



Steel workers hoist a girder during construction of the General Assembly Hall, 1951.

White cover publication: Advance version. Text subject to official editing and review.

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**UN80 INITIATIVE**

# **Progress Report**

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

May 2026

**UN80 Initiative: Progress Report**

**Report of the Secretary-General, 26 May 2026**

Advance version. Text subject to official editing and review.

Cover: UN Photo Library, Steel workers hoist a girder during construction of the General Assembly Hall, 1951.

# Table of contents

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>INTRODUCTION</b>   | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>WHY THIS MOMENT REQUIRES DELIBERATE REFORM</b>                         | <b>5</b>  |
| Reform for impact   | 5         |
| Action is becoming more urgent  | 6         |
| Member States shape the next phase  | 7         |
| <b>WHAT UN80 IS DESIGNED TO SOLVE</b>                                     | <b>8</b>  |
| UN system growth and complexity   | 8         |
| Joining the dots: from fragmentation to coherence                         | 8         |
| The objective is practical, not theoretical                               | 9         |
| <b>UN80: A COHERENT REFORM LOGIC</b>                                      | <b>10</b> |
| Three workstreams, one practical purpose                                  | 10        |
| 1: Change begins at the centre  | 11        |
| 2: Mandate discipline strengthens stewardship                             | 11        |
| 3: System-wide delivery arrangements must match today's needs             | 12        |
| The workstreams reinforce each other                                      | 12        |
| <b>PROGRESS TOWARDS A BETTER-PERFORMING UN SYSTEM</b>                     | <b>13</b> |
| Progress is visible, but uneven   | 13        |
| The Secretariat is changing how it works                                  | 13        |
| Member States have established a new basis for mandate discipline         | 15        |
| New delivery models are being developed and tested                        | 16        |
| Country and regional arrangements are being redesigned for greater impact | 18        |
| Shared services, technology and data are becoming system-wide enablers    | 19        |
| Horizontal coordination is being strengthened                             | 21        |
| Other structural proposals are advancing through the appropriate pathways | 21        |
| <b>A CALL TO MEMBER STATES</b>  | <b>24</b> |
| Use resolution 80/251 as a governance tool                                | 24        |
| Give direction on country and regional arrangements                       | 24        |
| Back shared services, technology and data to improve delivery             | 25        |
| Consider structural proposals on their merits                             | 25        |
| Align funding practices with UN80 objectives                              | 25        |
| Exercise governance coherently across the UN system                       | 26        |
| <b>CONCLUSION: SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERY</b>                     | <b>26</b> |
| Annex: Comprehensive Guide to UN80 Initiative Work Packages               | 28        |

# Introduction

**1. The launch of the UN80 Initiative in March 2025 was a recognition of the immense challenges facing the United Nations system and of the opportunity and responsibility to rise to meet them.**

**2. The challenges are found in the everyday lived experience of millions of people** caught up in multiplying conflicts, denied the benefits of sustainable development or deprived of the exercise of their human rights. That same lived experience is also testimony to the glaring reality that a well-functioning and effective multilateral system is a precondition for a just, sustainable, peaceful and prosperous world. There is no credible alternative.

**3. The UN system has agreed crucial blueprints for the substance of that better world:** the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Pact for the Future, both major accomplishments and powerful statements of intent. But a real question remains about its capacity to work with its Member States to deliver them. It deserves an answer that goes further than a renewed appeal to political will, one that addresses head-on the long postponed decisions on how the UN system can be better structured, resourced, managed and held accountable for results.

**4. Today the system faces demands that are broader, more complex, more globalized and, in many senses, more urgent** than those which shaped its structures and ways of working in the past. Events have run ahead of the UN's capacity to adapt, with lightning-fast transformative changes in the world and, at best, gradual institutional modifications at the UN, often in the face of strong resistance from different actors.

**5. That is why I set out proposals in the UN80 Initiative** with the overarching objective of achieving **“a paradigm shift in how the UN system organizes its work and collaborates for greater impact”**.

**6. Over the last year, significant progress has been recorded, made possible by the active engagement of Member States and the mobilization of the UN system as a whole.** Member States have embraced the logic of and urgent need for the UN80 reform effort and have already taken important decisions for its implementation. They have identified the connections between it, the SDGs and the Pact for the Future, including the need for reform as part of a broader effort to strengthen the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its centre, to keep pace with a changing

world. And they have made it clear that they expect more. For their part, entities across the UN system have become active leads for UN80, taking on responsibilities that go beyond their own specific institutional concerns and mandates. Common purpose has won out over fragmented governance prerogatives to generate a truly system-wide response to a systemic crisis.

**7. In an intensive, data- and evidence-driven process, UN80 has moved beyond diagnosis.** Operational innovations are already taking hold. Substantive assessments, proposals and pilots are emerging across different areas, and further reports and information briefs will follow on specific items as a basis for decisions and delivery.

**8. Throughout, UN80 has been guided by the principles I set out at the outset,** namely that it should: advance the purposes of and respect for the UN Charter in a balanced manner across all three pillars: peace and security, sustainable development and human rights; strengthen the system's capacity to support countries; maximize concrete impact; optimize efficiencies and effectiveness; build on past reforms; and ensure that all reforms are undertaken in accordance with applicable rules and procedures. In addition, in this initiative of significant complexity, a particular effort has been made to ensure transparency, including through monthly briefings to the General Assembly and the Comprehensive Guide, "Progress and Next Steps", published in April and annexed to this report.

**9. This report frames the next phase of the initiative. It records decisions already taken.** It shows where UN80 has generated movement, and how reform proposals are advancing along their respective pathways. It distinguishes issues that are ready, or nearly ready, for decision-making from those requiring further design and consultation. It also makes clear where political support and decisions are now needed to carry reform all the way from design to delivery, always as a Member State-driven process and in strict respect of established mandates and governance arrangements.

# Why This Moment Requires Deliberate Reform

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## REFORM FOR IMPACT

**10. Reform has been a constant in political discourse at the United Nations over the years. That can be seen as positive because the pursuit of improvement is a healthy feature in the life of any institution. Yet reiterated recognition of the need for change, which does not lead to consequential results, can be damaging too; it can breed cynicism and the perception that the system is unwilling or incapable of reforming itself.**

**11. In any circumstances, the UN's 80th anniversary would be an appropriate occasion for it to look hard at itself and its reform options.** But the specific circumstances of the moment make real reform essential and the success of UN80 imperative. A number of factors underscore the need to move the process forward without delay and to address tough issues with resolve.

**12. First, multilateralism has been hit by an unprecedented combination of adversity:** deep geopolitical division and tension; a dramatic reduction in resources; flagrant violations of the Charter and international law with impunity; and a consequent underlying questioning of the value and utility of multilateralism itself. All of this has made it difficult for the UN system to deliver at the level that people rightly expect of it, and the growing gap between needs and expectations on the one hand and means and resources on the other could easily generate a serious crisis of credibility. Yet, some of those who question that credibility have a direct responsibility for the obstacles to effective multilateral action.

