovery under the broader sustainable development agenda. Landscape approaches underpinned by integrated landscape and spatial land use planning are crucial for environmental rehabilitation and recovery. In addition, there is an overall acceptance that sectorial approaches to land and water management are no longer sufficient to meet global challenges of biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation, sustainable food production and that "integration" and "reconciliation" among different land users are crucial. Apart of the lack of an updated cadastre, the pressing challenge of integrated landscape management is to link for example agricultural practices with other landscape scale activities and ensure the ecological integrity of key biodiversity values and ecosystem services. In this sense, a stronger SEA legislation and SEA-vetted integrated landscape approaches can provide a basic framework for balancing competing demands and integrating policies for multiple biodiversity, land and water uses within a given area.

Climate Change

Russia's war against Ukraine has had a harmful impact on the global climate, causing the release of substantial quantities of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. As indicated by the interim assessment¹⁵⁷, the greenhouse gases emissions linked to twelve months of warfare amounted to 120 million tCO₂e. Fuel consumption has progressively risen each passing month of war, and the extensive use of ammunition has necessitated a significant boost in production in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere to replenish dwindling stocks.

In anticipation of a potential counter-offensive by Ukraine, Russia has constructed kilometers of fortifications along and behind the front lines, using concrete for construction, resulting in additional carbon emissions. The occurrence of fires larger than one hectare has surged 36 times compared to the pre-war period of 12 months. These fires are mainly concentrated near the front line, with many leading to the destruction of forested areas.

The ongoing war in Ukraine caused the country's economy to contract by almost 30% in 2022, resulting in a corresponding reduction in emissions. However, it is expected that the reduction in emissions is less than the decline in GDP. Nonetheless, these reductions were significant, but most of the emissions reduction has simply been displaced outside Ukraine. Millions of refugees have been forced to flee the

¹⁵⁶ UNECE, [The Water Convention and the Protocol on Water and Health](#).

¹⁵⁷ <https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/clim-damage-by-russia-war-12months.pdf>

war, taking their carbon footprint with them to Europe and other parts of the world. In addition, due to energy shortages, disrupted supply lines, and destruction of factories, the production of consumer goods has shifted from Ukraine to other parts of Europe, resulting in increased emissions in those regions. Thus, the reductions in emissions in Ukraine have largely been offset by increased emissions elsewhere, providing no meaningful relief to the climate.

In July 2021, the Government of Ukraine updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 65 percent by 2030 from the 1990 levels. Every five years, countries need to review and enhance the level of ambition reflected in that national climate action plans to ensure that the global average temperature will not rise above 2°C, with aims to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. In Ukraine, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions over the next ten years will be achieved through a number of complex solutions, including modernization of the energy infrastructure and industrial enterprises, developing of renewable energy sources, introducing energy efficiency measures, waste management reform; reforming forest management. Support was provided to the Government of Ukraine by improving the national greenhouse gas inventories and conducting a gender analysis of the national climate policy perspectives. As of 2023, assistance is provided to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources in developing the NDC Roadmap and Financial strategy, alongside an Investment Plan that will run until 2030 to enable successful implementation of the revised NDC. Additional work would be required to revise the NDC to align it with the needs of post-war reconstruction.

The Environmental Security and Climate Adaptation Strategy, complemented by the **Operational Action Plan** were approved on 20 October 2021. The Strategy sets the framework for adaptation action in Ukraine, focusing on essential steps to assess climate impacts on society, economy and nature, integrating adaptation in sectoral and local policies, and ensuring the better use of climate data. **The Action Plan sets out required changes to legislation, including incorporating climate adaptation in local economic and social development strategies**, an environmental assessment process, and an environmental impact assessment process. To bring the Strategy to the life, changes to legislation are also required, including incorporating climate adaptation in local economic and social development strategies, an environmental assessment process, and an environmental impact assessment process.

Consequences for sustainable use of transboundary water resource within the framework of the UN Conventions on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents are still to be fully estimated. However, there is certainly a need to support river basin and flood risk management planning and to maintain mechanisms for transboundary cooperation in Ukraine. As a Party to the UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Ukraine is obliged to implement industrial safety measures, including for prevention, preparedness and response to accidents at hazardous facilities, including tailings, however, lack of access to and information regarding the facilities which are currently outside of control of the Ukrainian government pose growing risks to industrial safety and environmental security. The UNECE Industrial Accident Notification (IAN) System ¹⁵⁸ is a mechanism that can be used, among others, to report an (imminent) accident or request mutual assistance to mitigate its consequences. " ¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ <https://ian.unece.org/>

¹⁵⁹ UNECE, [The Water Convention and the Protocol on Water and Health](https://unece.org/environment-policy/publications/convention-transboundary-effects-industrial-accidents) and <https://unece.org/environment-policy/publications/convention-transboundary-effects-industrial-accidents>.

In accordance with Ukraine's draft recovery plan - specifically, Direction 5, which focuses on effective public administration in the realms of environmental protection and resource utilization - and the recent launch of Ukraine's SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment) register, the country is now presented with a significant opportunity. This development enables Ukraine to not only ensure a sustainable recovery but also foster increased transparency and public engagement. The application of both SEA and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is vital in this transformational process. However, it is particularly important that all reconstruction plans are subjected to SEA, in line with Ukraine's international commitments. For projects located in environmentally sensitive areas such as the Danube Delta and the Carpathians, the application of transboundary EIA, backed by the Ukraine-Romania bilateral agreement under the Espoo Convention, is indispensable.

5. Population Groups (at risk of being) Left Behind

The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs are underpinned by the principle of leaving no one behind and reaching the furthest behind first. Ensuring that those who are left behind or at risk of being left behind are put at the centre of all humanitarian, development, and peace efforts will be imperative if progress towards the SDGs is to be sustained and advanced in Ukraine. Reducing inequalities (*SDG 10, SDG 5*) will also require tackling the often-deep-rooted causes of vulnerability, marginalization, gender discrimination, and exclusion.

The 2021 Ukraine CCA provided a comprehensive outline of those population groups left behind, or at risk of being so, which remains relevant under current conditions¹⁶⁰. However, the full-scale invasion has created new categories of vulnerable groups while exacerbating the vulnerabilities of those already marginalized, excluded, or at risk. This section identifies those population groups, focusing specifically on the impact of the conflict on each.

However, it is important to note that these vulnerabilities and characteristics are often intersectional and overlapping and can apply to multiple groups or individuals simultaneously. They often evolve over time depending on geographical locations, gender, age, health, displacement status, amongst others. While this section categorizes the various vulnerable groups under sub-headings, these should not be interpreted as being distinct or static, but overlapping, fluid, and changing.

Women and Girls

Prior to February 2022, women and girls experienced a wide variety of inequities, which have been exacerbated during Russia's full-scale invasion.¹⁶¹ As highlighted throughout this document, women and girls, in all their diversity, face a wide variety of barriers to their full and meaningful participation in society. High levels of unpaid care work, the gender wage gap, limitations to women's representation in decision-making, and increased safety risks for women and girls are just a few of the prevalent challenges.¹⁶² With women constituting the majority of refugees from Ukraine and those displaced within the country, they face significantly increased safety and protection risks, including multiple forms of gender-based violence (*see section below in this chapter on 'Persons at Risk or Survivors of Gender-Based Violence' for further information*). Women and girls have been found to be more in need than men and boys across all humanitarian sectors.¹⁶³ The impact of the war is particularly disproportionate for women and girls facing multiple vulnerabilities, such as female-headed households, displaced women, Roma women, women living with HIV¹⁶⁴, rural women, LGBTQIA+ individuals, and women with disabilities. The recognition of the gendered effects of the war are essential for all actors to develop holistic humanitarian, development, and recovery responses that address the different needs and priorities of women and girls.

Children

Since February 2022, over two million young children in Ukraine have been at serious risk of severe adverse impacts on their physical, mental, and emotional development. The conflict has disrupted daily life and deprived children of opportunities to develop, learn, and play in safety. Children have been evacuated or displaced, have lost family members, and have not gone to school. The compound

¹⁶⁰ <https://ukraine.un.org/en/126017-ukraine-common-country-analysis>

¹⁶¹ UN Women and CARE, *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine, 2022*.

¹⁶² UN Agencies, *Human impact of war in Ukraine*, 12 June 2023.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Ukraine has the second-largest HIV epidemic in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with an HIV prevalence of 0.9-1% in the general population.

stressors on children and families have exposed children to increased risk of violence, abuse, neglect, exploitation, and separation from families. The conflict has also increased risks of sexual exploitation, trafficking, and other forms of abuse, particularly for girls.¹⁶⁵

Prior to the escalation, Ukraine had the highest number of children in institutional care in Europe, with over 91,000 children in residential institutions, including orphanages, boarding schools, and other care facilities. Following the full-scale invasion, 38,882 children were returned to their families for safety and security reasons without assessing the families' ability to care for their children. In addition, 4,292 children from residential institutions were evacuated abroad and 1,611 were relocated within the country, of which 1,042 are between 0–5 years old from baby homes.¹⁶⁶ Nearly half of these children live with a disability and are at particular risk of harmful impacts to their development.^{167,168} Moving children with disabilities safely has proven difficult, and in some cases impossible, with some children being left behind as caregivers and staff of institutions attended to their own family needs and safety.

Given the ongoing disruption to family life through the impact of conscription, family separation, and relocation, there is an increased need for the provision of child protection services, especially in collective sites where children and youth constitute 25 per cent of residents. Current efforts to ensure that children remain in family and community settings are centred around identifying foster families, bolstering kinship and guardian care, providing cash assistance to targeted families, and increasing and improving social services. However, there is a critical need to ensure appropriate service provision for child protection prevention, risk mitigation and response services, and child-friendly facilities and resources to allow for their healthy continued learning and development.¹⁶⁹

Young People

According to the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine, about 40 per cent of young people have been forced to leave their homes, of which 2 million have already left the country and more than 2.2 million have become internally displaced. Youth are experiencing declining economic opportunities with a third of young people having experienced a loss of income due to the war.¹⁷⁰ Youth migration abroad has resulted in a loss of human capital, with a risk to recovery and future economic performance. About a quarter of youth reported mental health challenges.¹⁷¹ Young women face specific challenges due to both their age and gender.

Participation of young people in politics and civil society remains low, with 70 per cent not involved in civil society institutions.¹⁷² However, the war is highlighting the resilience of Ukrainian youth who have often been at the forefront of the country's humanitarian response and volunteer movement. A UN commissioned study on the impact of war on youth in Ukraine found that 30 per cent of respondents had volunteered for the first time in 2022, compared to only 6 per cent reported in the 2021 State of Youth in Ukraine research.¹⁷³ These findings are corroborated by the SHARP survey, which indicates that the sense of civic duty among young people is much higher than the actual engagement among youth.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ UNICEF and Ministry of Social Policy, *Children and War in Ukraine*, 2022.

¹⁶⁷ USAID and UKAID, *Hope and Homes for Children. Behind the Mask of Care: A Report Based on the Results of the Situation Analysis of Baby Homes in Ukraine*, 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Maestral, *Ukraine Country Care Snapshot*, 2023.

¹⁶⁹ UNICEF Child Poverty report.

¹⁷⁰ UNDP and UNFPA, *Impact of War on Youth in Ukraine*, April 2023.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

This highlights the urgent need to leverage and channel their untapped potential, and to ensure equal participation and inclusion of youth, including young women, in all response and recovery efforts.

Older People

Ukraine has the largest percentage of older people affected by conflict in a single country in the world, with a quarter of the population aged more than 60 years old and over 1.7 million people aged over 80 years.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, around 80 per cent of single pensioners, who are mostly women, live under the poverty line.¹⁷⁵ As Ukrainian women live on average 10 years longer than men, they represent about two-thirds of persons aged 65 and above.¹⁷⁶ Over 22 per cent of those deemed to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023 are over the age of 60 years, accounting for 3.9 million people.

Many older people face a range of heightened and specific challenges, including access to essential humanitarian support. The war has severely impacted older people's access to pensions, health care, and other basic human rights, including adequate housing. A lack of digital literacy and low incomes can increase difficulties with accessing key life-supporting resources and services which have been converted to digital formats. Older people, including those with disabilities, have often remained in their homes in villages and towns in areas of fighting and encountered challenges in accessing bomb shelters, supplies, and services. According to a 2023 survey, only 20 per cent of older people find it easy to access humanitarian aid, while 58 per cent consider it difficult. Of all older people surveyed, 34 per cent did not receive aid despite needing it.¹⁷⁷

Separation from families, including caregivers and support systems, has left many exposed and isolated, thus exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities.¹⁷⁸ Already prior to the 2022 full-scale war, the vast majority of older people in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts — who are less likely to flee due to reduced mobility and a strong sense of attachment — reported feelings of depression, anxiety, and helplessness.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, many older people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their food and livelihoods. In many liberated areas, their lack of access to potentially mined agricultural lands also increases their vulnerability.

Ongoing armed conflict, poverty, poor social protection policy, and a lack of affordable and accessible housing has also led to an increase in new cases of institutionalization among older people and persons with disabilities, particularly those displaced. As such, there is an increased need to promote the deinstitutionalization of older persons by addressing the underlying factors of institutionalization, including poverty and lack of support to older persons, a lack of suitable and affordable housing, and inadequate of community-based support services.

Persons with Disabilities

There were around 2.7 million persons with a registered disability in Ukraine in January 2020, however, this number is highly likely an underestimation as registered disabilities are determined by medical commissions and follow a lengthy process.¹⁸⁰ In April 2022, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities warned that persons with disabilities in Ukraine were at risk of being

¹⁷⁴ State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Distribution of the permanent population of Ukraine by sex and age*, 2019.

¹⁷⁵ OECD, *Social policies for an inclusive recovery in Ukraine*, 1 July 2022.

¹⁷⁶ State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Distribution of the permanent population of Ukraine by sex and age*, 2019.

¹⁷⁷ Ground Truth Solutions, *Call for communication, collaboration, and cash: Perceptions of aid in Ukraine*, March 2023.

¹⁷⁸ OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023*, 28 December 2022.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ WHO, *Situation assessment of rehabilitation in Ukraine*, 2021. p. 46.

abandoned in their homes or in residential care, with no access to life-sustaining medications, oxygen supplies, food, water, sanitation, support for daily living, and other basic facilities.¹⁸¹

In its October 2022 Report, the Committee also raised concerns about reports of persons with disabilities living in residential care institutions in territories under the control of the Russian Federation being denied evacuation and access to basic services, which, according to initial reports, resulted in the death of at least 12 persons with disabilities. Additional concerns were raised regarding reports of persons with disabilities being kept in inhumane conditions by the Russian Federation during armed hostilities and being held *incommunicado* or forcibly transferred to the Russian Federation or to Ukrainian territories under Russian control (*see footnote for the October 2022 report of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, including its recommendations*).¹⁸²

The task of caring for persons with disabilities has increased dramatically as casualties mount from combat, land mines, and attacks on civilians. As the war becomes increasingly protracted, it is assumed the numbers of persons with disabilities will continue to increase and demands for rehabilitation being unmet.¹⁸³

Seventy-three per cent of respondents to a survey on access of people with disabilities to services and aid indicated the absence of accessible bomb shelters near their residence.¹⁸⁴ Accessibility of some newly available modular housing for IDPs is also a growing concern. A study by civil society organizations identified noncompliance on 10 out of 16 minimum requirements for accessible shelters developed by CBM International.¹⁸⁵ There are also concerns around the lack of accessibility for persons with disabilities at service delivery facilities, particularly in rural areas, and public spaces more broadly, which creates obstacles to the return of persons with disabilities who have been displaced within the country or abroad.

There are currently over 700 institutions in the country, housing over 100,000 individuals (children, older persons, and persons with disabilities). A crucial task going forward will relate to deinstitutionalization, with the aim to transform the system into a modern framework upholding human-rights principles and providing high-quality community-based care and reintegration services — a requirement in the EU candidacy process. Moreover, families and communities will need support to create inclusive environments and infrastructure and to support families with social services to ensure persons with disabilities can live and be cared for in community rather than in institutional settings.