**13. But the fact is that the overwhelming majority of Member States remain firmly committed to the UN, its values, purposes and objectives.** That means that reform that really works to strengthen the system in turbulent times is more urgent than ever to bolster its credibility, effectiveness and usefulness. Nothing will better serve the UN and its Member States alike than change that

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## +40%

increase in conflict-related deaths 2023 to 2024, the third consecutive annual increase

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## 1 in 4

developing economies remained poorer in 2025 than in 2019

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
## -23%

reduction in total international assistance from 2024 to 2025, the largest funding cut on record

## GROWING GAPS BETWEEN GLOBAL NEEDS AND MEANS


### Growing state-based armed conflict

Number of active conflicts




### Setbacks in sustainable development

Share of SDGs by status of progress




### Rising climate risks

Global temperature change over time




### Shrinking international assistance

Official development assistance. DAC




### Fewer people reached in crises

Humanitarian assistance recipients



### More aid workers killed

Recorded deaths of humanitarian workers



Sources: UCDP; UN SDG Progress Report; WMO; OECD DAC; OCHA. See sources and notes.

demonstrably upgrades the impact of what it does. The pressures now confronting the system are unlikely to be short-lived, and it will likely continue to operate in a contested environment shaped by paralyzing geopolitical divides for the foreseeable future. The way forward is for it to be intransigent on principles and bold and creative on reform.

# -27%

decline in core contributions from OECD DAC countries to the UN system 2024-2025, the largest cut on record

## ACTION IS BECOMING MORE URGENT

**14. Second, the status quo is untenable. The options now are either change through a deliberate and considered process of reform** decided by Member States through due process, or change imposed by external pressures as has happened to several multilateral entities, inside and outside the UN system, in recent months. For multiple reasons, the first option is clearly better. It offers the opportunity to build a high-performing, effective and impactful UN system, fit for the future. The latter risks opening the way to successive, crisis-driven adaptations, incoherence and decline. The dangers of inaction are manifest. It would leave existing weaknesses unaddressed and could usher in a process of erosion in system capabilities. The status quo might feel like a comfort zone, but it could turn out to be more like a trap.

## MEMBER STATES SHAPE THE NEXT PHASE

**15. Third, Member States have already expressed themselves strongly in favour of reform and of UN80 (A/RES/79/318).** Admittedly, approving the general proposition of reform is less demanding than agreeing its precise terms. The journey from the generic to the specific brings into play sensitivities, interests and perspectives that make for tough decisions.

**16. At this stage, the overall direction and scale of UN80 lie in the hands of Member States to determine.** As it moves into its final stage of decision-making and delivery, the UN80 Initiative’s 31 work packages stand at different levels of advancement. Where work packages are ready for action by Member States, the relevant intergovernmental organs can decide on them through established processes. Where further preparatory work and design are needed, Member States can guide it. Where implementation phases have begun, Member States can encourage and incentivize progress.

**17. From now on, Member States will craft the key outcomes of UN80.** They have recognized that the case for reform is robust; they will decide how they act upon it. In this Member State-driven process, it is the task of the Secretariat to provide the information, data and analysis that enable them to make fully informed decisions and to press ahead with action that falls under the authority of the Secretary-General.

**18. The purpose of reform is not change for the sake of change,** nor is it to take hurried or arbitrary decisions on the basis of momentary convenience or circumstances. UN80 has to lay the foundations for a stronger, more impactful UN system through a carefully considered process of deliberate reform. This is necessary to help translate the priorities already set by Member States, including in the 2030 Agenda and the Pact for the Future, into tangible, more coherent and visible results.


**-6%**

further reductions in international assistance forecast for 2026

## UN SYSTEM FUNDING AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY ARE UNDER PRESSURE


### Declining share of core funding

Share of voluntary core + assessed funds




### Surging arrears of assessed funds

UN Secretariat, regular and peacekeeping



### Staff separations in 10 largest entities

Est. staff changes, anonymized, 2025–April '26



Sources: UN CEB Financial Statistics; UN Secretariat; Estimates, UNJSPF. See sources and notes.

# What UN80 Is Designed to Solve

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## PROTECT IMPACT

- **193 Member States and over 8 billion people:** Connected to shared goals, norms, values and standards.
- **Over 400 million people:** Reached on the ground with development support in 2024.
- **Over 120 million:** Reached with life-saving assistance during crises and disasters.
- **Over 1,100 locations:** Served in support of Member States, communities and people.

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## DECREASE COMPLEXITY

- **Over 140 UN system entities** across UN Offices and Departments, Peacekeeping Operations, Political Missions, Regional Commissions, Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies, and Related Organizations.
- **Over 240 intergovernmental bodies**, including committees and other forums, established by UN principal organs and serviced by the UN Secretariat.
- **Over 40,000 resolutions and decisions** of the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council since 1946.

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## UN SYSTEM GROWTH AND COMPLEXITY

**19. Over eight decades, the UN system has evolved, and it has grown. In the process, it has taken international cooperation to new heights and delivered immense benefits to humankind. It is a record of achievement that has no precedent. It needs to be celebrated and taken forward for the benefit of succeeding generations.**

**20. But in the very act of establishing its unique legitimacy, its global reach and presence, and its multiple specialized capacities, the UN system has also acquired considerable institutional complexity.** The system has grown mandate by mandate, entity by entity, crisis by crisis and reform by reform.

**21. Its history of gradual evolution has left the UN system often difficult to navigate,** which gives arguments to those who try to portray it as a slow and heavy bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it is true that Member States may face multiple potential entry points and partners in the system, which may sometimes compete for their attention. And they may experience greater difficulties than they should in accessing services that they urgently need.

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## JOINING THE DOTS: FROM FRAGMENTATION TO COHERENCE

**22. A further consequence of its institutional development is fragmentation and duplication of functions, processes and activities in the system.** Entities that have been founded at different times and with only limited interaction may have felt obliged to set up their own administrative and support services and develop activities with little reference to what is being done on contiguous issues elsewhere in the system. The outcome can be parallel operating modalities, with the waste and inefficiencies that implies and, in the worst cases, harmful inter-entity competition stoked unintentionally by unhelpful funding modalities and misaligned incentives.

**23. In the same 80 years of its history, the UN has accumulated an impressive volume of mandates,** some 40,000 decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council. These mandates are an expression of the collective will and priorities of Member States. They are a defining achievement of multilateralism and the basis on which Member States direct the work of the system, but their complexity and volume naturally make their implementation and oversight more difficult.

**24. The reform challenge that arises from this wealth of multilateral political capital lies in making the connection between these mandates, implementation responsibilities, resources, delivery arrangements and accountability for results.** Too often, there is no clear line of sight between what Member States decide should be done, what is actually done in the system and by whom, the resources used and the ultimate impact for people on the ground. This weakens governance, complicates management and makes it difficult to demonstrate convincingly the real value of what the UN system does.

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## THE OBJECTIVE IS PRACTICAL, NOT THEORETICAL

**25. UN80 cannot and does not aim to rewrite UN history. It is not an attempt to redesign the system from first principles.** Neither is it a random catalogue of disconnected ideas and initiatives acting at the margins. Instead, it is a concerted and strategic initiative to address and correct systemic characteristics inherited from the past, which detract from efficiency, coherence, transparency and impact. It is practical and realistic, and can make a major difference to the way the system works. It can strengthen the chain from mandate creation to final impact; facilitate better stewardship of resources; promote more coherent structures and services; transform the management and use of technology and data; help Member States access relevant, high-quality support and services easily and quickly; and establish management processes that hold the system fully accountable for results and impact.

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## REDUCE PROCESS BURDEN, OVERLAP AND FRAGMENTATION

- **Over 27,000 intergovernmental meetings** serviced by the UN Secretariat in 2024.
- **Over 2,000 reports** prepared by the Secretariat in 2024, including 1,100 to the General Assembly; Report length increased by 40% since 2005.
- **Broad presence, concentrated spend:** In most country contexts, 3 to 4 entities account for about two-thirds of spending, while more than 20 entities are active on average.
- **Many small transactions:** About 75% of government grant transactions together account for just 16% voluntary funding, creating a large workload for a limited share of resources.

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## MODERNIZE METHODS

- **Digital gaps:** Only 14% of UN organizations report high / very high digital maturity.
- **Results gaps:** Only 30% of UN system entities have integrated results and resource framework showing contributions translate to impact.
- **Review gaps:** 86% of mandates for UN Secretariat entities lack Member State instructions on review or termination.

# UN80: A Coherent Reform Logic


## 3 WORKSTREAMS, 1 PRACTICAL PURPOSE

**26. UN80 is organized in three workstreams, but has a unifying reform rationale:** to bring mandates, institutional arrangements, resource use and delivery mechanisms into better alignment, so that Member State decisions can be translated into results as reliably, efficiently and accountably as possible.

**27. This is why the initiative should be understood as three workstreams coming together in one coherent chain of improvement.** Efficiencies in the Secretariat, discipline across the mandate life cycle, and changes to structures, programmes and system-wide enablers each address connected links on the same chain of improvement. The objective is not to reduce the United Nations to a smaller or simpler institution. It is to make the system more coherent, more usable, and better able to deliver on mandates.

### THREE WORKSTREAMS, ONE CHAIN OF IMPROVEMENT - ACROSS THE MANDATE LIFECYCLE

Workstreams cover arrangements for mandate creation, resourcing, to implementation, impact and review



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## 1 CHANGE BEGINS AT THE CENTRE

**28. Workstream 1 has particular significance as the point of departure for UN80 because it is about the Secretariat,** under my direct responsibility. It has generated measures to simplify administrative processes, consolidate support services, reduce duplication, improve stewardship of resources and relocate functions where appropriate. It has led to adoption of a significant reduction in the budget for 2026, with the process being carried forward in the 2027 exercise. It has also sent a broader signal: the discipline expected of the system as a whole begins at the centre. This provides an example and lends credibility.

**29. The Secretariat experience is not the only source of learning.** Several agencies, funds and programmes have also had to undertake even more demanding processes of adjustment under the pressure of abrupt revenue reductions, independently of UN80 and before its inception, revealing remarkable resilience and capacity for adaptation. These experiences are distinct, but they reinforce an important lesson: it is better to improve efficiency deliberately and proactively than to have change imposed by crisis. They also create conditions for further system-wide cooperation as UN80 develops.

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## 2 MANDATE DISCIPLINE STRENGTHENS STEWARDSHIP

**30. Workstream 2 has already given Member States and the Secretariat powerful new tools to manage mandates more coherently across the full mandate life cycle.** It has also placed responsibility on the Secretariat to create the conditions for their effective use. Mandates remain the responsibility and prerogative of Member States. The purpose of the life cycle approach is to give Member States better visibility over how mandates are created, resourced, implemented, reported on and reviewed.

**31. This is a crucial stewardship function.** Better data, mandate registries, clearer citations, improved reporting formats, review clauses and stronger system-wide results management can help Member States identify overlap, clarify responsibilities, reduce avoidable burdens and assess whether mandates are producing intended results. The forward agenda for the Workstream over the coming years is ambitious, covering the whole mandate life cycle: creation, implementation and review. But with the already demonstrated determination of Member States and the reinforced analytical capacities at the disposal of UN80, there is a real prospect of breakthrough.

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### **3 SYSTEM-WIDE DELIVERY ARRANGEMENTS MUST MATCH TODAY'S NEEDS**

**32. Workstream 3 completes the reform logic by examining how existing delivery arrangements can be modified and common tools and support systems strengthened across the system** to maximize impact in rapidly changing and often challenging conditions. Its work is diverse, and includes consolidation and transition of entities; country and regional arrangements; shared services; technology and data; expertise and knowledge arrangements; humanitarian and peace and security delivery models; potential mergers and funding mechanisms that can better align incentives with desired outcomes.

**33. That diversity does not detract from the coherence of this workstream.**

It reflects the reality that delivery depends on many connected systems: institutional structures, geographical presence and capacities, operational support, digital tools, data, financing and accountability. The test for each proposal is therefore practical: whether it contributes to improving the ability of the system to support Member States and the people it serves.

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### **THE WORKSTREAMS REINFORCE EACH OTHER**

**34. As UN80 has advanced, the connections between the three workstreams and indeed individual work packages have become ever clearer.** Efficiency gains alone will not produce the United Nations that is needed. Nor will mandate discipline alone. Nor will changes to delivery arrangements alone. The value of UN80 lies in combining these elements for real impact. That is why the initiative truly represents an institutional paradigm shift. It aims not to deliver a one-time set of adjustments, but to create a more disciplined way for the United Nations system to adapt, perform and account for impact. And that is the measure of a high-performing and reformed United Nations.

# Progress Towards a Better-Performing UN System

## PROGRESS IS VISIBLE, BUT UNEVEN

**35. With objective and quantifiable metrics not yet available for all UN80 work packages, any credible assessment of progress depends upon a sincere effort of candour.** Excessive optimism can only be self-defeating if the true objective is to strengthen the UN system rather than just to appear to be doing so.

**36. After a little more than one year, a reasonable conclusion is that the initiative has recorded substantial achievements, but that they are uneven.** That is unsurprising, and possibly inevitable, given the variety of mandates, entities, governance bodies and operating contexts involved, and the different scale and ambition of specific work packages. Some reforms are already moving into implementation; some proposals are ready or nearly ready for intergovernmental decision-making; and others require further development, consultation and design. What is important now is that every work package is taken forward in accordance with the clear pathways set out in April's Comprehensive Guide, "Progress and Next Steps". The detailed information set out there is not repeated in this report, which instead presents a broader picture of progress and where it should lead next.