Persons at Risk or Survivors of Gender-Based Violence

Whilst Ukraine had made progress in updating legal frameworks and promoting a more comprehensive response to GBV prevention and response services, pre-war gaps in provision and financing combined with an increase in need, has resulted in a decrease in service provision and increased vulnerabilities, especially for women from marginalized groups, such as Roma,¹⁸⁶ and those living in collective sites. Additionally, there is low awareness about legal protection relating to GBV, sexual harassment or

¹⁸¹ Cited in European Parliament, *Russia's War on Ukraine: People with Disabilities*, November 2022.

¹⁸² United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, *Report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on its twenty-seventh session (15 August–9 September 2022) (CRPD/C/27/2)*, 13 October 2022.

¹⁸³ WHO, *Situation assessment of rehabilitation in Ukraine*, 2021.

¹⁸⁴ National Assembly of People with Disabilities Ukraine, *Analytic Report on the Results of the Survey on the Access of People with Disabilities to Various Types of Aid and Services Provided at their Permanent Places of Residence During the Wartime*, 2022.

¹⁸⁵ HelpAge International, *Finding Housing for People with Disabilities Who Are Fleeing War: Humanitarian Needs of Men and Older Women among IDPs in Lviv and the Region*, October 2022.

¹⁸⁶ Regional Gender Taskforce, *Making the Invisible Visible An evidence-based analysis of gender in the regional response to the war in Ukraine*, October 2022.

gender-based discrimination in employment. Ongoing attention is needed to ensure that those who work as part of the GBV response and legal frameworks ensure a survivor centred approach.

GBV, including conflict-related sexual violence, is a critical and life-threatening concern, especially for women and girls, in conflict-affected areas in Ukraine. Two thirds of women in Ukraine had experienced some form of GBV in their lifetime before the escalation of the conflict.¹⁸⁷ The beginning of the full-scale war in February 2022 and the deterioration of the security context has sharply increased the risk of multiple forms of violence — including conflict related sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and trafficking in persons.¹⁸⁸ Most cases of conflict-related sexual violence documented by OHCHR occurred in the context of deprivation of liberty or in communities controlled by Russian forces. Sexual violence was perpetrated against women, men, and girls. The full scale of such violations is yet to be verified, and documentation is ongoing. In 2022, the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine documented 125 cases of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) committed since 24 February, against civilians and prisoners of war, affecting 80 men, 42 women and 3 girls. In most incidents involving adult male victims, sexual violence was used as a method of torture during their captivity by Russian armed forces, Russian-affiliated armed groups and Russian law enforcement authorities. Incidents of rape, including gang rape, were documented against 10 women, 1 girl and 1 man. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine also investigated sexual violence crimes, reporting that the victims of rape ranged between 4 and over 80 years of age¹⁸⁹. The human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine referred to 24 reported cases of forced stripping, nudity and threats of sexual violence were committed by Ukrainian armed forces, law enforcement personnel and civilians or members of territorial defence units in the months following the invasion¹⁹⁰.

The risks and vulnerabilities to GBV are sharply increasing due to the deteriorating socio-economic situation with 50 per cent of population (half of them women) expressing readiness to accept risky job offers which could lead to exploitation, trafficking, and violence.¹⁹¹ Intimate partner violence reportedly remains high across Ukraine, and disproportionately affects women.¹⁹² However, GBV remains underreported, notably due to factors including stigma and the prevailing security situation.

Although some GBV-specialised services continue to operate in a number of municipalities and in large cities, except in those communities where active hostilities are taking place, essential services are currently affected by significant gaps and limitations, including reduction in services, broken referral pathways, lack of quality services — including GBV case management services and safe shelters — and weak coordination at regional and community levels, among others. Girls and women with disabilities, Roma women, and LGBTQIA+ women face additional obstacles in accessing such services. The capacity of the state to reach and provide life-saving assistance and survivor-centred care to GBV survivors continues to decrease due to the high costs of the war, displacement, a lack of qualified staff, and redirection of formerly available GBV services to serve the more visible needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups. In a survey conducted in late 2022, 33 per cent of rural households confirmed that no GBV services were available in their area compared to 9 per cent in urban areas, while 63 per cent of households report not knowing about their area's GBV services.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ OSCE, *Well-being and Safety of Women: OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women*, 2019.

¹⁸⁸ Protection Cluster, *GBV and the Ukraine Response*, 1 April 2022.

¹⁸⁹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a77533-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-note-secretary>

¹⁹⁰ 2022 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV; <https://www.stoprapenow.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/SG-Report.pdf>

¹⁹¹ IOM, *National Survey on People's Vulnerability to Human Trafficking and Exploitation in the Context of War*, October 2022.

¹⁹² La Strada International, *Ukraine Hotline Infographics*, 26 July 2022.

¹⁹³ REACH *Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA): Gender Focus Brief*, May 2023

In a welcome development, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) entered into force on 1 November, after approval by the Ukrainian Parliament on 20 June 2022 and ratification on 18 July 2022, thereby committing the Government to eradicating specific forms of GBV, designing comprehensive policies and measures to protect and assist all victims, and providing assistance to civil society organizations and law enforcement agencies to adopt an integrated approach to eliminating violence against women.¹⁹⁴ However, there still a need to amend the national legislation to harmonize it with the Istanbul Convention and raise awareness among judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers and the public, particularly women and girls, on Convention.

Furthermore, concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Ukraine by Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 1 November 2022 remain extremely relevant for Ukraine¹⁹⁵.

In addition, in May 2022, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration signed a [framework of cooperation between the Government of Ukraine and the UN on the prevention and response to conflict-related](#) sexual violence. The agreement and its implementation plan use a gender-sensitive policy approach and include key gender-responsive provisions, such as ensuring protection for women and girls at risk of human trafficking, strengthening the capacity of the security/defence sector and of accountability mechanisms, and providing holistic assistance and access to justice for survivors.

Internally Displaced Persons

There were approximately 5.1 million people internally displaced across Ukraine as of 23 May 2023, of which 58 per cent are female, 24 per cent are children, and 21 per cent are older persons. A quarter of IDP households include a person with a disability.¹⁹⁶

While protracted displacement is becoming more prevalent, the crisis remains dynamic. In May 2023, 60 per cent of IDPs had been displaced for one year or longer while 5 per cent of IDPs were displaced in the prior two months. Among those still displaced, 25 per cent were considering leaving their current location in the coming weeks (an estimated 1.27 million individuals) while 21 per cent were planning to return to their places of origin, mostly in northern oblasts, in the next three months. Fifty-eight per cent of IDPs (an estimated 2.9 million individuals) hope to one day return to their areas of displacement.¹⁹⁷

Those living in displacement, particularly women and girls, face heightened risks of human trafficking, exploitation (including sexual), and abuse. Persons who have difficulties obtaining or choose not to register for an IDP certificate do not have access to state-run housing assistance and could experience difficulties in accessing social services, disability related benefits and services, medications, and secondary education.

Income sources have been severely impacted, with 20 per cent of surveyed IDPs reporting that monthly livelihood cash assistance was their primary source of household income. Fifty-four per cent of those relying on social assistance reported a total household income which, when divided by the number of

¹⁹⁴ The Council of Europe's Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.

¹⁹⁵ https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F9&Lang=en

¹⁹⁶ IOM, *Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 13 (11 May-14 June 2023)*, 2023.

¹⁹⁷ UNHCR, *Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine*, February 2023.

people in the household, was equal to or less than UAH 2,600 (the subsistence minimum poverty line as of May 2023).

Current and former areas of hostilities where housing has been damaged or destroyed inhibits the return of IDPs to their homes and creates uncertainties for IDPs and host communities regarding short- and long-term needs for those displaced. Since most IDPs now live in the central and western parts of Ukraine, demand for housing in these areas has significantly increased.