**37. The outcomes of the two intergovernmental processes so far established under Workstreams 1 and 2 are tangible and significant indicators of progress.**

## THE SECRETARIAT IS CHANGING HOW IT WORKS


**38. In connection with Workstream 1, the General Assembly adopted through its resolution 80/242 a programme budget for the UN Secretariat** which included a reduction of over 9 per cent in resources and 21 per cent in posts for 2026. Early and determined

# 31

UN80 work packages, involving 34 UN system leaders, 85 individual actions and 64 UN system entities

### Progress stage

UN80 work packages



# -21%

reduction in staff positions in the revised UN Secretariat budgets for 2026, compared to 2025

## EARLY CHANGES IN THE UN SECRETARIAT

- **One platform:**  
New York common administrative platform (CAP) now serving 6,000+ personnel, down from 11 teams.
- **More scale:**  
Expansion of CAP to 5 additional duty stations planned.
- **Lower-cost locations:**  
Over 220 staff posts and positions will be shifted from high-cost locations in 2026, as part of about 2,300 positions shifting across the UN system.
- **More digital:**  
Pilot implementation of new digital hub in Valencia; Secure general-purpose AI tools rolled out at 40% reduced cost.
- **More efficient:**  
10 payroll centres consolidated into one global team, raising productivity by 67%; 51 travel teams consolidated into 14.

# >2,300

staff positions geographically relocated from high to lower-cost locations across the UN system.

preparation since 2024, in anticipation of a tightening financial environment, helped mitigate, though not eliminate, the impact of the post reduction on staff, supported by a voluntary separation programme and local and global placement exercises and other measures under the staff support framework. The same forward-looking approach helped enable an orderly 25 per cent reduction in peacekeeping troops around the world, due to a sharp reduction in assessed contribution. This degree of planning was, however, not equally feasible across all parts of the system, due to entirely unpredictable, large-scale reductions of resources, with painful consequences for many.

### **39. The adoption of the 2026 programme budget also marked the beginning of ongoing change in the Secretariat's operating model.**

This has included measures to streamline administrative services, consolidate functions, reduce duplication, improve service quality and strengthen stewardship of resources. It has also included the introduction of common administrative platforms in New York and Bangkok, and the geographical relocation of functions where they can be performed more effectively and efficiently.

**40. The emphasis throughout has been on improving consistency and reliability of support to programme delivery**, stripping out parallel wasteful processes and enabling managers to focus sharply on results. An essential component of implementation has been action to support affected staff, ensure business continuity, address risk and monitor the quality of service provision.

**41. For the 2027 proposed programme budget**, and building on efficiency measures under UN80 Workstream 1, as well as guidance from the General Assembly, we will propose the establishment of common administrative platforms in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and Addis Ababa and the expansion of the platform in New York. There will be additional proposals to relocate functions to lower-cost duty stations, based on functional assessments, and proximity to operations and field presence. Further, measures will be proposed with a view to reducing hierarchical layers at senior levels. Proposals will include the abolishment, downgrading and reclassification of several senior level posts in 2027 and clear orientation for Member States' consideration to meaningfully amplify this process in the preparatory work for the 2028 budget.

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## MEMBER STATES HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW BASIS FOR MANDATE DISCIPLINE

**42. Under Workstream 2, the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 80/251 on mandate creation, implementation and review for an efficient and effective United Nations has been widely acknowledged as a major step forward.**

**43. Its point of departure is recognition that mandates are the responsibility and prerogative of Member States.** It goes on to put in their hands a powerful instrument that, if used well, offers them the opportunity for much more effective stewardship of how mandates are created, resourced, delivered and reviewed. Because mandates are the essential determinant of what the UN system does, this can transform the system's everyday workings in fundamental ways, rationalizing meetings and reports, reducing overlaps and duplication, assigning clear responsibilities, and providing accountability for results.

**44. For this to happen, the Secretariat will need to provide Member States with the range of advisory services outlined in resolution 80/251.** The experience of negotiating the resolution has already demonstrated the criticality of this support and the improved capacity of the Secretariat to respond to Member State needs and expectations.

**45. Work is now progressing on many fronts,** including the development of mandate registries and interoperable digital tools; concept notes and templates; guidance on mandate creation; clarity and discipline in mandate citations; improved reporting formats; review and streamlining of reports of the Secretary-General; clauses for the review and possible retirement of mandates; stronger support for mandating bodies; and more coherent system-wide management of results, allowing entities to align implementation more coherently.

**46. These are all indications of the magnitude of the challenge over the coming year to realize the opportunities opened up by the resolution,** which, after all, is a means to an end. Ultimately, what matters is whether it will be used to change practice across the system.

**47. It is widely recognized that serious reform requires an initial investment if it is to generate efficiency gains.** The request is modest compared to the potential benefits and this makes an important point at a time of heavily constrained finances: properly

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A/RES/ **80/251**

New General Assembly resolution on better mandate creation, implementation and review processes

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**-30%**

fewer mandate sources cited per Secretariat entity on average in 2027 programme plans after review for relevance and comparative advantage

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## EARLY PROGRESS ON MANDATE DISCIPLINE

- **Mandate registry:** pilot version live at [mandates.un.org](https://mandates.un.org)
- **More transparent:** over 40,000 resolutions and decisions searchable, including about 4,000 in active implementation.
- **More analytical:** Trends in length, similarity, frequency of resolutions being made available to delegates in 2026.
- **More concise:** Over 600 regular SG reports reviewed for potential improvements and new reporting formats in development
- **More digital:** Digital tools introduced to cut effort and improve quality in mandate citation management.
- **More focused:** Concept notes and model review clauses in development by Member States to improve mandate design and review.

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# -67%

reduced length of humanitarian response planning documents for over 30 humanitarian operations: lighter, more strategic and digital

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## RESET HUMANITARIAN DELIVERY

- **Hyper-prioritized:** Humanitarian plans focused from \$33B for 135 million people to \$23B for 87 million people with the most urgent needs.
- **Faster:** Planning timelines for major humanitarian response operations reduced by 51 days.
- **More efficient:** Over \$18B in supply chains under integration, with 5 large country pilots underway, together accounting for 30% of global delivery.
- **More connected:** ID systems for over 80 million beneficiaries being integrated to simplify enrolment and deduplication.
- **More aligned:** One shared performance appraisal now covers double-hatted Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators.
- **More joined-up:** RC/HC offices co-located in 57% of operations, with target raised for 2026.
- **Forward-looking:** Joint humanitarian-development transition strategies agreed for 8 country settings.

considered investment in real change is sometimes required to bring success, and it is this that distinguishes strategic strengthening of the United Nations from a straightforward exercise in cost-cutting and austerity. UN80 is the former, and decidedly not the latter.

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## NEW DELIVERY MODELS ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND TESTED

**48. Under Workstream 3, I have underlined that the ultimate test of the UN80 Initiative is impact for the people served by the United Nations.** This is why several work packages are focused on the development, testing and scaling of improved delivery models across the pillars of the Charter.

**49. In humanitarian action, UN80 is advancing qualitative operational change.** The UN's unique humanitarian system is being stretched to breaking point as demand for its assistance skyrockets and resources available to it plummet. The New Humanitarian Compact cannot by itself resolve the acute pressures facing humanitarian action, but it can help the system use its capacities more coherently and effectively to save lives. This includes major simplification of planning processes, clarification of roles and responsibilities and strengthened humanitarian diplomacy. The New Humanitarian Compact also focuses on integrating supply chains through coordinated global procurement of core relief items and operational support items; optimized global logistics for international transport and warehousing; and harmonized in-country logistics for last-mile delivery. Together, these will enable all agencies to draw on shared services led by those best placed to provide them, reducing duplication and making better use of comparative advantages.

**50. A portfolio of humanitarian data initiatives will connect previously fragmented work on core datasets, platforms, standards, capacities, and financing in a more joined-up approach.** The Humanitarian Data Collaborative, for example, will help identify emerging needs earlier, target assistance with greater precision and reduce fragmentation in data use. Agencies are also advancing interoperability across their beneficiary identity management systems to reduce duplication. The New Humanitarian Compact is now being piloted in five crisis settings (Afghanistan, Haiti, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia and Sudan). The real test will be whether the changes take hold there and, then, whether they can be adapted and scaled in other contexts.

**51. The Shared Platform Initiative complements this effort** by helping Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators bring teams together around shared priorities, performance expectations and accountability, rather than working in parallel processes.

**52. In the peace and security pillar, the pending peace operations review will affirm the central priority of peacemaking and prevention and build on the strengthening of our peacebuilding instruments** as approved in the revised 2026 UN programme budget. The review will present recommendations in response to the pressing question that multiplying, entrenched conflicts inevitably pose to the UN: how should the system's established toolbox adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of conflict and the deteriorating global peace and security landscape? Geopolitical divides have created a sense of impunity among violators of international law, parties to conflict and their external supporters, which represents a considerable obstacle to United Nations prevention and mediation efforts. However, maintaining peace and preventing or ending wars is a defining feature of the UN's mission and that is the motivation for the review.

**53. The large-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operations that have characterized UN peace operations in past decades depend on a combination of contextual circumstances for their success**, including political support, national consent and appropriate security arrangements. It is uncertain whether those circumstances are widely present. At the same time, the evolving conflict landscape, marked by the military use of drones and artificial intelligence, the resurgence of interstate conflict, the regionalization of intrastate conflict, the burgeoning presence of transnational crime organizations, the renewed nuclear threat and the widespread violation of Charter obligations, brings the need and opportunity for a reset of the peace and security toolbox for the current era. This may require different approaches and priorities in the deployment of existing and new tools.

**54. Peacekeeping missions, with more focused mandates, should be deployed only where peace agreements or at least robust ceasefires are in place.** The review will outline options for a more flexible UN peace operations architecture, including the delegation of programmatic tasks to best-placed system entities alongside associated resources, to reduce coordination challenges and facilitate mission transitions.

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## REVIEWING PEACE OPERATIONS UNDER STRAIN

- **More state-based armed conflict:** Over 60 state-based armed conflicts in 2024.
- **Fewer peacekeepers:** 60% reduction in deployed troops and police in UN peace operations since 2015-peak.
- **More realignments:** UN peacekeeping budgets reduced by over \$650M for 2026/27, excluding new mandates.
- **Peace operations review:** 45+ Member States and 20+ civil society organizations contributed inputs.

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## COUNTRY AND REGIONAL SUPPORT TO BE RECALIBRATED

- **Concentrated delivery:** Over 70% of delivery concentrated in 28 of 162 countries.
- **Fragmented presence:** On average, over 20 entities per country; Only 7 entities present in 130 countries or more.
- **Dispersed regional footprint:** 240+ regional offices spread across five major regions.
- **Limited pooled funding:** Less than 9% of UN system revenue was pooled in 2025, versus the 30% Funding Compact target.
- **Improvements proposed:** SG's 2026 QCPR Report proposes reconfigurations and improvements.
- **More expertise on demand:** Pilot underway with new expertise catalogue, access protocols and arrangements.
- **Joined-up knowledge:** Joint Knowledge Hubs being piloted for 3 initial policy themes to integrate over 90 potentially overlapping mechanisms.

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# 25

UN system organizations will make their expertise more easily available on-demand to better assist reconfigured UN country teams and the governments they support

**55. Several conflict situations might require Security Council-authorized peace enforcement operations** led by regional and subregional organizations or multinational forces, with well-defined mandates, including full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and accountability to the Security Council.

**56. The review will also include a set of more flexible and updated approaches for the area covered by Special Political Missions,** taking advantage of a diverse range of instruments, including, among others, multidimensional Special Political Missions, Special and Personal Envoys and Regional Offices. The good offices of the Secretary-General will also be permanently available.

57. It will be for the General Assembly and the Security Council to decide how to take relevant proposals forward.

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## COUNTRY AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING REDESIGNED FOR GREATER IMPACT

**58. With the 2030 Agenda less than five years from its deadline and far too many SDGs off track, it is urgent to ensure that support for Member States' sustainable development operates optimally.**

In recognition of this, UN80 has given particular importance to the reconfiguration of UN Country Teams and the recalibration of the Resident Coordinator system, backed up by a reset of the regional architecture. The idea is to build on the United Nations development system reform adopted in 2018 and further strengthen its ambition and impact at country level. The work undertaken in these areas forms an important part of the report on the implementation of the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development, following which more specific and detailed information on implementation will be provided later in the year. The aim is to move towards more contextualized, tailored country footprints with clear criteria for presence and composition, as requested by General Assembly resolution 72/279, and regional support leveraging its full potential. It is to ensure that country and regional arrangements are shaped by country priorities and needs, and effective mandate delivery, rather than by institutional inheritance alone.

**59. Underpinning these efforts is work that would make system-wide expertise and knowledge more easily and quickly accessible to governments and country teams,** taking advantage of the Resident Coordinator system, in line with the General Assembly resolution cited above. An expertise-on-demand mechanism is

under development, consisting of a common catalogue of available expertise, clear access protocols and standardized administrative arrangements, building on the reforms of country teams that Member States have previously agreed. Selected country teams are expected to test this mechanism starting in June, with the support of the Joint SDG Fund. This is a first step towards broader operationalization of a well-supported and demand-driven mechanism to engage UN system expertise in response to specific country needs.