Whilst the majority of IDPs are able to live in independent accommodation as of March 2023 — rented or with family and friends — more than 250,000 continue to live in over 5,000 collective centres across the country,¹⁹⁸ of which the majority of residents are considered to belong to vulnerable groups, including women, children and youth, older people, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQIA+. They often live in sub-standard conditions with a lack of private spaces, limited bathing and kitchen facilities, basic non-food items.¹⁹⁹ Such conditions can increase the potential risk of GBV incidents, especially for women and girls. Though collective centres have provided a safe space, there are risks that residents will languish and face reduced shelter and livelihoods options, particularly those who have lost homes and/or families to which to return. It is therefore imperative that plans are developed to reform collective centres to improve lodging conditions and protection, as well as instituting monitoring, supervisory, and complaints mechanisms for their residents, while examine community care and integration approaches to enable collective centre residents to transition towards normal living conditions.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers (inside and outside of Ukraine)

As of June 2023, UNHCR reports there are 5.9 million refugees from Ukraine recorded in Europe and 362,000 outside of Europe.²⁰⁰ Protection monitoring indicates that 86 per cent of refugee household members are women and children. In July 2023, 62 per cent expressed a wish to return to Ukraine while only 14 per cent plan to do so within the next three months.²⁰¹ The security situation, reconstruction, employment opportunities, and access to services have the strongest influence on whether these refugees will choose to return. In addition to reunifying separated families, returnees are likely to have a positive impact on economic growth and recovery, however, returns could also result in additional stress to ongoing housing and service delivery pressures.

While most of the pre-war refugee and asylum-seeker population in Ukraine left the country after the full-scale invasion, it is estimated that at least 400 persons remain.²⁰² The profiles remain diverse with more than 20 nationalities represented, with the largest groups coming from the Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Syria, Tajikistan, and Belarus. About 30 per cent of the overall population are women and children. These people continue to face obstacles in addressing their basic needs. Moreover, instances have been recorded where asylum seekers from particular nationalities have been denied access to the asylum procedure by the authorities without formal decisions being issued.

¹⁹⁸ UNHCR, *Ukraine Collective Site Monitoring: Round 7: March 2023*, April 2023.

¹⁹⁹ Ukraine CCCM cluster, 2023

²⁰⁰ UNHCR Operational Data Portal.

²⁰¹ UNHCR, *Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine*, February 2023.

²⁰² The State Migration Service reported that there were 1,510 recognized refugees and 1,013 holders of complementary protection in Ukraine as at the end of 2022. It should be noted that the State Migration Service numbers do not reflect departures following the full-scale invasion in 2022. [Link](#)

National Minorities

As one of the EU's key reform recommendations from June 2022, Ukraine is expected to amend and adopt legislation on national minorities. Consultations have been initiated between the Verkhovna Rada (parliament), Ukrainian civil society, and European partners to address concerns regarding the rights of national minorities.

Experts and some EU member states assess that the recently adopted law on national minorities needs improvements and clarifications to fully comply with the provisions of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In particular, it is assessed that the new law provides differential treatment between EU languages and languages of indigenous peoples, and does not eliminate various provisions of relevant Ukrainian legislation that provide differential treatment between EU languages, languages of indigenous peoples, and other minority languages in several fields, including secondary level education, print media, film, television and radio broadcasting, and publishing.²⁰³ The Law is also seen as restricting certain rights of national minorities "belonging to the aggressor state" for the duration of the martial law and for six months after its revocation. On 12 June 2023, the European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) issued an opinion on Ukraine's Law on National Minorities which outlined recommendations for changes to the Law.²⁰⁴ Due to recent legislative developments, Russian citizens in Ukraine may become migrants with irregular status and thus be subject of deportation.²⁰⁵ National and local authorities have also reportedly taken measures to restrict some activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Stateless Persons

Statelessness and undetermined nationality continue to hamper access to rights for thousands of people in Ukraine. During the last population census in 2001, 82,550 persons declared themselves as stateless, while 40,000 did not indicate their nationality. As of end of 2021, the World Bank estimated that about 395,000 people in Ukraine did not have an identification document.

The stateless population in Ukraine include Roma people who lack civil documentation to acquire/confirm their Ukrainian citizenship (*see next section on the Roma community*), former citizens of the Soviet Union who were unable to acquire Ukrainian citizenship in 1991, people living in areas under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation, and those internally displaced prior to the February 2022 who have been unable to obtain or renew personal documents since 2014, including children whose births have not been registered. Other population groups at risk of statelessness include asylum-seekers, refugees, and migrants (and their children) who did not start the processes of regularizing their status prior to 24 February 2022, persons in detention, and children born in places of confinement.

Children born in areas under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation face challenges in obtaining Ukrainian civil registration documents. When compared to the estimated number of births in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that were outside of Ukrainian control — over 110,000 at the end of 2021 — the estimated number of children under threat of statelessness due to lack of a birth

²⁰³ European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *The Law of the Land "On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine*, 28 April 2023.

²⁰⁴ European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *Opinion on the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine*, 12 June 2023.

²⁰⁵ Notably Resolution 1232 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from 1 November 2022 regarding "Some Issues of Providing Administrative Services by the State Migration Service Under the Legal Regime of Martial Law".

certificate issued by a recognized state was over 70,000. This number increased further in 2022 due to more territories coming under Russian military control.

The Roma Community

According to unofficial estimates of international and local civil society organizations, there are between 200,000 and 400,000 Roma people living in Ukraine, with between 4–8 per cent believed to be lacking the civil documentation needed to acquire or confirm their Ukrainian citizenship.²⁰⁶ The main causes of statelessness among the Roma in Ukraine include long-standing structural discrimination, complex administrative procedures to obtain documents or lack of civil documentation, state succession, and the generational inheritance of statelessness. Without birth certificates or any other identification documents to confirm their nationality, Roma people face difficulties enjoying their basic rights, including access to displacement related financial assistance from the state and humanitarian community, education, social benefits, health care, employment, and housing. The Roma community also suffer marginalization, violence, and injustice at the hands of authorities and citizens.

LGBTQIA+

While not criminalized, LGBTQIA+ people in Ukraine have traditionally faced homophobia, discrimination, and violence which have been compounded by the war. There is anecdotal evidence regarding LGBTQIA+ people having suffered from increased GBV as well as reports of police and territorial defence representatives having threatened or assaulted homosexual men. Members of the LGBTQIA+ community may face discrimination when displaced and seeking services in more conservative areas and could face limitations to choosing the housing option that they believe is safest for them.²⁰⁷ They can also face barriers in terms of care and consideration for loved ones who are veterans, given the ongoing lack of recognition of same-sex partnerships.²⁰⁸

Trans and intersex people face specific challenges, including the refusal to pass internal checkpoints, an inability to leave the country, and a risk of military conscription due to their identity documents not matching their gender markers. Inconsistencies between their identity documents and appearance can impact employment opportunities.²⁰⁹ They may be exposed to discrimination and violence, and fear losing access to crucial hormone therapy and other necessary medications and treatment.²¹⁰

However, attitudes towards the LGBTQIA+ community in Ukraine have been changing with polling conducted in May 2022 finding the number of people having a negative view of the LGBTQIA+ community decreasing to 38.2 per cent from 60.4 per cent six years prior.²¹¹ The war has also contributed to shifting attitudes on same-sex civil partnerships, particularly as in cases of injury or death, only legal family members have a say in a soldier's medical treatment or are eligible for social benefits, thereby limiting the rights of partners of LGBTQIA+ soldiers and veterans. A January 2023 survey found that 56 per cent of Ukrainians support same-sex civil partnerships, with 24 per cent opposing.²¹² President Zelenskyy responded positively to a July 2022 petition calling for same-sex civil

²⁰⁶ UNHCR, *Strategic Framework Roma Taskforce*, 2023.

²⁰⁷ OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023*, 28 December 2022.

²⁰⁸ Burghof Foundation, *It will be harder to deny LGBTQIA+ members of the military equal rights after they have risked their lives for the country*, 22 February 2023.

²⁰⁹ UNHCR Participatory Assessment 2022.

²¹⁰ OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023*, 28 December 2022.

²¹¹ Polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Findings referenced in BBC News, *Ukraine to consider legalising same-sex marriage amid war*, 12 July 2022.

²¹² Polling done by the National Democratic Institute and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Findings referenced in BBC News, *Ukraine to consider legalising same-sex marriage amid war*, 12 July 2022.

partnership, although noting that the necessary constitutional amendment could not be undertaken during wartime.

Veterans and their Families

The number of Ukrainian military veterans as of January 2022 was between 851,068 and 896,568, according to the official estimates of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, with women accounting for around 9 per cent of veterans. It is estimated that there will be close to three million veterans by the end of the war.²¹³

A survey by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation identified the following needs as the most urgent: support to veterans' family (27 per cent), help with housing (24 per cent), legal support (22 per cent), psychological support (17 per cent), and medical assistance (15 per cent). Among surveyed veterans, 23 per cent indicated that they did not require any special support. Requests for support to veterans' families primarily related to the need for information on benefits and psychological support (39 per cent and 38 per cent respectively). Additional required areas of support to families include financial (21 per cent), legal (20 per cent), and housing (15 per cent).

Seventeen per cent of respondents were interested in psychological help, and 38 per cent of surveyed family members of veterans were found to be in need of support, but only 14 per cent of veterans and their family members indicated that they used psychological rehabilitation services.²¹⁴ It may be assumed that the need for mental health services is significantly underreported, and that information regarding the availability of such support is limited. Veterans' groups and civil society organizations have also highlighted a significant backlog in medical and rehabilitation services, considerable waiting times for legal recognition of disability for wounded soldiers, and lack of social services, amongst other challenges facing veterans (*see footnote for further information*).²¹⁵

While most veterans plan to return to their previous workplace after the completion of their service, a 2021 IREX study on veteran reintegration showed that more than a quarter of veterans' pre-deployment jobs were not secured for them. Even among those who understood their jobs to be secure, only 70 per cent were able to return, with this figure standing at just 45 per cent for women veterans.²¹⁶

²¹³ Ukrainian Veterans Foundation, *Portrait of a Veteran in Russian-Ukrainian War*, 2022.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ UA Reforms, *Social Policies Regarding Veterans, People with Disabilities and Pensioners*, 2023.

²¹⁶ IREX, *Veterans Reintegration Survey Results on Veterans' Current Employment Conditions*, 2021.

6. Partnerships and Financial Landscape

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Government of Ukraine has been forced to shift its focus from SDG achievement and financing towards immediate defence, budget support, relief, recovery, and reconstruction. This has resulted in an unprecedented budget deficit of around 20 per cent of GDP in 2022 and 50% of budget in 2023. Ongoing and future fiscal needs over the next years will be considerable, making the country highly dependent on external financing. IMF estimates that public and publicly guaranteed debt will increase from pre-war 50.5 per cent of GDP to ca. 100 per cent in 2024 and will remain at this level within the project period until 2027.

Under a baseline scenario, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the total financing gap for 2023–2027 to be US\$ 115 billion, limiting Ukrainian investment capacity and emphasizing the need for continued external grant and concessional support. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates additional external financing requirements at US\$ 50 billion annually (or 20 per cent of GDP) over 5 years to be channelled mostly to the private sector to stimulate investment and boost growth.

Cost estimations for reconstruction based on the build back better principle vary. However, the 2023 Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates that in the year since February 2022, the war resulted in more than US\$ 135 billion in direct damage to buildings and infrastructure while total estimated reconstruction and recovery needs exceed US\$ 411 billion, 2.6 times Ukraine’s GDP in 2022, although this is likely to have significantly increased as a result of subsequent developments (*see Annex II for further information on total damages, losses, and needs by sector*).²¹⁷ Such massive needs will require the utilization of the full spectrum of traditional and innovative financing instruments available.

Since 24 February 2022, over 40 countries, as well as international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer groups, and private sector companies have provided financial contributions towards humanitarian, development/recovery, and military assistance.

Due to the absence of a centralized aid register inside or outside Ukraine — as well as considering issues around data transparency, overlapping and double counting, aspects of continuity (commitments versus disbursements), circularity (recycling of support on donor auxiliary operations), and absorption capacity — there is a significant challenge in quantifying and categorizing commitments and disbursements. As such, the establishment of a transparent country-level accountability and oversight system for international support is essential. Several government initiatives, such as the Digital Restoration EcoSystem for Accountable Management (DREAM), could be expanded for this purpose.²¹⁸

Official Development Assistance

Preliminary and partial data from the OECD indicates a significant rise in official development assistance (ODA) in 2022, reaching US\$ 16.1 billion (7.8 per cent of GDP), of which US\$ 1.8 billion was humanitarian aid.²¹⁹ However, these figures are unlikely to accurately reflect actual commitments and disbursements. The Kiel Institute’s Database of Military, Financial, and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine — which provides the most comprehensive tracking of aid flows into Ukraine — estimates total commitments to Ukraine


²¹⁷ The second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment February 24, 2022 – February 24, 2023 (RDNA2) is part of an ongoing effort—undertaken jointly by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the United Nations, and supported by other partners—to take stock of Ukraine’s damage and losses from Russia’s invasion and assess the scale of economic and social needs for Ukraine’s survival during the war and its prospering afterward. The full report can be found [here](#).

²¹⁸ [DREAM website](#).

²¹⁹ OECD, *ODA Levels in 2022 – preliminary data: Detailed summary note*, 12 April 2023.

in the year from 24 February 2022 at over € 169.5 billion, of which € 97.44 billion was in humanitarian and development assistance, seven times higher than the OECD figures noted above (See **Figure 7**).²²⁰ Such discrepancies reflect complexity of the aid landscape in Ukraine and the need for greater transparency.

Figure 7: Largest donor by financial and humanitarian commitments from 24 January 2022 – 24 February 2023. (Kiel Institute)



Furthermore, key supporters have responded flexibly to mobilise significant financing support involving new instruments, such as Ukraine long-term EU bonds, aimed at mobilizing around € 80 billion in 2023, the new € 50 billion EU’s Ukraine Facility, or the Canadian Ukraine Sovereignty Bonds. These instruments may also be scaled up based on emerging approaches towards frozen Russian assets as collateral. However, significantly more support will be required over the long-term to meet Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs.

National Financing Systems

Ukraine’s planned budget expenditures for 2023 amount to UAH 2.58 trillion (US\$ 56.3 billion) or 41 per cent of GDP. All domestic resources, amounting to UAH 1 trillion (US\$ 25 billion), will be directed towards military and defence spending, accounting for 40 per cent of total government expenditure, while only critical social costs will be covered through international loan and grant support.

Budget revenues for 2023 are anticipated to reach UAH 1,329 trillion (US\$ 29 billion) or 21 per cent of GDP, almost equalling pre-war levels. Eighty-seven per cent of all revenues are expected to come from taxation, reflecting the Government’s expectation of increased business activity and adaptation to the war economy. Donor funding is not included in direct budget revenues, as was the case in 2022, and will be used to cover the budget deficit.

The Government of Ukraine has also established various external and internal fundraising instruments. The UKRAINE24 platform has mobilized around US\$ 340 million since February 2022 from foreign charities and publics.²²¹ One of the most important planned instruments currently under development is the Fund for Liquidation of the Consequences of Military Aggression, primarily capitalized through proceeds from the confiscation of the Russian assets. Pending the legal basis for confiscation of the

²²⁰ Kiel Institute for the World Economy, *Ukraine Support Tracker*.

²²¹ UNITED24 [website](#).

Russian assets abroad, the Fund is currently financed through 50 per cent of National Bank of Ukraine profits and Russian funds confiscated *within* Ukraine.

Private Sector Support

Private sector support has become a key priority of the Government of Ukraine and donors. In May 2023 the Government of Ukraine launched the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development-led Ukraine Investment Platform²²² to track private investment and facilitate a military insurance trust fund for foreign investors — including with support of International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency guarantees and insurance — to catalyse private resources for reconstruction.²²³ Furthermore, recent targeted contacts with large foreign investment companies seek to solicit private investment towards the Ukraine Development Fund to finance flagship business and investment projects, including by the local private sector.²²⁴

With the historic background of one of the lowest levels of foreign direct investment per capita in the region, it is difficult to estimate the potential of various de-risking measures on business activity and investment in the current context. Anticipating a post-war inflow of private capital for reconstruction, the Government of Ukraine has already identified a US\$ 400 billion pipeline of key investment projects in industry, agriculture, technology, energy, and defence that could also be facilitated by rapid approximation of EU laws and regulations.

Civil Society and the Diaspora

Mobilization of Ukrainian civil society and volunteer organizations has been critical for the efficient military and humanitarian response across the country, including with key role of women-led and women's rights organizations. While no clear tracking mechanisms exists, it is estimated that Ukrainians and foreign supporters had donated more than UAH 33.96 billion (almost US\$ 1 billion) by the end of 2022 to National Bank of Ukraine accounts and to the three of the largest charitable funds (UNITED 24, Come Back Alive, and the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation).²²⁵

According to a recent poll, 61 per cent of Ukrainians have been providing support to volunteer groups in various forms.²²⁶ Some of the largest foundations and NGOs have even mobilized resources comparable to the National Bank and UNITED24 platforms.²²⁷ Volunteer financing also provides an important form of flexible financing that can be rapidly deployed at the local level based on needs. Leveraging and strengthening local capacities through pilot initiatives can also help solidify previous decentralization reforms and ensure a participatory approach to recovery.

Ukraine's large diaspora is also a key partner and source of financing. Remittances have historically represented a significant financial inflow and have remained relatively stable since the full-scale invasion. The National Bank of Ukraine estimates inward remittances flows to reach US\$ 12.9 billion in 2023 and US\$ 13.9 billion in 2024, almost recovering to pre-war levels (US\$ 14 billion in 2021). Beyond providing significant direct support to many households, such funds, coupled with diaspora financing, could be leveraged as an important resource for reconstruction.

²²² ERBD, *EBRD-led Ukraine Investment Platform launched in Tokyo*, 12 May 2023.

²²³ Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, *Sergii Marchenko: Recovery of Ukraine requires cooperation with the private sector to attract investments*, 12 May 2023.

²²⁴ Website of the President of Ukraine, *President holds meeting with world's largest investment company on creation of fund for rebuilding Ukraine*, 5 May 2023.

²²⁵ Ednannia, *Ukrainian Civil Society Under the War*, December 2022 - January 2023.

²²⁶ Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, *Resistance to the aggressor, volunteering, shelling of infrastructure: how a full-scale war affected the lives of Ukrainians*, 24 February 2023.

²²⁷ Forbes, *The first ten. The largest benefactors collected UAH 63 billion during the 9 months of the war. Forbes ranking*, 29 November 2022.

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion, the civil society's direct impact, and influence on the policy-making in areas such as defence, provision of humanitarian aid, provision of health and social services, anti-corruption monitoring, has grown immensely both in scope and importance. Even before the full-scale invasion Ukraine had a vibrant NGOs and volunteer community which supported the Ukrainian army, took care of the needs of veterans and their families and IDPs from the East of the country, in many cases closing the existing gaps in government service provisions. The full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine greatly amplified the scale of the existing problems, prompting the civil society actors (NGOs, volunteer organizations) to scale up their involvement to deliver urgent humanitarian and recovery support.

UN supports strong partnership with the CSOs through various mechanisms and platforms on national, regional and local levels to strengthen the inclusive recovery and development processes. One of the positive examples is the recent creation of the National Dialogue Platform for Gender-Sensitive and Inclusive Recovery, which was launched in September 2023 by the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Commission for Gender Equality Policy in Ukraine. The platform, in its initial stage of formation, will be instrumental to provide the opportunity for enhanced coordination and facilitate the strategic, but also technical expert exchange between the partners and stakeholders for recovery including line ministries, UN, donors and CSOs. Despite the difficulties faced by the business community during this time, many of the functioning companies embraced social responsibility, significantly stepping up their financial, in-kind and logistical support for humanitarian as well as military support causes, often in partnership or through various civil society groups and networks.

Moreover, NGOs continue to self-organize into networks, which amplifies their effectiveness to advocate for [Principles for Ukraine's Reconstruction and Modernization](#) (RISE Ukraine coalition).

Some of the strongest NGOs which initially focused on providing humanitarian aid, have now an ambition to transform themselves into social service providers for the government.

Longer-term the potential partnerships within the civil society will involve partnering with networks of civil society actors grouped around specific development needs and social themes (e.g. veteran affairs, education, health, social and mental health services provisions). Given the direct involvement of businesses, it would be necessary to capitalize on the NGO-business nexus to amplify its effectiveness.

New Financial Architecture as Enabler for Faster Recovery

Going forward, Russia's full-scale invasion and other global crises have exposed the need to reform the international financial system to mobilise necessary financing for sustainable development, recovery, and climate action. International financial institution reform through the Bridgetown Initiative and the New Global Financing Pact are expected to leverage further international financial solidarity for countries in vulnerable situations, such as Ukraine. This will lay down a more realistic path to financing the immense reconstruction needs at the necessary scale and speed, create the necessary fiscal space, and stimulate private and foreign investment. Along the new UN SDG Stimulus, Ukraine must benefit from expanded volumes of concessional lending and grant financing, lowering the cost of borrowing. Further financing instruments could include additional IMF Special Drawing Rights allocations, expanded use of blended finance, focus on solvency-focused debt sustainability, and promotion of the SDG-aligned Integrated National Financing Framework initiated in Ukraine prior to the full-scale invasion.

7. Conclusions and Opportunities

As detailed throughout this CCA, as well as various other sources, the impacts of Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 have had, and continue to have, devastating consequences for every facet of life and society in Ukraine. Addressing recovery and reconstruction needs will be considerable and complex — particularly while large-scale military hostilities continue — and will come at a significant financial cost. However, it is imperative that efforts and resources towards early recovery and reconstruction are not delayed until an end or a reduction in the conflict but are undertaken expeditiously in a manner that builds upon and complements ongoing humanitarian interventions and catalyses emerging development opportunities. By addressing the challenges outlined in this document, including from gender responsive perspectives, and seizing opportunities to build back better, Ukraine can rebuild and transition towards a more sustainable, inclusive, rights-based, and resilient future for all people in Ukraine, particularly the most marginalized and vulnerable.

Inclusive, Transparent, Responsive, and Accountable Governance: Good governance and anti-corruption and a return to democratic and inclusive and accountable institutions, when the needs of all people will be addressed accordingly, will be imperative for Ukraine's recovery, and political stability, and path towards EU accession and SDG implementation. This will require capacity development of governance institutions at all levels and support for the integration of EU Acquis requirements. Continued support to the decentralization and civil service reform processes remains essential to reinforce a strong social contract between institutional service providers and their beneficiaries. It will be equally important to ensure capacity development of civil society partners to facilitate their meaningful participation, particularly of those with multiple vulnerabilities. Support for improved transparency and accountability and tackling corruption will be key for ensuring economic stability and an efficient recovery process, particularly as funding inflows increase and as an important dimension of Ukraine's journey towards EU membership. This will include improved public financial management and public access to information across all aspects of governance. Equal gender representation in governance will improve Ukraine's recovery and development outcomes and strengthen focus on human capital development and adequate social spending.

Building capacities of the independent media sector and strengthening media literacy skills among the population will ensure robust protection against mis- and disinformation and foster transparent and accountable governance.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Judicial reform and anti-corruption in the judicial sector will be required to improve access to justice at national and community level, for women and men on equal basis, as will normative support and alignment with international standards, SDGs and EU Acquis requirements on addressing organised crime, justice and the rule of law.

Investing in access to justice — particularly ensuring a people-centered justice approach with quality legal aid services including for the poor, capacity-building for people at large, police, prosecutors, and judges, and a sustainable national victim support programme — will be essential in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. This will require sustained capacity-building and human rights and law education of people at large and assistance relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity investigations and trials, with rebuilding a functioning criminal justice system to respond to ordinary crimes. A capacitated media can also play a role in collecting information related to crimes, including potential war crimes, to support the pursuit of justice. It will be important that every investigation and judicial processing of such

cases follow victim-centred approach, and victims need to be provided with effective legal remedy, justice, and comprehensive reparations.

Ensuring access to appropriate human-centred support and reporting mechanisms and affordable specialized services will be key to resilience and recovery efforts for survivors of GBV, including conflict-related sexual violence, persons with disabilities, ethnic and social minorities, older persons, and those near the frontline. In addition, gender-responsive preventative and response mechanisms, as well as improved coordination and cooperation between national and international authorities, can help tackle trafficking in persons and effectively support victims.

Inclusive, Responsive, and Accessible Social Protection and Social Cohesion: In addition to the unprecedented humanitarian support that will be required over the coming years, efforts must also focus on implementation of essential recovery and reform measures to strengthen the national social protection system to increase its effectiveness, shock-responsiveness, and financial sustainability. This should include a further expansion in coverage so that those entitled to support, in country or outside, can access it when most needed, improved targeting to reach the most vulnerable, ensuring cash transfer amounts are adequate to meet basic needs of men and women, improved and efficient registration systems, and increased allocation of flexible resources and finances to ensure social protection systems are sufficient to meet current and future demands.

The war may have a negative effect on social cohesion for society as a whole. The national and local recovery interventions should address the possible new divides and strengthen the social cohesion among the target communities and especially the most vulnerable groups. This will enhance the trust both vertical (trust between government/institutions and society) and horizontal (trust within the groups in society) and support communities to become more resilient during the early recovery phase. Priority should be given to supporting the active participation of youth, and civil society actors, including women mediators and community leaders, who play a crucial role in building trust in societies, by representing the most vulnerable or marginalized.

Accessible, Affordable, and Quality Health Services: Complementing the Government of Ukraine's postwar recovery planning, international partners have identified immediate critical priorities for the recovery of the health sector. This will require substantial capital investment and public sector expenditure, as well as strengthening the National Health Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Public Health Centre. Towards the longer-term objective of achieving universal health coverage, partners should support the implementation of the Ukraine National Health Strategy 2030, including through strategic and policy support and building upon reforms undertaken since 2015. Technical assistance and gender-sensitive service delivery — particularly in key areas such as primary health care, mental health and psychosocial support, and rehabilitation — should be prioritized. Early childhood and young age interventions addressing the impact of the conflict on children will also be imperative as well as to address the needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations. There are also opportunities to strengthen institutions, partners, and services to improve maternal and child health care, mental health including substance use, nutrition, and childcare, particularly within conflict-affected areas.

Inclusive and Quality Education for All: Recovery of the education sector in Ukraine will require significant support to ensure its alignment with international standards and best practices, particularly EU frameworks for education and early education and care. This will necessitate support for the development of the necessary policies and strategies, including an Inclusive Education Strategy and a catch-up strategy for students left behind as a result of the war. Repair and reconstruction of damaged and destroyed educational facilities and provision of necessary material support will be required while

capacity development support and incentives can help ensure an adequate and skilled cadre of teachers and other education staff. Mental Health and Psychosocial Support should be integrated in school education, with education actors and institutions capacitated to provide emergency interventions. Early learning programmes should be expanded while safe and conducive learning environments should be promoted. Provision of life skills education and social emotional learning for adolescents can increase resilience, wellbeing, and participation. Investment in secondary and higher education, attracting girls to STEM education, and other skills training mechanisms and institutions (vocational, professional education for adults, veterans), will also help ensure that people are able to (re)enter the labour market.

Protecting and Sustaining Access to Culture and Cultural Livelihoods: Protection and preventive conservation of sites and assets, as well as the development of a comprehensive recovery plan aligned to international standards, will be key to safeguarding of the culture and heritage of Ukraine for future generations. This will require the revision of state policies, institutional capacity development, and incentives for the resumption of cultural activities in safe territories and return of cultural sector professionals to Ukraine. At the same time, investing in culture and cultural heritage is a key component for sustainable economic growth, fostering educational, technical and professional development of human capital, the creation and diversification of employment opportunities across the cultural subdomains, including restoration and rehabilitation of damaged built heritage and historic cities, as well as with important contribution and potential for relaunching tourism sector's development.

Sustainable Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Systems and Services: Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Ukraine's water supply and sanitation services should apply a *build back better* approach to its systems and infrastructure in accordance with international best practices while integrating key aspects of energy efficiency and a circular economy. Capacity development support will be required to strengthen the skills of professionals involved in the sector, while material support, such as equipment, technology, and infrastructure, can help to improve WASH services. Fostering partnerships between local and international stakeholders should facilitate knowledge sharing, resource pooling, and the implementation of collaborative initiatives. Partners should further assist the Government, local authorities, and relevant stakeholders to formulate policies that prioritize sustainable water and sanitation management. The recovery of Ukraine's essential agricultural sector will necessitate improved irrigation practices to minimize water loss and increase conservation. Educational institutions should be supported to provide water and sanitation related educational programmes while behaviour change initiatives can help to promote proper and sustainable water use, sanitation practices, and personal hygiene for girls and boys. There is also a need to finalize and implement river basin and flood risk management plans to ensure a safe and clean environment and to facilitate transboundary water cooperation.

Sustainable, Inclusive Economic Recovery: Despite the challenges, risks, and downturn of the economy of Ukraine, opportunities exist to stimulate sustainable and inclusive economic recovery. While the EU accession process is likely to be lengthy, it has the potential to unlock access to new markets and funding and will require businesses to comply with the bloc's environmental regulations. In the meantime, timely implementation of EU Acquis requirements will demonstrate the country's commitment to reform and increase EU and investor confidence. To ensure inclusive growth, it will be essential that any shift in trading patterns, industrial reconstruction, and economic diversification benefit all regions of the country.

Incentivizing the adoption of greener practices by the private sector and increasing consumer demand for environmentally sustainable products will necessitate a strategic communications and marketing

campaign and piloting and demonstration cases and should be backed by appropriate gender-responsive policies and laws. Incentives will be required for businesses to become more sustainable and to attract foreign investors. This can in part be done by encouraging Ukraine to join the Green Climate Fund and the Partnership for Action on Green Economy.

Women's economic empowerment and involvement in governance, recovery and reconstruction should remain a national priority for Ukraine to build back better and more equal. Support to self-employment and micro, small and medium entrepreneurship, including women-led, can significantly boost recovery and growth.

Resilient Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods: Ukraine's recovery should transition towards more sustainable and nature-positive agrifood systems. In parallel, the agrifood systems will need to strengthen food security and prevent all forms of malnutrition and ensure economic viability for producers and sellers. Agri-food supply chains and value chains will need ongoing support to re-establish or reinforce pre-war levels functionality, expand capacity to produce high value-add and differentiated products, address incremental demand, and recalibrate the needs of the shifting landscape of end-markets, both domestic and international. Demining of agricultural lands is an immediate need, as well as testing soil for contaminants and exploring options for sectioning off or remediating agricultural soils that are found to be contaminated with chemicals and heavy metals as a result of the war.

Agricultural practices should be modernized to improve production and environmental sustainability. Research and promotion of regenerative, conservation or climate-smart agriculture should be expanded as the sector rebuilds. Transitioning to environmentally friendly practices also allows more farmers to enter the growing and more lucrative organic sector. This will require investment in extensive marketing and training as Ukraine rebuilds the agri-food sector. The agricultural sector should also transition to green or greener forms of energy, both at farm level and at processing facilities. Rural and urban livelihoods that contribute to the agri-food system can be diversified and improved through smarter, greener value addition practices. This will also help bring production and processing in line with international standards and the EU Acquis requirements.

Support in solving land tenure issues and protection of land rights for women and men will be vital to recovery and reconstruction of the agricultural sector and rural areas. Land management tools to support amelioration of farm structures and reduce land abandonment could be employed to further improve and stabilize rural communities.

Decent Work and Resilient Livelihoods: Enhancing opportunities for decent work and resilient livelihoods will be key for Ukraine's recovery and poverty reduction. Investments in education and skills training initiatives that meet labour market needs — with a focus on green jobs — will help bolster Ukraine's human capital and increase labour productivity. Livelihoods interventions will need to be tailored to reflect economic and demographic changes in prioritized sectors, as well as taking into consideration the unique circumstances of various households, including those headed by women and those with individuals with disabilities. The equitable inclusion of women in the labour market, including through adequate investment into support infrastructure (ex. care services and alternative safety childcare services) will also define the ability of the country's economy to rebuild and recover. As such, creating an enabling environment for flexible working arrangements for workers unable to work outside of the home will enable them to engage in home-based or remote livelihood activities and employment. Creating economic conditions which incentivize workers to remain in and return to Ukraine will be key for recovery while policies should be developed which harness the potential of migration and foster

linkages with the diaspora. Support will also be required for the implementation of a sound legal framework for labour relations based on international labour standards and the EU Acquis.

The potential of digitalization and IT care technologies should be used, primarily within the scope of services for vulnerable groups to carry out its reconstruction. The sectors of the economy with the greatest women workforce (education, health care, social protection) should be equipped with digital auxiliary services, applications and platforms. This will lead to greater productivity, efficiency and quality of services targeting vulnerable groups (children, teenagers, sick, vulnerable, older age groups). It will also contribute to the growth of professional digital skills of women professionals. Investors who will contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war should ensure that women are well represented in all professional sectors. The government should regulate and monitor such inclusion.²²⁸

Infrastructure: As the country recovers, there are significant opportunities to invest more into green approaches to infrastructure and planning that are sustainable, durable, resilient, inclusive, integrating culture protection and vital contribution of artists and creative industries for quality design, and reflect the needs of a post-war Ukraine. This should include the development of comprehensive restoration plans for inclusive and accessible transport services in accordance with international best practices. It will be necessary to review the relevance of the transport map of Ukraine and formulate a national plan for reconstruction and improvement of transport services based on current needs with a focus on opening new trade routes, including by increasing linkages to the EU through multi-modal approaches to transportation. Support will be required to make rail and road systems more environmentally sustainable. Rebuilding Ukraine's damaged energy infrastructure presents many opportunities to make it more environmentally friendly and sustainable (*see footnote for further information*).²²⁹ The replacement of old and damaged equipment with new, efficient, and technologically advanced systems and scaling up renewable energy production will help diversify Ukraine's energy mix and strengthening its energy security.

Sustainable, Inclusive, Green, Responsible and Affordable Housing and Construction: Ensuring safe, equal, green, inclusive and affordable access to housing will be a key element of Ukraine's recovery, including in supporting the safe and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. Policies to regulate the rental market and strengthen protections for renters and to increase access to housing, including within assisted living facilities for people with disabilities, should be specifically considered, alongside broader reform efforts. Social housing stock should be expanded to support the dignified accommodation of displaced people. Ukraine has an opportunity to review its Housing Code and to develop a long-term housing strategy and masterplans for city development that will ensure availability of green, inclusive, sustainable, and affordable homes and liveable cities and communities. Housing reconstruction projects should significantly increase energy efficiency and utilize place-scale renewable installations to mitigate power disruptions and utilize sustainably harvested timber to help bolster the recovering forestry sector. Furthermore, capacity development and revisions to state policies are necessary to support cultural heritage preservation and safeguarding during reconstruction.

Environmental Protection, Disaster Risk Reduction, and Sustainable Natural Resource Management: Restoring and modernizing Ukraine's environmental monitoring system will help to better assess the health of the natural and human environment. Addressing and mitigating the challenges from industrial destruction, as well as the inherent environmentally damaging nature of Ukraine's heavy industries, will

²²⁸ <https://eca.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Ukraine-CSW67-consultation-key-conclusions-and-recommendations-1-03-2023.pdf>

²²⁹ UNECE, *Rebuilding Ukraine with a Resilient, Carbon-Neutral Energy System*, June 2023.

be essential. Disaster risk management systems and policies, as well as cross-border disaster risk monitoring, should be established or strengthened to improve early warning, mitigation, preparedness, and response capacities. Ukraine's waste management capacities will require significant support, particularly those related to conflict related waste, including toxic and explosive materials, including the provision of targeted support for specialized facilities and technologies. Promoting the establishment of recycling and composting facilities at varying scales is key to waste reduction and resource recovery efforts. Many opportunities also exist to monitor, remediate, repair, and better manage Ukraine's terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and to integrate ecosystem concerns into both emergency response and longer-term rebuilding and sustainable development.

Annex I: Key Reference Documents

Multi-Sectoral/Thematic

Government of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

UN Agencies, *Human impact of war in Ukraine*, 12 June 2023.

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WHO, *HeRAMS Ukraine First Round Results November 2022 - January 2023*, 2023.

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REACH, *Education Sector Assessment in Conflict-Affected Areas*, February 2023.

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UNESCO, Focus Study on Cultural and Creative Industries in Ukraine, July 2023

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WFP, *Ukraine food security trend analysis (February 2023)*, 13 March 2023.

Social Protection

OECD, *Social policies for an inclusive recovery in Ukraine*, 1 July 2022.

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REACH, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment 2022: Livelihoods Findings*, March 2023.

FAO, *Ukraine: Impact of the War on Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods in Ukraine*, 2022.

FAO, *Ukraine: Damages and losses in the aquaculture and fishery sectors - Report on the impact of the ongoing war*, 2023.

OECD, *The impacts and policy implications of Russia's aggression against Ukraine on agricultural markets*, 2022.

UNIDO, *Rapid Industrial Diagnostic Study, Ukraine*, February 2023.

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UNECE, *Increasing the Uptake of Biofuels and Biomass in Ukraine*, March 2023

UNECE, *Rebuilding Ukraine with a Resilient, Carbon-Neutral Energy System*, June 2023

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UNEP, *The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine: A Preliminary Review*, 2022.

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OECD, *ODA Levels in 2022 – preliminary data: Detailed summary note*, 12 April 2023.

Ground Truth Solutions, *Call for communication, collaboration, and cash: Perceptions of aid in Ukraine*, March 2023.

Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment

UN Women and Care, *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine*, May 2022.

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REACH, *Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) - Gender Focus Brief*, March 2023.

Regional Gender Taskforce, *Making the Invisible Visible An evidence-based analysis of gender in the regional response to the war in Ukraine*, October 2022.

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UNICEF and Ministry of Social Policy, *Children and War in Ukraine*, 2022.

UNDP and UNFPA, *Impact of War on Youth in Ukraine*, April 2023.

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European Parliament, *Russia's War on Ukraine: People with Disabilities*, November 2022.

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IOM, *National Survey on Migration, Human Trafficking and Other Forms of Exploitation*, February 2022.

IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix Various Resources and Reports*.

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Annex II: Total Damage, Loss, and Needs by Sector (US\$ billion)

Data from the Government of Ukraine, World Bank, EU and UN, *Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023*, March 2023.

Sector	Damage	Loss	Needs
Social Sectors			
<i>Housing</i>	50.4	17.2	68.6
<i>Education and Science</i>	4.4	0.8	10.7
<i>Health</i>	2.5	16.5	16.4
<i>Social Protection and Livelihoods</i>	0.2	4.2 ²³⁰	41.8
<i>Culture and Tourism</i>	2.6	15.2	6.9
Infrastructure Sectors			
<i>Energy and Extractives</i>	10.6	27.2	47
<i>Transport</i>	35.7	31.6	92.1
<i>Telecommunications and Digital</i>	1.6	1.6	4.5
<i>Water Supply and Sanitation</i>	2.2	7.5	7.1
<i>Municipal Services</i>	2.4	3.0	5.7
Productive Sectors			
<i>Agriculture</i>	8.7	31.5	29.7
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	10.9	85.8	23.2
<i>Irrigation and Water Resource Management</i>	0.4	0.3	8.9
<i>Finance and Banking</i>	0	6.8	6.8
Cross-Cutting Sectors			
<i>Environment, Natural Resource Management, and Forestry</i> ²³¹	1.5	0.5	1.5
<i>Emergency Response and Civil Protection</i>	0.2	0.5	1.5
<i>Governance and Public Administration</i>	0.3	1.4	0.6
<i>Explosive Hazard Management</i>	-	37.6	37.6
Total	134.7	289.1	410.6

²³⁰ Under social protection, household income loss valued at US\$ 61.5 billion is not included to avoid potential double-counting in relation to other sectors.

²³¹ Under environment and forestry, due to data limitations, only damages, losses and needs related to forest fires and mined forest areas, along with needs related to capacity building for environmental governance are included.



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