**60. Joint knowledge hubs are being developed to pool thematic knowledge and analysis on global priority areas.** The first hubs will focus on trade and regional integration, productive transformation, and strategic foresight; climate change and science, technology and innovation are under consideration for a subsequent phase. Relevant and easily accessible knowledge networks are critical elements of UN system responses.


**61. The test of success will be eminently practical:** Whether Member States – from small island developing States, landlocked developing countries, least developed countries, to middle-income countries and countries in complex settings – can benefit from the right support at the right time, and whether support is more coherent, responsive and better connected to national priorities and SDGs.

## SHARED SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY AND DATA ARE BECOMING SYSTEM-WIDE ENABLERS

**62. Each pillar of the United Nations depends upon the provision of effective support services.** For too long, many of these have been organized on an entity-by-entity basis, with consequences for efficiency, quality and transparency. Shared services, common back-offices and common premises have been a long-term aspiration but have been difficult to realize. A global feasibility study has already pointed to the potential gains from them, and UN80 provides the opportunity for a breakthrough, building on the consolidation of administrative services in the Secretariat and extending shared services across the entire UN system. The Unified Services Roadmap is turning potential into concrete commitments. It brings previously separate efficiency tracks into a single framework, including High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) far-reaching efficiency initiatives, Business Innovation Group (BIG)-led global shared services, common premises and common back offices. It covers procurement and supply chain, finance, information and

### 65% increase in efficiencies in 2025

Efficiencies in the UN development system




## UNIFIED SERVICES ROADMAP: MOVING FROM IDEA TO SCALE

- **\$981M in efficiencies** reported across the UN development system entities in 2025, up 65% from 2024.
- **17 administrative service lines** examined for potential changes and shared approaches.
- **20-80% potential efficiencies** identified in select services, if shared globally or outsourced.
- **5 largest entities** advancing supply chain integration.
- **56 countries** identified with highest common back-office potential.

### Shared approaches can improve both support operations and programme delivery across a \$66B base

Estimated \$66B UN system delivery, 2024



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# 26

UN system entities committed to make their public data and statistics available together in a new UN System Data Commons in one place by September

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## TECH AND DATA AS SHARED ENABLERS OF IMPACT

- **New baseline:** ICT baseline identified ~\$2.5B in core ICT spending and 9,000 personnel across 28 UN organizations.
- **Digital potential:** Only 14% of UN organizations report high or very high digital maturity.
- **Sharing potential:** Less than 10% of ICT spending delivered via shared providers, while core ICT services identified as broadly similar across entities.
- **Efficiencies:** 80% lower cost per user where cybersecurity services are already shared.
- **More efficient and better:** 90% reduction in time from idea to prototype with AI-assisted application development, including for new mandate citation management tool.
- **Accelerating joint solutions:** New Technology Accelerator Platform (TAP) to scale system-wide solutions for AI-assisted conferencing and translation, expertise-on-demand platform, and digital IDs for >120,000 staff and 80 million beneficiaries in phase 1.

communications technology, logistics, human resources and administration. The roadmap establishes a dual model, with targeted consolidation of services where scale and standardization deliver the greatest gains, and a marketplace where diverse solutions better meet operational needs.

**63. The Roadmap also connects global and country-level efficiencies.** Location-independent services will be delivered through global shared approaches based on the global feasibility study, while location-dependent services will be provided primarily through common country back-offices and platforms. This distinction matters because it allows the system to reduce duplication without imposing a single model for all services or contexts. A UN System Services Hub has been launched, providing one-stop access to 20 operational services, including travel, engineering, and fleet management. A reporting process and dashboard are being developed to track implementation, strengthen transparency and enable evidence-based decisions across the full Roadmap.

**64. Technology and data are being approached from a similar perspective and with the same discipline.** Their critical role as powerful enablers of mandate delivery is clear, but they remain fragmented across entities and platforms. A system-wide ICT baseline survey has identified opportunities for shared core services to be developed through phased expansion. Work is also underway on several system-wide software contracts to secure better terms and reduce costs. The Technology Accelerator Platform is being developed to support common technology solutions and capabilities in selected areas, including AI-assisted translation and conferencing, expertise-on-demand and common digital identity.

**65. The UN System Data Commons is intended to federate the wealth of data and statistics already available across the United Nations system** on a single platform to be launched by September, making them easier to find, compare and use. Twenty-six United Nations entities have already committed to this exercise. In a second phase, work will address joint management and modernization of the way data is collected and processed. In humanitarian settings, related initiatives, including the Humanitarian Data Collaborative, shared beneficiary data interoperability, deeper public-private data collaboration and pooled funding, can help leverage data as an enabler of impact. As these tools move forward, interoperability, cybersecurity, data protection and business continuity will be essential considerations in implementation.

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## HORIZONTAL COORDINATION IS BEING STRENGTHENED

**66. The imperative of better horizontal coordination is also being tackled within the same reform logic:** institutional arrangements and working practices should contribute directly to mandate delivery, not add avoidable coordination burdens. I have established the Human Rights Group, charged with strengthening system-wide coordination of the human rights dimension of policies and activities. Senior management coordination forums, inter-agency mechanisms and task forces are also under assessment. The purpose is to ensure that cross-cutting issues are handled through arrangements that clarify responsibility, share information, support coherent action across pillars and help the system deliver on mandates more effectively.

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## OTHER STRUCTURAL PROPOSALS ARE ADVANCING THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE PATHWAYS

**67. From the inception of UN80, the question of structural changes to United Nations entities has attracted considerable attention.** The view that the system would benefit from structural reorganization is widely held, yet advancing the relatively few specific proposals I put forward in the framework of the Initiative has been arduous. Tellingly, the open invitation to Member States to table additional suggestions for structural changes has generated no formal response to date.

**68. There are obvious reasons why structural change of this type is difficult: political sensitivities and vested interests are present;** bureaucratic inertia and defensiveness are significant; fears of disruption are real; and the need to protect agreed mandates is understood. In the light of these circumstances, my approach has been carefully considered. It has been to call for a thorough assessment of the potential benefits of a merger between UNDP and UNOPS to create a stronger policy and operational engine for sustainable development, and a corresponding assessment of the potential benefits of a merger between UNFPA and UN Women and their respective mandates to create a unified voice and a more powerful platform on gender equality and the rights of women, girls and youth. It has been to take a decision in 2026 to transition UNAIDS and mainstream its capacity and expertise into relevant development system entities to protect the HIV response.

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## IMPROVING INTERNAL COORDINATION PROCESSES

- **More joined-up:** UN Human Rights Group to focus and realign fragmented coordination efforts.
- **Strategic assessment:** intended to review senior management coordination; over 200 inter-agency mechanisms and task forces also under review.

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# 7

UN80 proposals to assess benefits from potential structural changes and consolidations

**69. Work is well advanced in the process of consolidating the United Nations' fragmented training and research capacities into two dedicated pillars**, one for training and one for research, complemented by a system-wide coordination mechanism co-led by UNU and UNITAR. The UN System Staff College would merge into UNITAR, creating a single institutional hub for UN system staff development and Member State capacity-building. The UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) would be integrated as a new research institute of UNU, thereby aligning UNRISD's social development research mandate with UNU's broader research strategy. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) would be integrated into UNODC, while preserving its research independence, to better connect work on crime prevention, criminal justice and related areas.

**70. Another area under consideration relates to the United Nations system's activities on the environment.** A process of analysis in four areas – science, governance, coordination and implementation – is nearing completion. This exercise explores options to strengthen multilateral environmental governance, including through efforts to facilitate cooperation among Multilateral Environmental Agreements. It also considers how to enhance United Nations system-wide coordination on the environment for more impactful delivery, while strengthening implementation so that it is more closely connected to the real economy. This will be the basis of an assessment to be presented to me by June, following which an information brief will be shared with Member States.

**71. Clear processes have been established to examine these questions in a transparent and orderly manner.** Full information on the merits, or otherwise, of these processes has to be made available to Member States, initially through baseline "As-Is" reports on the current situation and then through joint assessments of possible mergers themselves. It has proven in some instances challenging to provide this joint information and analysis, but this does not invalidate the approach. In all cases, applicable rules and procedures have been respected and the boards of the entities concerned consulted.

**72. At the moment of writing, there is good reason to expect that the decision on the transition of UNAIDS and the consolidation of training and research capacities will be submitted to the competent UN and intergovernmental organs as anticipated.** Work is moving steadily, including through a dedicated Working Group established by the UNAIDS Programme Coordination Board.

**73. A joint assessment of the potential merger of UNFPA and UN Women has been presented to Member States,** including the boards, and to myself. Further work still needs to be done in relation to the preparation of the joint assessment of the **potential merger of UNDP and UNOPS.**

74. In the light of the evolution of these processes, and the guidance and questions they generate, I will formulate and present to the General Assembly the decision points I consider appropriate.

# A Call to Member States

**75. The UN80 Initiative now enters its decisive phase. The past year has yielded substantial results, but the true balance of achievement lies in the months ahead.**

**76. Its realization will depend on an intensification of Member State engagement.** They will need to take decisions where proposals are ready; provide direction in ongoing design processes; offer support for several system-wide solutions, including through responsible funding choices; and exercise their governance prerogatives in ways that are in line with UN80 objectives.

**77. In turn, I commit the Secretariat to provide the necessary analysis, information and transition planning required for sound decision-making.** But ultimately, UN80 is a Member State-driven Initiative and its key outcomes will depend on Member State action. This is the context in which I address six calls to Member States on issues that can be fundamental to the success of UN80.

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## 1 USE RESOLUTION 80/251 AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL

**78. First, I call on Member States to seize fully the opportunity offered by resolution 80/251 on mandates. That means using it as a strategic governance tool along the chain of activity from mandate creation to review.** Member States now have in their hands the means to make the UN system operate at higher levels of transparency, efficiency, coherence and accountability for results. That will preserve Member States' full prerogatives as owners of mandates and empower them to be better informed and effective custodians of them. Used well, resolution 80/251 can help Member States improve the alignment between intergovernmental decisions, implementation responsibilities, resources and results. It can also help identify overlap, reduce avoidable reporting and meeting burdens, clarify responsibilities and create better conditions for review, adjustment or retirement of mandates. I reiterate the availability of the Secretariat to fully support this effort.

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## 2 GIVE DIRECTION ON COUNTRY AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

**79. Second, I call on Member States to give clear direction for the next phase of reconfiguring UN country teams and resetting regional arrangements,** building on previous guidance of relevant General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions. The objective is to offer Member States UN responses at scale, through easier and quicker access to cohesive support from entities across all pillars, whether resident or non-resident. The diversity of national conditions reflects the inadequacy of a one-size-fits-all formula. A key lesson from previous reforms is the need for clear intergovernmental guidance on expectations for implementation, and to ensure adequate follow-up by the relevant UN entities.

**80. I also call on Member States to provide adequate funding for a recalibrated Resident Coordinator system,** to enable it to fully deliver on its commitments, in line with resolution 72/279. It plays a critical role for the cohesive, effective and efficient UN system that Member States call for.

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### 3 BACK SHARED SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY AND DATA TO IMPROVE DELIVERY

**81. Third, I call on Member States to back the development, at scale, of system-wide shared services and critical common enablers, notably technology and data.** Where these can demonstrably improve quality, efficiency, transparency and delivery, they should become the default approach, with exceptions only where mandates or operating conditions clearly justify them.

**82. Reform processes inevitably face resistance from entrenched interests. Member State direction will be decisive to overcome this.** Governing bodies can help move the system from pilots to scale by encouraging adoption of joint responses and common solutions, requiring transparent service standards and costs, supporting interoperability and data governance, and asking entities to justify duplication where shared approaches would appear better placed to deliver better value and stronger results.

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### 4 CONSIDER STRUCTURAL PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS

**83. Fourth, I call on Member States to consider carefully the relevant proposals for entity mergers, consolidation and transition on their merits, through the applicable rules and procedures.** Many considerations will influence these decisions, and each process has its own complexities and specificities. The question common to them all is whether the structural changes proposed will promote already agreed objectives, protect and advance existing mandates and improve impact.

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### 5 ALIGN FUNDING PRACTICES WITH UN80 OBJECTIVES

**84. Fifth, I call on Member States to align funding practices, where appropriate, with the objectives of UN80.** Funding choices shape institutional behaviour. They can either support coherence, joint effort and accountability for results, or unintentionally reinforce fragmentation, parallel delivery and inter-entity competition. UN80 is therefore examining how core and pooled funding can be made a more attractive option for donors, how UN system results can be made more visible, and how donors can direct resources with greater confidence to activities that demonstrate real impact.

**85. This is distinct from the bedrock responsibility of all Member States to pay their regular assessed contributions in full and on time.** I call on Member States to do so, without conditions or delay. UN80 can improve the way the United Nations performs, but it cannot substitute for, or compensate for, failure to honour that basic treaty obligation.

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### 6 EXERCISE GOVERNANCE COHERENTLY ACROSS THE UN SYSTEM

**86. Sixth, I call on Member States to apply the objectives of UN80 coherently across the United Nations system.** Fully respecting the authority of the General Assembly, many of the decisions related to different areas of competence that will determine the success of UN80 will be taken across different intergovernmental organs. My own experience as Head of Government has shown me that whole-of-government positions are not easy to secure. That makes consistency more important, not less.

# Conclusion: Shared Responsibility for Delivery

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## DISCIPLINE IN IMPLEMENTATION

**87. From this moment until the end of the year, Member States, the Secretariat and the wider UN system have shared responsibility for the final delivery of UN80.** The initiative has been conducted to this point with full attention to transparency and consultation. That means that clear pathways to decision-making have been established, with timelines. But the task is not complete.

**88. The Secretariat must now intensify its efforts towards achieving decisions that are specific, concrete and backed by the analysis required for Member States to be confident that those decisions are properly informed.** Decisions should not be rushed or forced and need to garner the widest possible base of support. Where additional design work is required, it will be done. Accordingly, dedicated Secretary-General reports will be published in each case where an intergovernmental decision is anticipated. A total of 19 such reports is expected. In those cases where action is to be taken under my own authority, information briefs will also be published so that Member States can have a complete view of the overall UN80 delivery. Twenty such briefs are planned. This approach is designed to preserve trust and momentum. It helps maintain the integrity of the overall initiative by showing how separate work packages connect and contribute to the overarching logic of reform.

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## THE COST OF INACTION

**89. The level of Member State engagement in the UN80 Initiative has been remarkable and confirms that they see in the Initiative a necessary and appropriate response to the challenges that the UN faces.** Inaction in the face of those challenges would have been a mistake and a failure of responsibility. The major political and technical investment by Member States in UN80 since March 2025 now needs to be taken to its most impactful conclusion.

**90. Decision-making becomes more demanding as general deliberations give way to specific options.** Those motivated by convenience and inertia may opt for hedging, postponing or avoiding tough issues. That would come at a high cost. The real choice is between planned reform and externally imposed change, rather than between reform and the status quo.

**91. The opportunities carefully constructed over the past year could slip away and the moment could be lost.** Our shared responsibility is to make sure that does not happen.

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## BEYOND 2026

**92. I have made clear repeatedly that I am committed to delivering UN80 outcomes until the last day of my mandate.** With that determination reciprocated by Member States by year's end, the United Nations can be better placed to face the future. This does not mean that the work will not continue, or that the process of change at the UN will stop then. But it will be for Member States, together with the next Secretary-General, to decide what comes next.

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## THE CHARTER REMAINS THE FOUNDATION

**93. Important as reform through the UN80 Initiative, and whatever might follow it, can be, other factors will determine even more strongly the future direction of multilateralism.** The most efficient, streamlined, relevant and responsive United Nations system will only have the impact that the world needs if there is clear commitment, in practice, to the purposes, principles and obligations set out in the UN Charter. Member States that respect international law and human rights, that recognize that global challenges have no durable solutions without international cooperation, that summon the common purpose of solidarity in forging a better future and finance the system fully and predictably are the foundation of the UN we want. Rather than a utopian dream, this is about fulfilling the minimum voluntarily assumed obligations as Members of the UN. They must be respected.

## SOURCES AND NOTES

### PAGE 5

Sources: United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2025; World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, April 2026; OECD, Preliminary Official Development Assistance Statistics for 2025, April 2026.

### PAGE 6

Sources: UCDP/PRI0, 2025; United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2025; WMO, State of the Global Climate 2025; OECD, Preliminary Official Development Assistance Statistics for 2025, April 2026; OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2026.

Notes: ODA figures refer to official development assistance from DAC donors. Conflict data refer to state-based armed conflicts.

### PAGE 7

Sources: UN CEB Financial Statistics, 2026; United Nations Secretariat assessed contribution data; Staff separation estimates based on UNJSPF participant data, April 2026; OECD, Preliminary Official Development Assistance Statistics for 2025, April 2026.

Notes: Core funding includes assessed and voluntary core funding. Arrears combine regular budget and peacekeeping assessed contributions. 2024\* was the final year of the 2022-2024 triennial scale period. Peacekeeping assessments were issued for six months only, so the 2024 figure is not directly comparable with years reflecting a full year of assessments. Staff changes are anonymized and estimates only.

### PAGE 8

Sources: UN DESA, World Population Prospects; Secretary-General's Report of the Mandate Implementation Review, 2025.

### PAGE 9

Sources: Secretary-General's Report of the Mandate Implementation Review, 2025; UN Digital Library, 2026; Country Configuration analysis, UN80 Work Package 5; UN System ICT Baseline 2026, UN80 Work Package 15.

Notes: Meeting and report figures refer to Secretariat-serviced intergovernmental processes only.

### PAGE 13

Sources: Analysis based on UN80 Comprehensive Guide, Progress and Next Steps, April 2026; UN General Assembly resolution 80/242 and related 2026 programme budget documentation for staff position changes.

### PAGE 14

Sources: Secretariat efficiencies materials, UN80 Work Package 31; General Assembly resolution 80/242 and related 2026 programme budget documentation, as well as 2027 documentation; UN system survey, May 2026.

### PAGE 15

Sources: UN Proposed programme budget 2027, UN80 Work Package 31; UN Mandate Registry, mandates.un.org; Ad Hoc Working Group, Mandate Implementation Review, A/RES/80/251.

### PAGE 16

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### PAGE 17

Sources: UCDP/PRI0, 2025; United Nations Department of Peace Operations, uniformed personnel data, 2026; Peacekeeping budget documentation for 2026/27.

### PAGE 18

Sources: UN80 Country Configuration analysis, Work Package 5; UN80 Regional Reset analysis, Work Package 6; UN CEB Financial Statistics; 2026 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the QCPR: Addendum Funding Report; UN80 Expertise-on-Demand materials, Work Package 8; UN80 Joint Knowledge Hubs materials, Work Package 7.

### PAGE 19

Sources: 2026 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the QCPR; UNSDG Business Innovation Group, 2026; Unified Services Roadmap analysis, Work Package 14; Estimates based on UN CEB Financial Statistics for 2024.

### PAGE 20

Sources: UN System Data Commons materials, UN80 Work Package 16; UN System ICT Baseline 2026, UN80 Work Package 15; Technology Accelerator Platform business needs survey, February 2026, UN80 Work Package 15.

### PAGE 21

Sources: UN Human Rights Group terms of reference, 2026; Coordination mechanism mapping, UN80 Work Package 10; UN80 Comprehensive Guide, April 2026.

## ANNEX: COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO UN80 INITIATIVE WORK PACKAGES

The Comprehensive Guide of April 2026, which serves as annex to this report, brings together one-page summaries of all work packages that together make up the UN80 Initiative Action Plan across workstreams one, two and three. Its purpose is to provide Member States with a clear and practical overview of where work packages stand and the pathways to decision-making. Each one-page summary provides a concise snapshot per work package in a standardized format:

- Objective of the work package(s);
- How this objective is to be achieved;
- Progress made;
- Next steps; and
- Forward pathways to decisions.

The summaries give details of what decisions are expected to be taken, by whom, through which processes, and on what indicative timelines. They also set out further products to be shared with Member States.

The Comprehensive Guide is available for download here:

